My abandoned orphan “If a statement is true, then it should be accepted” came back with the suggestion that maybe it in itself is evidence for the existence of objective morality, and maybe it is even evidence for absolute standards (at least one, anyway)… or is that latter redundant.
I have no disagreement with you that God is love. I trust Him to be good, loving, fair, and just. And as I believe the Bible to be His Word, I trust what it says to be true because it is backed by His good authority (I don’t have space to defend all that here, but I don’t think that’s the root of our disagreement, anyway). The Bible gives me indication that your view of love is not the correct one, not God’s, and so I don’t hold to that view. Your answer so far has been to appeal to our desires about what we want to happen, but I don’t have reason to trust my desires about human’s ultimate destiny more than I have reason to trust God’s Word on that topic (“God is greater than our heart,” 1 John 3:19, and our hearts are “desperately wicked,” Jeremiah 17:9). Our main disagreement is that we have different ideas of what love is. You assume yours is correct, but do not justify why beyond intuition or preference (along the lines of “we just all know it, deep down”). Since I consider the Bible authoritative beyond whatever I “just know,” if I’m to be convinced of your view, then I would need justification beyond intuition, preference, or human desire.
To put it another way, and with a nod to the TAG argument (what this thread is supposedly about), if there is a God (and I know you believe there is), then He Himself would be the standard of what is good and evil, what love is.* Thus we would know love by knowing God, and we know God through His Word, the Bible. Therefore, the Bible is where we must go to determine love. As I don’t think your notion of love is Biblical, I am not inclined to accept it. If there is reason to see that it is the Biblical view, though, I am open to hearing that.
One final note: I know that you have mentioned some bad experiences in organized religion in your past, and, truly, I am sensitive to that. So please know that I have no intent to “beat you over the head” if our back-and-forth is bringing up some painful memories.
*By the way, the reason I brought up (one side of) Euthyphro’s dilemma was because you seemed to imply it when suggesting that God had to conform to a certain notion of love (evidently a notion independent of Him) in order to be good. But TAG demonstrates that I see Euthyphro’s dilemma as a false dilemma. Good is part of God’s nature – neither above Him nor below.
I’ve fallen behind on the individual replies. I’ll respond to @glipsnort and @Dale in summarized form here.
For the purposes of the TAG argument, since it is an existence proof, it only needs the existence of one objective, personal moral standard (recall that my working definition of personhood is something which has sufficiently many personal characteristics). The argument could allow for other nonpersonal morality to exist and still be valid.* Therefore, TAG loses no force if we focus only on morality that manifests in specialized instances (such as between two different people). Also, this particular discussion is not about whether or not morality is objective, so this post will proceed with the stated premise that the moral principles involved are objective.
So, for concreteness, assume that John has committed a moral wrong against Sally, an act which is wrong only because of some violated personal characteristic. That is, this act could in theory be committed with only 3 things in existence (John the offender, Sally the offended, and the moral standard). Since the moral standard is violated and is objective, then the wrongness of the act is not “part” of either John or Sally. The wrongness, and hence the personal characteristic which is violated, is part of the moral standard itself.
An alternative formulation might be easier to state. Since John’s act is wrong, then it goes against the moral standard. But now assume the moral standard does not possess the personal characteristics which are violated by the moral act. Then the act would not be transgressing the standard, but instead someone or something else (in this case, Sally). If the moral standard is not broken, then the act is not wrong by that standard. This contradicts our first assumption that John’s act was wrong. Thus, the moral standard must possess the personal characteristics.
There is another scenario I want to consider (since in the John and Sally example it might be tough to separate the personhood of Sally from that of the standard). Imagine that Jeanette harbors murderous thoughts in her heart toward someone else. This desire to murder is a moral wrong in and of itself, even if Jeanette never outwardly acts in any way on that impulse (and it is wrong regardless of the effect it would have Jeanette herself – for example, we can ignore the physical toll that bitterness has on a person’s body and this would still be wrong). Further, the moral nature of these thoughts is inherently personal. In this scenario, a personal moral wrong has been committed even though no “other person” was ever harmed (nor even Jeanette). Thus, no human is harmed, and yet a personal moral wrong has been committed. The only thing that was violated was a moral principle. I think this shows that the moral standard which is violated would then possess the personal characteristics inherent in this moral wrong.
