No comment on nuclear weapons at the moment except to say I think it needs to be discussed under the principle of double effect which is defined below. I finished my last, excruciating piece on objective morality. The whole piece is there. This was a rough one. I’m still not certain on a few issues but it really goes down some deep rabbit holes. I had no intenton of this section being 14 pages…
[9] The Perverted Faculty Argument and Sexual Ethics
I have intentionally avoided the perverted faculty argument (PFA) until now. It certainly provides the backbone for traditional Catholic sexual ethics but it is fiercely debated even by those who agree on the basic general ends of human nature. My goal here is to provide an overview as I think not including it would do a disservice to the readers. For the best modern defense of the PFA, I recommend Ed Feser’s Article, ‘In Defense of the Perverted Faculty Argument’ in Neo-Scholastic Essays. It should be noted that most philosophers disagree with the PFA but this is not due to evaluating it on its own terms. Following Hume, most philosopher do not accept final causality as a part of the world and are stuck with the is/ought problem and the problem of induction. The basis of the PFA is teleology in conjunction with hylomorphism*.* It attempts to bridge the gap between biological reductionism and ghosts in a machine Platonism*.* The argument does not have any force outside of that context. For this reason, I offer this quote from Timothy Hsiao as a summary of what moral natural law entails:
“For the natural law theorist, both our understanding of both moral and non-moral goodness depends on our first understanding something’s function or nature. We cannot say that something is good or bad unless we first know what its function is. To borrow an example from Peter Geach (1956), I cannot know what a good hygrometer is if I do not know what hygrometers are for. As Geach points out, ascriptions of goodness and badness only make sense when considered under a description. “There is no such thing as being just good or bad, there is only being a good or bad so-and-so.” Goodness and badness, in other words, are species-specific concepts. A firefighter is good by fighting fires, since that is what firefighters as a class are supposed to do. A vehicle is good by transporting people and goods well, since that is how vehicles as a class are supposed to function. An orange tree is good by producing fruit, since that is how orange trees as a class are supposed to develop. Good firefighters, good cars, and good orange trees are all good in the sense that they are fulfilling their respective ends. Something that is good for one thing may not necessarily be good for another. Nevertheless, all good things are similar in the sense that they are all good by functioning as they should.” [Consenting Adults, Sex, and Natural Law Theory]
What is the PFA: In a nutshell, the perverted faculty argument says it is intrinsically immoral to actively use a natural human faculty while simultaneously and deliberately thwarting its inherent, objective purpose. This is extended by strict natural law theorists to basic biological functions. This is believed to follow from all that we have said before. Immoral actions are those that go against our ends as dictated by our nature. A good triangle is one with three straight sides, a good heart is one that efficiently pumps blood and so forth. A good human is one that functions according to their essence. Humans are both physical and immaterial. We are composites of matter and form –with the immaterial soul being the substantial form of a human being. The essential question here will come down to how much can biology dictate the nature or essence of what is means to be human.
Why is the PFA Important? If you have been following, the end of our intellect is to to know truth and determine what is good. The end of the will is to be able to choose that good or what leads to our flourishing. This leads to the obvious conclusion that we should want to know if the perverted faculty argument is correct or not. In simpler terms, we cannot make good decisions without knowing the truth. It is also important to some as it is the only viable means of justifying traditional sexual ethics based on reason alone (new moral law fails). Feser writes:
“there are no serious alternative arguments for the intrinsic immorality of contraception, homosexual acts, etc. (apart, that is, from sheer appeals to the authority of scripture, tradition, or the Magisterium).”
If the PFA is wrong, or being implemented incorrectly, then we have no natural reason for objecting to contraception and no natural reason to view two consenting adults of the same sex engaging in safe sexual activities as morally wrong. It is for this reason that many critics dismiss the PFA as an ad hoc attempt to justify outdated sexual ethics. This may very well turn out to be true but this , of course, this cuts both ways. Uncritical dismissals and eye-rolling at the PFA may just as likely be fallacious attempts at justifying one’s own sexual status quo (through begging the question, confirmation bias or incredulity).
