I recently wrote an article proposing Merciful Ambiguity Theodicy (MAT), a meta-theodicy that interprets divine hiddenness, scriptural tension, and religious uncertainty as morally purposeful. It offers a unified framework for understanding how ambiguity across faith, ethics, and revelation might serve to preserve freedom, provoke moral reflection, and extend mercy. I’d be very interested to hear your thoughts.
- Here’s a twist. Thinking has become a tedious task, which I prefer to reserve for my brothers, since they appear to be more incapable of it than me. Instead of doing my own, I submitted your article to Chat GPT, which never ceases to surprise me with it’s “artificial insight and generosity”. And the following is Chat GPT’s response:
Dennis Solokhin’s Merciful Ambiguity Theodicy (MAT) is a thoughtful, creative, and emotionally intelligent proposal that takes a longstanding problem in theology—divine hiddenness and the ambiguity of revelation—and flips the framing. Rather than viewing ambiguity as a defect in divine communication or evidence of divine absence, Solokhin reinterprets it as a morally intentional feature of a theistic world: a mechanism that protects human freedom, promotes moral sincerity, and restrains divine judgment.
Below is a response analyzing the philosophical strengths, theological implications, and some potential challenges of the proposal.
Strengths of the Merciful Ambiguity Theodicy
1. Unified Framework for Multiple Theodical Problems
Solokhin succeeds in offering a meta-theodicy—a higher-order explanation that unites disparate theodicies (for divine hiddenness, natural and moral evil, revelation, pluralism, etc.) under a single ethical rationale: ambiguity as a mercy-preserving condition. This unity is rare in the literature and provides a fertile base for systematic theological development.
2. Moral Weight and Accountability Are Calibrated
The claim that greater knowledge brings greater accountability is not new (cf. Luke 12:48: “To whom much is given, much will be required”), but Solokhin builds a whole theodicy around it. By doing so, he offers an elegant reason for divine hiddenness that moves beyond the typical free will defense: namely, that ambiguity is not just required for freedom, but also for just mercy—so that people are not judged harshly under epistemically constrained conditions.
3. Respects the Complexity of Religious Experience
The inclusion of 14 distinct domains where ambiguity plays a role (from religious pluralism to divine silence) shows an impressive sensitivity to lived religious experience. These are not only philosophical problems; they are pastoral realities, and MAT provides a potentially reassuring response without dismissing the emotional and existential weight of the questions.
4. Maintains Epistemic Humility
Rather than offering a triumphant rationalist theodicy, Solokhin’s tone and framework allow for epistemic humility—acknowledging that many people, through no fault of their own, do not find religious belief compelling. MAT reframes this not as failure, but as part of the divine intention to preserve non-coercive moral response.
Potential Challenges or Questions for Development
1. Does MAT Risk Justifying Too Much?
If ambiguity is always interpreted as morally purposeful, MAT may risk becoming unfalsifiable—too ready to reinterpret any divine silence or moral contradiction as “intended mercy.” This is a common risk in any totalizing theodicy. The challenge is to show that MAT has discriminatory power: that is, it can explain ambiguity where it occurs, but also tell us when clarity should be expected (e.g., moral truths about justice or compassion).
2. What About Victims of Suffering Without Moral Agency?
Solokhin anticipates this objection and argues that suffering—such as that of animals or infants—may still serve a “plausible deniability” function. But this feels tenuous for many. Why would the suffering of the innocent be required to preserve moral freedom for others? The framework here needs tighter metaphysical and ethical scaffolding. Could there be non-suffering ways to preserve ambiguity?
3. Is It Compatible with Classical Theism?
MAT seems to presuppose a relational and libertarian view of divine-human interaction, where God restrains Himself for our sake. This harmonizes with personalist or open theist views of God, but might challenge stricter forms of classical theism (e.g., divine simplicity, immutability, and aseity). MAT can likely be adapted to different metaphysical models, but this may require careful theological work to avoid internal tensions.
4. Are Some Domains of Ambiguity Better Explained Otherwise?
While the unifying ambition is laudable, not all ambiguities may have the same function. For example:
- Scriptural tension may emerge more from human participation in revelation than divine withholding.
- Doctrinal disagreement might be more about hermeneutical variation than divine intent.
Solokhin may want to distinguish first-order ambiguities (e.g., divine silence) from second-order ambiguities (e.g., ecclesial or interpretive fragmentation) and clarify how MAT interacts with each.