Switching gears to another comment you made, Steve: You say that these notions are poorly defined (I presume you are talking about personhood). You’re not wrong; the definition is difficult to make rigorous. My approach has been to consider personhood as a collection of personal characteristics, namely, necessary components which culminate in a list of characteristics which are sufficient for their sum to be considered “personhood.” The TAG argument (probably) doesn’t need the definition to be complete, but rather some subset of personal characteristics are likely sufficient. While I might not be able to completely define personhood, but the argument doesn’t need a complete definition, either.
Further, my feeling is that this definition problem is inevitable when we talk about things so fundamental. In the same way that we all have circularity in our ultimate beliefs, we need circularity in definitions; you can’t define words without the use of other words, meaning some words are left undefined and are just considered “understood.” Where that circularity comes in is hard to nail down, but we might be butting up against it here.
*At risk of overcomplicating the discussion, let me say something about my personal belief which I am trying to avoid bringing into TAG unless necessary. I do believe that my original statement, “Moral acts can only be done to a being with personhood; I cannot commit moral wrongs against inanimate or lifeless ‘nonpersons’ ” is true. Similarly, I do believe that “morality cannot exist without personhood.” The reasons which anchor this belief (at least most proximate to the belief) are reasons I cannot include in TAG (namely, because all moral wrongs are committed against the person of God; including that reason would make TAG a circular argument – in the wrong way!). I don’t think there can be a moral wrong unless there is a being with personhood who does or could suffer harm or pain (physical, emotional, spiritual, or otherwise) from the act. This applies to acts committed against the environment, inanimate objects, and oneself, for ultimately I see these as offending God’s person. My leaning is that the personal aspect of morality is part and parcel with morality itself. If not for something personal, what distinguishes, say, destruction of nature or impersonal objects which is moral from that which isn’t? As a simplistic example, if I destroy a beautiful painting without permission, I have harmed the painter. But the painter could destroy the same painting and it would not be immoral to do so. I see the difference between them being inexorably linked to the personal aspect, and indeed I think the idea extends to all moral acts (though I am not defending that here). Nonetheless, since I think TAG has a way forward even for people who disagree with me on this point, I am trying to keep it out of the argument, at least for now.
I feel like we’re in 2010, I’m Hal and you’re Dr. Chandra.
I appreciate your sensitivity to my experience of fundamentalist and then damnationist spiritual abuse (frying pan, fire), but I’m used to it. Only in classic, via media, Anglicanism (Episcopalianism) has my blood actually run cold, and I gave up in despair.
So the psychotic behaviour of the God of Genesis is love? He explicitly murdered over two million people throughout the Bible, apparently mellowing with age, and that is love? Even the ten Satan murdered were at God’s command. Then there’s the hundreds of millions He drowned near the beginning and the billions He slaughters at the end, to make up for going progressively easy on us since the Flood. Two hundred million troops in the final battle. That’s all love? And that’s before we get in to the details of how He loves them all to death.
God’s judgment and justice are not incompatible with His love. So while the examples you cite are not in the “top ten” of His love’s expression (Jesus dying on the cross must be #1 on that list – it fulfilled both His boundless love and His perfect justice!), neither are they in conflict with love. Punishment, justice, judgment – these aren’t fun words to dwell on, but when they are executed in holiness, they are not unloving or unrighteous. I also think it’s worth noting that this judgment executed on earth does not necessarily indicate eternal punishment of those people; any or all of them may have repented and been saved for eternity, even if the earthly judgment (death) was still meted out.
That might raise eyebrows or cause you to scoff, perhaps. If so, then I emphasize that God, by virtue of the authority inherent in His position as Creator and Lord, is the one with the right to determine when such severe outcomes are necessary (and, yes, when they are loving and righteous). If He is God, then He defines what is good, right, and loving by His unchanging nature. We may not understand it, or we may even dislike it, but it His rightful place to make those decisions (Job 38-42, Romans 9:19-21), and it is His nature which determines “right” in the first place, anyway. He is infinitely wise and omniscient, and we are not even close to either, so it would be foolish for us to think that we could know better than He does what is the best course of action. In comparison to God, we simply don’t know what we’re talking about (Job 21:22, Isaiah 40:14, 1 Corinthians 2:16).