Example of the PFA:
· The Digestive / Nutritional Faculty: the inherent end of chewing, tasting and swallowing food is nourishing the body. The classic example is a person who feasts and then purges before digestion so they can eat more. In this instance, they actively used digestive faculties for pleasure while deliberately, thwarting its natural end of nourishing the body.
· Communicative faculty : the inherent end of communication or speech is to convey truth. Lying is actively using the biological faculty of speech to thwart its ends.
· Reproductive Faculty: sex is procreative and unitive. Engaging in homosexual relations is to use our sexual faculties for non-procreative means—thus thwarting them. The same can be said of contraception and ejaculation anywhere outside of a woman’s vagina. Sexual ethics based on natural moral law, especially those associated with Catholicism are not just about homosexuality. Anyone who masturbates is guilty of using their sexual organs to achieve pleasure in a way that thwarts both of its ends. This also holds true for IVF (in-vitro fertilization). While this process is procreative, it actively bypasses the unitive purpose of sex. Not to mention, the semen used for IVF is mostly obtained from samples produced via masturbation which is itself considered morally wrong. This is the most contentious point of the PFA and what leads many to reject it. I note that none of us are unbiased when it comes to sexual ethics.
Avoiding Straw Man Critiques:
Sometimes people object to the PFA using a host of counter examples that don’t seem immoral to anyone. It is important to note that the version of the PFA Feser promotes clearly says that your actions must use a faculty to thwart its specific end. This means you can use a faculty for another purpose. For example, you can use your leg to hold up a table. But you cannot actively thwart the ends of your own leg. It would be immoral to cut off your leg and use it as a permanent table fixture. It is also worth noting that objects can have multiple ends. The male sex organ is also used to excrete liquid waste.
Active-Frustration vs Non Use: According to proponents of the PFA you do not have to use a faculty all of the time. Fasting, for example, is deemed acceptable if it is meant to achieve spiritual growth or teach self-discipline. Feasting and then purging food is not acceptable. Similarly, celibacy would be acceptable whereas contraception is not since it engages a faculty while directly thwarting its end. For this same reason it is not immoral to choose not to have children. A person may forego a family life and dedicate their life to science in an attempt to cure a disease or someone may take a vow of celibacy like a priest or as Mary, the mother of God did.
Common Critiques of the PFA
As noted above, many common critiques of the PFA are dealt with rather easily and show that objectors have not adequately dealt with or understand what they are talking about. I reiterate that using something for other purposes that do not thwart the ends of the faculty and non-use are both acceptable to strict natural lawyers.
The Chewing Gum Objection: chewing sugar free gum is using a faculty of the digestive system (chewing) with no intention of digestion. The table below shows how this reductio ad absurdum argument is intended to work with contraception.
|
Chewing Gum |
Contraception |
| Faculty |
Digestive: teeth, saliva, and the chewing reflex are biologically intended to break down food so that it can be swallowed, digested, and used for nutrition. |
Reproductive: the reproductive organs are intended to unite into a singular organism that creates life. |
| Pleasure |
Food tastes food |
Sex feels good |
| Perversion |
Chewing gum with no intention of swallowing thwarts the nutritional end of digestions. |
Contraception thwarts the procreative purposes of sex. |
Unless we are prepared to think chewing piece of trident gum is a moral crime, we must reject the PFA as it has reduced to absurdity. A similar argument about drinking diet soda is also made along with using earplugs to block out sound. We are enjoying the taste of diet soda without any nutritional value and thwarting the purposes of our ears.
How would a PFA advocate respond? Chewing gum is considered stopping short as opposed to active sabotage. Partially engaging a faculty (chewing) without achieving its final end (digesting) is not a perversion of the faculty. It is just an incomplete use of it. This would be comparable to kissing and hugging. These are affectionate and arguably sexual acts but they stop short of intercourse and do not violate the PFA. An actual violation would be throwing up after eating (bulimia or the ancient Roman Vomitorium).
