The Bible is neither a science textbook nor a philosophy manual. It uses ancient cosmology and phenomenological language. A-T Philosophy gives us a proper metaphysical understanding of how the world operates in relation to God in light of creation ex-nihilo and God as being itself. Numerous passages describe both God and Jesus as the creator and sustainer of all things.
Depending on how words are defined you might want to say God intervenes in nature but A-T philosophy rejects this as an external meddler. That is what “intervention” conjures and that is what is objected to. God is the sustaining cause of all being. When God performs a supernatural miracle, he acts from within nature, elevating it to a higher power. He does not violate natural law which many A-T’s think is metaphysically impossible. A better word is suspending natural law and this ties into how laws of nature are understood from the get go. If you want to call that “intervening” I won’t argue against but nature depends on God at every instant. You can’t have the physical world without God but you can have God without the physical world. So asking about God vs evolution is the wrong question in my mind. It is not a question of God vs evolution. There is no either or here. The only proper questions is: how did God choose to create us. That is a question science can shed a lot of light on.
A discussion on Miracles by Feser is appropriate: (Five Proofs)
What, then, is a miracle if not a violation of the laws of nature, and how could miracles occur if laws are metaphysically necessary? Ramelow sums up the Thomistic answer as follows:
What defines a miracle is not merely that it is an exception to what is natural (which would be true for defects as well), but that it elevates the nature of a thing to a power that cannot be accounted for by this nature. Unlike said defects, miracles are exceptions that are super-natural rather than sub-natural. As such, then, miracles are not violations of the laws of nature. Even though they would have to be called “physically impossible,’ yet they are not contrary to nature; rather, they are beyond.
Hence, it would be a sheer mistake to think that the difference between ordinary events and miracles is that whereas the former happen on their own, God causes the latter. The world is not like an airplane on autopilot, with God interfering from time to time to
perform a course correction. God is the ultimate cause of all things, the natural and preternatural as much as the miraculous. Indeed, as the arguments of his book show, it is the ordinary, natural course of things, and not miracles, which is the most direct evidence of God’s existence and action as First Cause. As Brian Davies writes:
Some people would say that God can intervene so as to bring it about
that changes occur in the world. On the classical theist’s account,
however, such changes cannot be literally thought of s divine interventions
since they and what preceded them are equally the creative
work of God.86
Davies goes on to quote Herbert McCabe, who says:
It is clear that God cannot interfere in the universe, not because he has
not the power but because, so to speak, he has too much. To interfere
you have to be an alternative to, or alongside, what you are interfering
with. If God is the cause of everything, there is nothing that he
is alongside.87
Davies adds: “You cannot intervene in what you are doing yourself.
And, say classical theists, God cannot literally intervene in his own
created order.”88
Like the term “violation”,the term “intervention” wrongly suggests
that a miracle is a kind of violent motion, as if God has to force
things to go in a certain direction. That would be a fitting characterization
if the world were a machine and God a machinist who ccasionally steps in to fine-tune it, but it is highly misleading given the conception of God and his relationship to the world argued for in this book. A better analogy might be to think of he world as music and God as the musician who is playing the music. Divine conservation of the ordinary, natural course of things is comparable to the musician’s playing the music according to the written score as he has it before his mind. God’s causing a miracle is comparable to the musician temporarily departing from the score, as in the sort of improvisation characteristic of jazz. The musician hardly has to force the music to go in some way it wasn’t already going; every note, including the written ones that precede and follow the improvised ones, is produced by him. Still, the improvisation definitely adds to the score something that wasn’t already there, just as, in Ramelow’s words, a miracle goes “beyond nature” and “elevat[es] it to a higher power”.
Discussion from Oderberg (Real Essentialism)
It is commonly thought that a miracle, if such were possible, would involve a breach of one or more laws of nature, thus reinforcing the idea that the laws are not metaphysically neces- sary. In other words, a miracle is usually thought to show that a law of nature might fail to hold. This, however, is the wrong way of conceiving of miracles. A miracle would not be a breach in the laws of the nature, but a suspension of the laws.
But if the state can choose to fail to enforce a law or else to revoke it altogether, why doesn’t God have the choice? Since the laws of nature are the laws of natures, for God to interfere with an operative law would by that very fact involve God’s preventing natures from operating according to what they are, which is not a mere semantic impossibility but a fundamental metaphysical one. God is bound by the natures He creates as much as by the laws of logic, which, as I have claimed, are but a species of essentialist necessity. He could, of course, annihilate the natures he has created and replace them with new ones that operated according to different laws: He could, perhaps,35 replace all current organisms with new kinds of organism that could rise from the dead according to a law of reverse entropy that replaced the current thermodynamical law. That is not, however, the same as preserving the natures that do exist but frustrating their operation according to the current laws. For the current laws simply describe how the natures that do exist must operate. Why couldn’t God, say, prevent salt from dissolving in water by a momentary interference, without annihilating the natures of salt and water? But then He would have to change the nature of something else – space, time, the atmosphere, or something else involved in normal dissolution – and to change the nature of a thing is to annihilate it altogether, whether or not it be replaced by some other kind of thing with a different nature. I conclude that the possibility of miracles does not refute necessitarianism about the laws of nature.
Vinnie