This isn’t to say that He executes justice without reasons that we can grasp; dozens of possible reasons are available with a quick internet search (“how is God’s justice loving?”), so I won’t write a thesis here duplicating it all. But one I want to highlight: not only is His justice righteous in its own right, it also brings about other, higher goods, such as increased wonder and reverence of God for those who witness His power and righteousness (Romans 9:22-23), and that is certainly a loving outcome.
I think this issue, understanding the coexistence God’s perfect love and His perfect justice, is an important one that many struggle with (and everyone questions at some point). What has helped me (and I’m still plumbing its depths) is to dwell on Jesus’ willingness to be the one to take on Himself the justice due to us (to me). His love demonstrated there, sufficient to eternally save even those who may have already received His earthly judgment in the examples you cited, reminds me that His justice does not cause Him to forget His love.
I don’t struggle with it all. If He exists He’s so powerful He grounds infinite nature and transcendent reality - Heaven - from eternity and is fully aware at all scales; immanent. He is big minded. Not petty minded. Not incompetent. Not in our helplessly deranged image. His only intervention in nature, above grounding it, is by and around Incarnation. Justice which does not obtain universal equality of outcome is injustice. Is human inadequacy. There is no thesis that makes obscene horror stories, that we made up - Earthly judgement - from Genesis to Revelation, just. You can write all you like, you will fail. You will blaspheme Love. God is not psychotic. There is no theodicy for being an arbitrary self righteous killer.
I don’t see God’s judgment described in the Bible (past, present, or future) as petty, incompetent, psychotic, arbitrary, or self-righteous. And I don’t believe that “universal equality of outcome” is the correct notion of justice.
…but you knew I was going to say that. I’ve (partially) defended my views already, but at this point I think we are just going to talk in circles. My summary position is that the notions you use of love, justice, and some related terms, are not ultimately the correct ones when discussing God’s dealings with His creation. God defines them, not us, and He is not accountable to what we would like Him to do, whatever our supposed reasons. So on one point, we almost agree: God needs no theodicy.
“You can write all you like, you will fail.” Then that seems to be a good signal for me to stop writing. 
Perhaps we can continue another time.
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We have objective evidence of God’s providential interventions “into nature” in the lives of his children on multiple occasions. They are not always easy or desired, but God is sovereign, and his M.O. is demonstrable even to the molecular level.
My apologies @chadrmangum, for reading ‘Chandra’ in your moniker. You’re a most level chap in the face of my… tactics. Please don’t stop. Not on my account. Our definitions, concepts, usages are utterly unreconcilable. Whatever is written about God in the Bible is absolute literal truth for you, it therefore defines love for you. No? Except where it’s metaphoric which changes nothing about His nature. If justice isn’t about restitution then it’s about vengeance. I will judge God if He judges me thus.
I think we are using some of our terms to refer to different things. For me, “moral principle” denotes a statement regarding what should or should not be done, said, thought, or desired. A “moral system” is any nonempty (and, probably, finite) set of moral principles (just one moral principle could define a moral system, or it could have thousands of moral principles). Thus there are several moral systems at play in any time and culture at one time. This will be important below.
“Morality doesn’t have to exist external to humanity in order to be justified.” The scope of the moral system is the major issue here. A moral system can only apply to those within its scope. You evidently want that system to encompass every human, but there is a problem: different humans have different ideas of what is moral and what isn’t, and therefore there is more than one moral system at play, even within one culture at one time. Thus, the problem of justifiability remains. How could Alice ever justify a certain moral principle or system to Bob who disagrees (and who thus uses a different moral system)? Alice would have to appeal to a moral standard that is outside of both of their systems. This same phenomenon would appear for every pair of people who disagree, and indeed even to any hypothetical or possible moral disagreement. As such, that standard must be external not just to Alice and Bob, but to every pair of humans, and therefore to the set of all humans. That standard is therefore objective. This is why justifiability does imply that morality exists external to humanity.