PFA Proponents are clear:
Feser: The perversion of a human faculty essentially involves both using the faculty but doing so in a way that is positively contrary to its natural end. As I’ve explained many times, simply to refrain from using a faculty at all is not to pervert it. Using a faculty for something that is merely other than its natural end is also not to pervert it. Hence, suppose faculty F exists for the sake of end E. There is nothing perverse about not using F at all, and there is nothing perverse about using F but for the sake of some other end G. What is perverse is using F but in a way that actively prevents E from being realized. It is this contrariness to the very point of the faculty, this outright frustration of its function, that is the heart of the perversity.
In justifying gum chewing above, I wonder if PFA advocates would consider homosexual foreplay and sexual act acceptable as long as they stopped short? Some dissenters would attempt to frame this differently. What if we say gum is not food, it is artificial rubber and putting this into your digestive tract and engaging in its faculties (chewing and tasting) is a putting it in a place it does not belong. The PFA advocate might respond: the mouth is meant for chewing and tasting and gum is a chewable object. It is like using a hand to grip a rubber stress ball.
The Musical Instrument Objection: Something like the mouth has many purposes. It can speak, kiss, lick envelopes, whistle or play the flute. If you use your mouth to blow into a saxophone does this frustrates its natural end (eating/breathing)? The answer is no and playing an instrument, unlike vomiting after eating, does not directly thwart the faculty. The PFA allows refraining from using a faculty and it allows repurposing insofar as it does not thwart the primary end of the faculty in question. It must be understood that most of these objections are about sex. They will lead to something like, “The mouth/Organs do many things, why can’t we use them to do what makes us happy?” I note that this objection is a textbook example of subjective morality (what makes us happy) and has no force against the PFA which says you can do many things with your mouth/organs them insofar as you do not pervert the faculty itself.
Can you Kill yourself to Save Your Children?
Earlier it was noted that you can jump on a grenade to save a friend’s life. The reason this is not immoral is you are not choosing to kill yourself. You are choosing to use your body to shield a friend from an explosion even if you will likely die as a consequence. A counterfactual was used to justify this and this sort of argument is known as the double effect which means: : an action with both a good and a bad effect is permissible if the intention is solely to achieve the good, the action itself is not evil, the bad effect is not a means to the good, and the good outweighs the bad.”
But what if a madman told you to kill yourself or they would kill your children. Under PFA you could not kill yourself. It is not moral to bring about good by doing evil. You can fight, jump in front of a bullet and die as a consequence but you could never take your own life and have this considered morally good. The principle of double effect does not work here as it does in the case of diving on a grenade. Many people would have tremendous difficulty with this. Of course, for the Christian, we are called to do good, trust God and let the chips fall where they may. Romans 12:12: says not to overcome evil with evil.
Critique: PFA is Based on Biological Reductionism:
Melissa Moschella (Old Natural Law Theory, Marriage, and Sexual Ethics) put forth an argument you will find in several new natural law theorists:
Consider another example. Our sweat glands exist for a clear biological purpose of thermoregulation, and recent evidence indicates that the odor that results from our perspiration, particularly in the armpits, seems to have a biological purpose of sending pheromonal cues regarding the biological suitability of potential mates. Yet no one thinks that the use of antiperspirants and deodorants, which act contrary to these biological purposes, is morally wrong, even while one is intentionally engaging one’s sweat glands (by, for instance, sitting in a sauna). This is because acting contrary to these biological purposes does not entail a failure to respect an aspect of human well-being. There is no one-to-one correspondence between biological purposes and human well-being. Impairment of biological functions can be wrong if it is contrary to health, the preservation of life, or some other human good, but it is not wrong in and of itself.
She seemingly accuses the PFA of biological reductionism: **“**There is no one-to-one correspondence between biological purposes and human well-being.” Proponents of the PFA believe they are avoiding a naturalistic fallacy and might actually accuse the pheromone objection of biological reductionism. That aside, Thomists argue that we cannot disconnect ourselves from the physical world and they reject both physicalism and Platonism in favor of hylomorphism. To deny our physical nature is to deny our humanity which is a composite of form and matter. Our physical nature is an inextricable part of our essence.
