Primary and Secondary Causes, God through (not vs) Nature, and Gaps are scraps. (Aristotle and Aquinas and Cosmological arguments)

[mitchellmckain (Scientist and Christian)]

@Vinnie

What is a universe and what is a law of nature? For me a law of nature is simply “a shorthand description of the way material substances will tend to operate given their natures.” A law of nature is just a description of the potentiality of material objects.

For me as a physicist there is no distinction because I think the laws of nature are basically just the geometry of space-time. The laws of nature are just the form of the universe itself.

@Vinnie

The cool thing about the prime mover argument and other proofs used by Feser and other Thomists is that that the divine attributes are part of the package. They extend naturally from the arguments. So whether you call it God or “Universe” or “Kablombah”, the prime mover will have the properties of the classical definition of God.

I asked about your meaning of “prime mover” in the other thread and now a search of the phrase “prime mover argument” links it to the “unmoved mover” of Aristotle.

I do not think any attributes of God come from the argument. In Hawkings’ “Brief History of Time” (or its sequel), the prime mover was just a quantum fluctuation. Thus I think these attributes are really just a product of other premises added to the argument.

@Vinnie

I think the issue is that you may be describing God as creating countless prime movers of which there can only be one.

I think this is incorrect because it runs rough shod over the complexities of causality and points to the problem with this phrase “prime mover” as opposed to “uncaused cause.” Let me clarify by distinguishing the difference between two questions:

1. Why does anything exist at all?
2. Why has one particular thing or course of events happened rather than another?

The phrase “prime mover” suggests all change and movement has only one cause. Causality is more complex because most things have many different causes rather than only one. And while some of the causes may trace back to a uncaused cause, others may be traced back to events which are not determined by pre-existing conditions even though they only happen because pre-existing conditions allow it. Thus these events are contingent but not determined.

And we see this in both science and theology. In science there are countless numbers of quantum fluctuations with no determining cause which all contribute to change and movement in the universe. And in theology there is free will, which suggests we make our own choices not determined by other things – sure we have reasons for our choices but we choose those reasons ourselves.

To be sure, some people do not believe in free will and believe in predestination or determinism. But it is dishonest to close this question by inserting hidden premises assuming this into other arguments.

@Vinnie

From Aquinas we get the idea of Primary vs Secondary Causes. God is not an intervener in nature but the sustainer.

This recalls my responses in the other thread.

@mitchellmckain

@Theangeloffury

I’m aware of arguments as God being the sustainer of the universe

This is an argument to which I am opposed and I see no functional distinction from pantheism. It raises the question of whether God is unwilling or incapable of real creation – creating something that can stand on its own. And neither of these look viable to me – neither of these are a God which I can admire, neither are an authentic relationship.

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@mitchellmckain

Interestingly, this raises in my mind Aristotle’s four causes: material, formal, efficient, and final. I would say all of these apply to anything contingent. But none of these are the same as active dependence. Obviously creation implies God is the efficient and final cause of the universe. And I even have no problem with the idea of a passive dependence such as saying the material cause of the universe is some kind of emanation of God. No, my problem has to do with the formal cause only, claiming that God cannot create anything which cannot maintain its own existence by the nature God has given it. That looks to me like an unreasonable limitation upon God and to say this is what God has done looks indistinguishable from pan(en)theism to me.

This idea of God as sustainer in terms of material cause is pretty much the same as the question of contingency – that things only exist because of God. But in terms of formal cause, I object to the idea God cannot or would not be a real creator by making things which cannot exist on their own. The only additional thought I have now was that this idea of a sustainer in terms of material cause might give me some way of giving some meaning to the idea of God as “ground of being.” In which case, my objection to this idea is more about limiting God to such a role or even exaggerating its importance. Far far far more important to me is God’s role in a relationship of separate existences – Him and ourselves. This is the difference between theism and pantheism.