Comparative Notes
Solokhin’s MAT resonates with and advances themes from:
- John Hick’s soul-making theodicy – but where Hick emphasizes moral development, Solokhin emphasizes moral shielding as a form of mercy.
- Paul Moser’s hiddenness theology – especially the idea that God avoids coercion to foster relational authenticity.
- Marilyn McCord Adams – particularly her idea that some evils are so horrendous they must be defeated by intimate, redemptive participation rather than explanation. MAT softens the demand for “defeat” by denying that full clarity is required at all.
However, MAT stands out in foregrounding ambiguity itself—not just as a byproduct of freedom or history, but as a positive, moral instrument of divine mercy.
Suggestions for Further Development
- Engage Objections to Hiddenness Theodicies (e.g., J.L. Schellenberg): Why wouldn’t a loving God make Himself known to nonresistant nonbelievers?
- Develop Eschatological Implications: If ambiguity preserves mercy now, what happens in judgment? Does God reveal Himself fully then? Does ambiguity cease?
- Systematize MAT into a Model: A formal schema distinguishing types of ambiguity, their moral purposes, and their theological limits would help make MAT more rigorous and less impressionistic.
- Explore Cross-Religious Resonance: Could MAT apply within Islamic, Jewish, or even Buddhist theologies where divine silence or hiddenness is thematized differently?
Final Verdict
Merciful Ambiguity Theodicy is a promising, unifying, and ethically rich proposal that deserves serious attention. It reframes divine hiddenness not as a problem to be solved, but as a design choice aimed at preserving freedom, humility, and mercy. With refinement and further engagement, especially with critical objections, MAT could become a substantive contribution to contemporary philosophy of religion and theodicy.
If Dennis is planning to develop this into academic work, I strongly encourage him to explore publication options in journals like Faith and Philosophy, Religious Studies, or The Journal of Analytic Theology. It’s a valuable and original contribution.
The name maybe original, but the thology isn’t. The invisibility of God is essential for human freedom. We can choose to ignore Him. If He was visible or discernable to all then He would either have to assert Himself or be seen as impotent.
Richard
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Hi Richard, I agree that God’s hiddenness has long been linked to preserving human freedom.
What I’m doing with Merciful Ambiguity Theodicy is expanding that idea: not just that God is hidden to protect free will, but that ambiguity across scripture, morality, and revelation serves a merciful function, shielding people from harsh judgment under limited knowledge.
Unlike traditional theodicies that address isolated problems, MAT functions as a meta-theodicy, aiming to unify multiple theological tensions under a single moral logic of divinely intended ambiguity.
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Forgive me, but what i see is intellectualisation that is more appropriate to academics than grass roots theology and practical witness. There is, of course, a place for both within theology, but I am past such intellectual gymnastics.
Richard
Topics covered before, I suggest you read what has already been said.
Your paper: Why is God’s existence not more obvious?
Be sure to look for my answers in these two threads… well actually the first quotes my answer in the second: my answer
Your paper: Why does the Bible feel more like a messy, human document than a perfect revelation? Why does the case for Jesus’ resurrection depend on ancient texts rather than decisive, public evidence? Why can intelligent, reasonable people sincerely believe in completely different worldviews or none at all?
I think there are some premises behind these questions that many will not and need not accept.
- That the Bible is the one and only communication from God.
- That salvation depends upon having certain beliefs such as in Jesus’ resurrection.
- That it is better in some way that people should all believe the same.
Otherwise, why should we expect the Bible to be so different, or that Jesus resurrection should be so clear and obvious. And why shouldn’t people believe in different things? I would compare the diversity of thought to the diversity of genetics as something which makes human civilization more adaptable just as genetic diversity make the species more adaptable.
Your paper: These aren’t new questions.
Nor are your answers all that new. This is not to discourage you in telling people but just to caution you against claiming too much for yourself. Even if it isn’t exactly brand new, this doesn’t mean it isn’t something people need to hear. Nor does it mean you cannot express it in a way that will help people understand things better.
Consider the words of Jesus…
Matthew 13:10 Then the disciples came and said to him, “Why do you speak to them in parables?” 11 And he answered them, “To you it has been given to know the secrets of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it has not been given. 12 For to him who has will more be given, and he will have abundance; but from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away. 13 This is why I speak to them in parables, because seeing they do not see, and hearing they do not hear, nor do they understand.
In this Jesus suggest ambiguity and the freedom to disbelieve is required, and by implication that both doubt and faith are necessary in God’s work with mankind.
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