The sweating argument shows how complicated a simple perverted faculty argument becomes. Thomists might argue there are vital vs incidental faculties, and this means they are not all to be given the same metaphysical weight. The intellect (truth), digestive system (individual preservation), and the reproductive system (species preservation) are considered vital faculties. Others like the growth of fingernails, the shedding of hair, or the secretion of sweat are incidental or secondary biological mechanisms. Thus, wearing deodorant or trimming fingernails is how a rational agent manages lower biological functions to maintain social harmony (a higher end). In addition to the vital/incidental distinction, Thomists and advocates of the PFA will advocate the principle of totality. The individual parts of the human body serve the whole. It is claimed that sweat is only being suppressed in a localized region, but your body will still regulate itself. Feser breaks it down as follows in his perverted faculty paper:
“A third point to keep in mind is that there are crucial differences between, on the one hand, an individual deliberate act of using a bodily faculty and, on the other, an ongoing and involuntary physiological process. Use of the sexual organs is an example of the former whereas hair growth, breathing, perspiring, and lactating are examples of the latter. Now the former has a specific end-state or climax, while the latter do not. In particular, the former has as its physiological end a specific emission (or reception) of semen, while the latter have as their end the continual generation of hair, sweat, and milk and the continual oxidation of the blood. There is no specific individual event that initiates the latter processes and there is no specific individual event that culminates any of them either. It is oxidation in general, hair production in general, sweat production in general, and milk production in general that is their natural end. And those general outcomes are not frustrated by any individual act of smoking, shaving, breast-pumping, or putting on antiperspirant. By contrast, the process that begins with arousal and ends with ejaculation within the vagina is episodic rather than ongoing, and its outcome, which is a specific event, is frustrated by contraception, masturbation, and the like.”
Inconsistency In Sexual Ethics: Masturbation, the use of contraception, contraception and homosexual sex are all considered immoral under natural law. All of them thwart the procreative end of sex. Male ejaculation must occur in a vagina in order to be morally good per the perverted faculty argument. PFA advocates will usually tell you that oral sex as foreplay before coitus is acceptable. But they would tell you that anal sex could not serve as foreplay and would be a violation of natural law. The reasoning is that the male sex member is mimicking sex by being placed into an excreting orifice that does not have reproductive teleology and was not designed for that purpose. This is a case of putting something where it doesn’t belong. I admit I wonder how anal sex foreplay could be construed as in inherently wrong since it mimics coitus within a biological system that has no teleological orientation toward reproduction, but somehow male to female oral sex does not do the same. This “gratuitous” inconsistency does not refute the PFA itself, but it makes you wonder how ad hoc some of the views based on it might be. Melissa Moschella raised an example that hammers home this point:
“I think Feser would agree that it is permissible to enjoy—even to the point of salivating at—the smell of fresh baked goods, even though one may not eat them because, say, they belong to another, and even when one is not trying to stimulate one’s appetite in preparation for a meal. That’s because, in doing so, one uses one’s nutritive faculty for something other than its natural purpose but not in a way that is contrary to that purpose. Yet if this is so, why is it not permissible (as Feser agrees it is not) to look lustfully at pornographic pictures, even if they are pictures of one’s spouse? These uses of the sexual faculties are no more or less contrary to the natural end of the sexual faculties than salivating at baked goods outside the context of a meal is contrary to the end of the nutritive faculties.”
It seems the sexual faculty is more stringently restricted by the PFA than other natural faculties.
A Sterile couple and the PFA
Suppose a woman has a hysterectomy to remove cancer and can no longer get pregnant. Would sex between her and a husband be excluded because it is no longer procreative? The sterile couple argument is problematic for new natural law theorists, but classical proponents of natural law would say you are not using the faculty in a manner contrary to its intended purpose. There is a difference between actively sabotaging a faculty and using a faculty that has a natural defect. This would be like claiming that a blind man opening his eyes would be immoral which no natural moral law theorist worth their salt would do. Thus, sterile sex is permitted.