But further let me nuance the idea of “justifiability” that I have been using as there are implicitly two related but distinct notions. (Justifiability is different when discussed across times/cultures versus between individuals in the same time and same culture as one another.) Perhaps a more descriptive term for what I (usually) have meant would be “universal justifiability;” there are things that no person should ever do, so there is some justification for why it is always wrong for all people at all times in all cultures. Making a claim of universal justifiability can only be done if there is an external, objective standard because it must be applicable to all moral systems to be universal, and therefore cannot be properly contained in any of those systems (some systems might include a supporting “justificationary” moral principle, but as it applies to systems which don’t include it, it is external even to the systems that do happen to include it). Whatever moral principle universally justifies an action as right or wrong, that principle must exist externally to all of the systems it applies to. Being universal, it applies to all subjective systems, and so it must exist externally to all subjective systems. Therefore it is an objective principle. Thus there would be at least one objective moral principle, hence an objective moral system. And since this moral principle gives “the” reason justifying right and wrong for everyone at all times, it is part of the ultimate, objective moral system.
Evidently, your issue is that you reject universal justifiability since you say, “There is no requirement to justify a moral code outside of the society in which the morality exists.” While this statement gives up universal justifiability, you simultaneously make claims of justification between times and cultures when you say that child sacrifice to Molech is wrong, i.e. “No, I don’t think it is moral to sacrifice people to a god. I also think it is morally wrong to commit genocide.” You cannot have it both ways. And there is a further problem: even at a fixed time and in a fixed culture, there is not just one moral system in use. Different people in the same time and culture disagree. So is there any justifiability between those people? More on that in a moment.
To give up universal justifiability reduces one’s moral senses to sheer opinion. We would no longer be able to declare that anything is wrong—just that it isn’t currently our preference for behavior (or thoughts or words or desires). Moral declarations would be on the order of statements like “I like chocolate bars better than fruit snacks.” But you evidently believe that morality is more than just preference, or else you would not say that sacrifice to Molech is wrong, nor would you spend this amount of time debating something if we can both freely choose whatever we want to be true (would you expend considerable effort trying to convince me to like fruit snacks better than chocolate bars?). Thus, you (as do I, and as does everyone that I have ever met) believe in a sense of justifiability in morality that is more forceful than opinion, and which apparently applies to people who choose different moral systems than you do; your actions show me that you hold affirm universal justifiability. This sense does not square with the subjective morality view.
“Second, moral systems can exist within the human experience only and be justifiable because we are all humans.” You are stating that we do have a way to justify any moral system involving humans (apparently across times and cultures), which conflicts with your quote above. Further, this purports a higher level moral principle that morality can be justified between humans. Does this principle apply to all humans, even those using a different moral system? If so, if you simply declare that all humans must be subject to the subjective system, then that declaration is external to the subjectively determined moral system, and hence demonstrates the existence of an objective standard. (As I stated in a previous post, if one of the moral principles is “everyone has to abide by the other principles in this system,” then it only applies to those who are inside the system. The nature of morality is such that a person is capable of choosing whether or not they will recognize a certain system. If they reject a subjective system, then they are only subjectively wrong. If they reject an objective system, and the ultimate one which is justifiable to all people at all times, then they are objectively wrong, and in a serious way.)
You also say that we can justify morality by the fact that we are all humans. Apparently this means that all humans are answerable to the same morality by virtue of them being human. But this principle is itself a moral principle, and therefore in your view it is only of value if it enjoys common agreement. But that doesn’t seem to be what you mean when stating it.
“Morality doesn’t require complete agreement between everyone.” Exactly. In fact, we know that disagreements are real, current, and numerous. So we have to ask if there is any way to determine who is right or wrong in a moral disagreement. If we cannot, then we have total moral chaos where every act is equally moral with all other acts. If there is a way to decide, but only in certain times and cultures, then this is what I am calling (plain old) justifiability, and it doesn’t have any force to people who choose to reject it. If there is a way to decide that all people ought to recognize, then we have universal justifiability, which leads to an ultimate objective standard as explained. The important point is (universal) justifiability of morality, not whether someone agrees with it. A person can be wrong about something without agreeing that he/she is wrong.
