Reggie,
thank you for the article. It is indeed interesting and reminds me of an article in the most famous german science magazine, āSpektrumā, about a team of mathematicians who are researching on human consciousness. I think those studies are very interesting, but if they will provide anything further shall be seen. However, the position outlined in the article isnĀ“t inconsistent with what I wrote above. Irreducible materialism, as well as property dualism (rather my position) are both positions who can fit in this view. In the first one, consciousness is an irreducible, emergent phenomenon. Now, I myself am not a fan of this, because it has certain weaknesses:
Why do the atoms in my brain, but not in the brain of my dog, are able to let something emerge, that is able to reflect on the fact, that we are indeed made of atoms? (Feser on Raymond Tallis on Naturalism)
How can we account for all the people with consciousness, who also have a Hydrocephalus?
Also I feel like āemergingā is an intellectual pleasant way for the scientist to say āfill in the blankā. Of course, people like Bill Newsome hold a position like that and this is not an attempt to bash him, I understand him, when he says that there are probably many neuroscientists who would close their lab tomorrow, if it were apparent, that there is no way to understand this phenomenon through scientific (read: materialistic) methods. So, although I donĀ“t believe it will happen, the scientists should continue trying.
Property dualism is similar, with the difference, that the mental, consciousness phenomena, canĀ“t be reduced to material properties and are in a way seperated from it, but it needs the material reality to express themselves. Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers are property dualists. Thomism is similar.
The article describes the āsoulā, the mind as something that fits into both concepts. But I donĀ“t think anyone should try to draw a scientific concept of the afterlife from it. It depends on the presupposed worldview and there are certainly perspectives that see this as supporting evidence. What we can at least draw from it are further arguments against eliminative materialism (āevery mental process is an illusionā) from people like Rosenberg and the Churchlands.