A modern philosopher would strongly critique this on the grounds of intent and outcome. A couple having sex while using contraception intends on getting pleasure without a child. A naturally sterile couple also intends the same thing with the same outcome. Since it is known that the couple cannot produce a child they are knowingly engaging in a non-pro-creative act. If the unitive good can be achieved when the procreative end is factually impossible, then the unitive good is not ontologically dependent on the procreative outcome. As noted, the PFA proponent would distinguishes between active sabotage and a natural defect and also reject outcome-based morality (consequentialism or utilitarianism). The modern philosopher might retort and see this as exploiting a defect to get the pleasure just the same. It seems proponents of the PFA are fine with a sterile couple having sex as long as they go through the motions of reproduction without any chance of procreation. It should also be noted that the unifying nature or sex is tied into reproductive capacity and child rearing. It would seem then that to be consistent, a proponent of sexual ethics based on the PFA should be opposed to sterile sex.
A PFA advocate would object the contracepting couple deliberately chooses to thwart the ends of the sexual faculty, whereas the sterile couple chooses to engage in a natural procreative kind of act but a natural defect prevents it from fruition. To use one of Feser’s own analogies, a PFA advocate would claim that a three-legged dog is not a pantomime of a dog. It is a real dog that is missing a leg.
One Final Objection to the PFA: Natural Goodness and Sex
Christopher Arroyo (following the thinking of Michal Thompson and Philippa Foot) takes exception to the sexual ethics advocated by the PFA with a specific focus on Feser’s work. Arroyo writes:
Where Feser and I disagree is in our understanding of the natural ends of human sexual activity. I think he too narrowly construes these ends because he fails to recognize some of the implications of how goodness depends on what X is, a failure that involves Feser not appreciating some of the implications of another philosopher on whose work he relies. In presenting his understanding of how the goodness of X depends on X’s nature, Feser draws on Philippa Foot’s Natural Goodness, as do I. But Feser and I arrive at different conclusions about the goodness of intrinsically nonprocreative human sex acts because Feser’s account of natural goodness generalizes across species and, therefore, does not recognize some of the ways in which evaluative judgments of an individual human being as a member of its species depend on particular features of the human life-form that are not shared with all animal species.
Arroyo distinguishes between a good pen and a good martini and correctly tells us it is not intelligible to claim a good martini is one that writes well. What is good for something depends on its nature. After an example using claws from the animal world, Arroyo’s argument is that we cannot generalize of sexual organs across animal species to make goodness evaluations for humans who are rational beings. Humans are holistic and there may be psychological goods to things that go beyond or even contradict our biology. Thus, Arroyo accepts goods based on our nature but would disagree with the PFA altogether. He writes:
“Feser spends almost half of his paper presenting and defending his version of the perverted faculty argument (2015, pp. 398–413). I neither present his version of the argument nor do I critically engage it because the argument of this paper is that Feser’s starting point (that is, his understanding and use of natural goodness arguments) is mistaken. So, if my argument is sound, his version of the perverted faculty argument does not get off the ground, since the first premise of his argument entails a mistaken understanding of how the good of members of a species living being relates to its natural ends, and his second premise mistakenly restricts the natural ends of human sexual faculties to procreative and unitive ends.”
I think this is the strongest way to argue against the PFA. To attempt to show that it is illegitimate from the outset. Once it is granted, its internal logic holds up pretty well. While both Feser and Arroyo agree morality is based on our nature, they come to radically different conclusions. I think we can parse their views as follows. Feser determines flourishing from teleology, Arroyo determines our teleology from holistic human flourishing. Thomists like Feser posit a hierarchy of commensurable natural goods or ends whereas Arroyo subscribes to teleological pluralism and incommensurable goods.
An article cited earlier also thought Feser put the cart before the horse. ]Melissa Moschella wrote:
Feser is correct to say that our sexual faculties have both a unitive and procreative function. Yet the moral significance of this factual claim depends on our prior grasp of the values of human life and interpersonal—specifically marital—union. Feser has the order of derivation backwards.