One more note here. The defense that I am accustomed to hearing about subjective morality, and which seems similar to some of your defenses in our discussion, tends to be something like, “if society can be responsible and learn over time about what worked and what didn’t in the past, then we can improve morally as a human race.” This type of justification is circular, and not in the necessary way. It seeks to define the notion of morality through societal opinion, but simultaneously uses an already defined notion of what is good and what isn’t (this is the “bad” kind of circularity because, though it already has definitions of some fundamental notions, it seeks to define them anyway in a possibly different way). In the context of that sentence, words like “responsible,” “learn,” “what worked,” and “improve,” all rely on a standard (about what ought to be done or not done) which supersedes times and cultures, and thus would be objective.
As to the slavery question, making necessary distinctions is not “hemming and hawing about particulars.” The differences described in the slavery article are qualitative and relevant, not just particulars. To skim over those details is to ignore crucial information. And while on the topic, if you’re up for a bit longer read, I came across this sermon which has a lot to say about it:
Sermon: More than a Bondservant | Kevin DeYoung | URC (universityreformedchurch.org)
About 1 Samuel 15, I’ll tell you what I believe to be true, but I am not able to defend all of my claims here. I don’t have the space for that. I will also try to tie the question back into what is relevant for our main point, the existence or nonexistence of an objective, ultimate standard for morality. Yes, the Israelites were justified in carrying out what God commanded. God alone has the authority to judge and execute justice using whatever means He deems best. Molech was not the true God but an idol, so his commands do not carry divine authority. To follow Molech’s commands which break Yahweh’s is to commit an objective moral wrong. The difference is whether the one true God makes a genuine command, or if the hearer puts God’s authority behind words which are not actually God’s. There have been many instances when people have been confused about this, but that does not mean that a genuine command from the true God is not possible. As I believe the Israelites were truly commanded by God to do this in 1 Samuel 15 (and several other places in Scripture), then there is nothing inconsistent about my affirming them in striking down the Amalekites. Certainly you will ask how I know when someone is genuinely commanded by God, and I do not have a general answer that will apply to all situations. Trying to figure that out would take us very far from the topic of this thread.
I assume your point in bringing up this passage from 1 Samuel is to reveal supposed evil commanded by God in the Old Testament. But by what standard do you consider them evil? It is apparently an idea of our current cultural agreement about what is right and wrong. But this brings us back to square one with the original TAG argument. If there is a God, then by definition He is in authority over humanity. He could not be subject to our idea of morality; we would be subject to His. If you assume, as you do here, that God is answerable to our culture’s idea of right and wrong, you discount the very possibility of a real God existing. So you would be assuming the negation of the argument before starting it, which is not a fair starting point.
To summarize, subjective morality can be used to explain most of what we observe in everyday life, and that seems to be your motivation for holding to it, but everyday moral experiences aren’t in question here. Here we are asking if subjectively determined morality can be the ultimate standard, even across all of history. It breaks down when pushed to that extreme. The view (unintentionally) uses imprecision (fuzzy notions of what a moral system is and who a given system can apply to) and equivocation on key terms (with some definitions slipped in surreptitiously and used only implicitly) to mask internal incoherence. I urge you to reconsider (and eventually, hopefully, reject) it. Whether or not you find my words convincing, I thankfully am not the standard. God is. And I hope you will revisit that as a legitimate option.
Don’t worry, @Klax, I’m not stopping on your account. I’m stopping because we have come to a point where I think we have identified the (or a) root of our disagreement, and as you say, it is currently utterly unreconcilable. Sure, we could keep typing the same old things or trade off stating our views on all sorts of things (I don’t take 100% of the Bible literally – I try to take it literally where it intends to be taken that way, and not when it doesn’t intend it, with the elephant in the room being “well, when does it intend it?”; I don’t think justice is a dichotomy between restitution or vengeance; and I disagree that God is our equal, that we could judge Him as He judges us). But I don’t think we are really advancing toward agreement, nor even mutual learning, any longer. So let me say cheers to you. Maybe we can pick it up at a later date.
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A worthy adversary, enemy mine : )
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I observe that morality must exist whenever humans interact with one another. There’s no way around morality. If there was just one human on an otherwise empty planet then there wouldn’t be morality because there wouldn’t be humans interacting with one another. So morality does apply to all humans who interact with one another, by definition.
No, she wouldn’t She could appeal to the subjective inner sense of morality that exists in the vast majority of people.