It is not that a theoretical understanding of the telē (plural of telos) of our sexual faculties then leads us to conclude that those telē are intrinsically valuable. In fact, a complete theoretical understanding of the natural ends of our sexual capacities depends on our prior practical grasp of the human good that possession of those faculties enables us to achieve. Theoretical knowledge of biology can reveal the biological end of our sexual faculties, but it is only to the extent that we properly understand the good of marriage that we can come to a complete and accurate understanding of the rational human purpose of our sexual faculties.
I think this objection is forceful. I am not sure what to make of teleological pluralism the manner in which Arroyo presents it. A good pen is one the writes well. But if a pen is meant to write well, how could there be another objectiveend that contradicts this? We could dissemble a pen and use it for something else. Maybe MacGyver would use it to help make a bomb, but this is to destroy its substantial form. For Feser the pleasure of eating is not its main end. Providing us with the nutrients we need to survive is the purpose of eating. No one disagrees with this last statement but why can’t eating also be a natural social good of? Arroyo writes:
In order to emphasize the differences between the functions of eating in the human life-form and the function of eating in the life-form of other animals, I want to sketch how eating contributes to human flourishing in ways that go beyond the mere intake of nutrients. Perhaps some other non-human animals eat in order to survive, but that is not the purpose of eating in a flourishing human life, even if it is true that human beings need nourishment. Nor is nourishment a necessary factor in all that counts as good eating in the human life-form. Here it is instructive to remember a remark of Gareth Moore on this topic: ‘The best eating is often unnecessary; it is a treat, something that we do over and above what we need, just because it is delightful. We also recognize a value in positively feasting, in self-indulgence, occasionally eating beyond, or even far beyond, our needs as a form of celebration. To eat beyond necessity contributes to human well-being, as does most going beyond need’ (1992, p. 68).
In making his observation about eating beyond need, Moore is arguing for the view that doing things just because we enjoy them is a crucial part of the human life-form (though he does not use that phrasing). Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that eating plays a number of roles in the human life-form, many of which involve more than the sheer enjoyment of eating. Take the following (incomplete) list of examples: eating a turkey with friends and family for Christmas dinner; eating cake to celebrate one’s birthday; eating a pint of ice cream to alleviate the pain of a breakup; swallowing antacids to sooth one’s upset stomach; eating as a courtesy, as when one accepts food from one’s host even when one is not hungry; eating a chocolate lava cake for dessert, even though one is full; drinking a martini or two after a long day of work. Although eating or drinking for these various purposes may be (but need not be) enjoyable, one misunderstands the preceding examples if one construes them simply in terms of the pursuit of pleasure. On the contrary, these purposes have to do with a variety of distinctively human goods (that is, a variety of distinctively human natural ends), goods such as the celebration of accomplishments, familial bonding, the strengthening of friendship, healing over love lost, and commemorating traditions, to name just a few. The goodness of these natural human ends have nothing to do with survival or even the taking in of nutrients. In fact, some of these goods (such as the stiff drink at the end of a long day, or eating dessert at the end of a luxurious meal) run contrary to biological health– yet we acknowledge them as genuine human goods.
I quoted this in full because I think it is Arroyo’s strongest point. Now Feser would probably say all of these things can be done without perverting our digestive faculties just as we can forego having children if we make a vow of celibacy (not using a faculty for a higher good is not thwarting it). But those like Arroyo would push back and claim we are not thwarting a biological faculty but repurposing a biological tool for holistic-human wellness—which is flourishing. For example, when chewing gum you are using the digestive faculty (chewing, salivating) purely for sensory pleasure and stress relief, actively “frustrating” the end of nutrition by spitting it out. Is chewing gum an objective metaphysical perversion, or just a rational creature repurposing a biological tool for a minor psychological good? Of course, Feser would say that spitting out gum is not thwarting our digestive faculties, it is simply stopping short. The PFA is very specific that you must actively thwart the faculty but many common folk might start to wonder at what point we are simply playing semantics games. Arroyo also brings forth another objection:
He’s essentially just taking it for granted that to use the sexual faculty in a non-procreative way in every particular instance is necessarily to frustrate the faculty. But that doesn’t follow. For example, an act of oral intercourse when ones wife is pregnant does not in any meaningful way frustrate the sexual faculty. There’s nothing to frustrate since the woman is already pregnant! To defend against objections like this, it seems all you can do is to say that it’s the purpose of semen to go in the “right” place even if the woman can’t conceive because she’s already pregnant. But that seems really odd. Sure, semen is ordered towards impregnation. But if she’s already pregnant what purpose is being fulfilled, what order is being respected by depositing semen in one place or another? Of course, the other approach one can take here is just to say that sex with a pregnant woman is also intrinsically evil, but the Church tends to allow for that (at least in modern times) so you won’t find many defenders of the PFA going this route.