I reject the claim that we have access to an external objective morality. I have yet to see any such moral system that can be objectively evidenced. All I have seen is our own subjective judgments of what is and isn’t moral. If there are universally justifiable morals then those are the product of shared subjective opinions of what is moral.
No, that declaration is part of the subjective determination, not outside of it. It is a subjective opinion that people should adhere to basic human rights. How we enforce that subjective opinion differs, and it is a group effort to debate and enact those opinions. It isn’t a single person making demands and enforcing them. It is society as a whole.
What objective system?
I don’t see why a moral system would require universal agreement.
Then you are replacing morality with obedience. There were people who tried to justify their actions with the phrase, “I was just following orders”. It didn’t go well for them.
I am saying that a subjective morality is the only morality we have.
Wasn’t it shown that all you need for morality is one person? Unnecessarily damaging the environment or beauty counts as being immoral.
Agreed, but the point (and question) is, what morals?
And Bob is free to disagree. Houston, we have a problem. ; - ) Are we talking about Democrats, Republicans or Libertarians? Let’s not forget anarchists –their numbers may be growing, and some would add communists.
Obedience to a loving and omniscient Father is always a good thing, because we may not understand all things and have the big picture, the forest for the trees. When we were little, we did not understand all the consequences of our disobedient actions, like chasing a ball into the street.
We can start with the objective morality of “If a statement is true, then we should accept it” as a foundation, and build from there.
“She could appeal to the subjective inner sense of morality that exists in the vast majority of people.” And Bob could appeal to his own subjective inner sense which differs from Alice’s, so neither one has justified anything to the other person. They have only shared opinions, and that gives no compelling reasons for someone to change their mind, their view, or their behavior. Subjective opinion as a basis for morality is in conflict with genuine justifiability.
“Then you are replacing morality with obedience.” I am saying that, if God is the ultimate standard for morality (as I believe He is), then obedience to His commands would be moral (my quote came from a paragraph in which I said that I could not defend all of my claims due to space, and that is still the case). This does not replace morality with obedience, but gives an instance of an action that would be moral. Obedience to a necessarily good command is a subset of what encompasses morality.
“I have yet to see any such moral system that can be objectively evidenced.” Correct me if I’m wrong, but this seems to be your central argument against an ultimate objective moral. I maintain that establishing the self-inconsistency of the subjective morality view, which I believe I have already done, is sufficient to demonstrate the existence (necessity) of an objective moral system as the ultimate standard.
I know you disagree with that. I think we have come to an impasse. I maintain that my previous replies here have sufficiently answered your critiques and that the subjective morality view is ultimately self-inconsistent, but I know that you are not convinced. Perhaps I have misunderstood your claims. If that is the case, please correct me, as I truly want to understand your view (there’s no benefit in us “talking past each other”). But in the meantime, I think it is best to draw this to a close.
And it needn’t be under duress or any obligatory pressure at all. The example of the young man applies, gladly bringing a bouquet to his beloved and obeying the ‘laws of love’ – even at willing sacrifice of the expense of money and/or time.
Whichever morals we, as a social group, decide to apply.
There is no problem with people disagreeing.
You are assuming a father is loving, and you assume that the father will only command moral things.
“Stealing someone’s money” can not be shown to be true or false in an objective sense.
There is nothing wrong with disagreement. You don’t have to force people to believe as you do.
It is very common for people to accept a subjective opinion based on debate and arguments.
You keep assuming that a morality needs genuine justifiability. It doesn’t.
How did you determine that God’s commands are moral, other than just assuming it? If you can’t demonstrate that a command is moral, then you are replacing morality with obedience.
You have not shown inconsistency in a subjective morality. You make the claim that morality needs genuine justifiability, but have yet to show why this is a requirement. You make the claim that a moral system must be accepted by all people, and have yet to show why this is the case.
It is your assumptions that are the problem. You assume that a moral system must be agreed upon by everyone, that there can be no disagreements, and that a moral system needs “genuine justifiability”. Morality needs none of those.
It can be, based on and developed from “If a statement is true, then it should be accepted”, but you will disagree as to what statements are true.
I think you missed the point about “we”. Immoral wars are fought over that little detail.