Feser would respond by pointing out this confuses the structure of the act with the outcome. They are performing an act that is – by its very nature—structured toward procreation. That conception will not occur because it has already occurred is an accident of biological circumstance. There is no defect in the act itself. Something failing to achieve its natural end through accidents of nature is not the same as actively thwarting it. Arroyo’s rejection of Feser’s generalizations at least opens the door to the possibility of a more integrated understanding of human intimacy. Here is how I synthesize these principles.
My Thoughts on Sexual Ethics.
These are my tentative thoughts that are subject to change upon further evaluation. If a couple can achieve the unitive end of sex while engaged in a procreative act they know is entirely stripped of its actual procreative power, then there really is no logical reason to assume this unitive end cannot be achieved in other non-procreative sexual acts. If the unitive good can demonstrably survive the total known absence of the procreative outcome, demanding that the physical structure of the act remain identical is an exercise in empty biological reductionism that elevates the mere plumbing of the act above the rational, embodied intent of the spouses. If the unitive and procreative ends of sex are not impossibly intertwined, then traditional sexual morality based on the PFA falls apart.
The other prong I would take is pointing out how Thomists use the Doctrine of Double Effect. Sacrificing yourself to save someone else’s life is considered ethical. If we are taking seriously the biological ends of humans, the will to live must be considered one of the most obvious and basic ends we have. Thomists have to do a bit of hoop jumping and claim the person is not choosing to kill themselves (as they don’t want to actually die), they are choosing to shield a friend from the blast. Dying is simply an acceptable consequence. They use the idea of counterfactuals to demonstrate this, but I think most people who jump on the grenade know they are basically sacrificing their life for a friend. We certainly treat them as heroes so this this does appear to be splitting hairs. But if we accept this logic, we must apply it consistently. If I jump on a grenade, my primary act is ‘shielding my friend,’ not 'suicide’ or ‘the intentional frustration of my life.’ Likewise, when I engage in non-coital sex, my primary act is not ‘the intentional frustration of reproduction.’ I want to be intimate with my wife and bond through the bodily giving of the self. That our actions are not procreative is merely a circumstance—a secondary consequence I am willing to endure for the greater good of our embodied union. A strict Thomist might claim that intentionally engaging in a non-procreative act violates the principle of double effect. But this is only true if the unitive and procreative ends are impossibly intertwined—a premise that advocates of sterile sex have already implicitly abandoned.
Another way of approaching this issue to consider non-coital or non-procreative sex as merely refraining from using the procreative faculty and as we know, not using a faculty is not morally wrong. In this context we would simply be abstaining from using the sexual faculty for procreation and instead using it for the other purpose of bonding and unity. If we are allowed to play semantic games, then I am not sure why I can’t distinguish between “not using” and “thwarting” for non-procreative sex.
The advocate of the PFA allows thwarting lower functions for the good of the whole human but not when it comes to sex. One cannot intentionally engage in non-procreative sex in a moral way. One can intentionally engage if non-procreative sex if the non-procreative aspect is due to biological accidents. One can spend their entire life abstaining from the good of procreation and be seen as morally good, but one cannot engage in a unifying and embodied act of intimacy with another that is not procreative.
Procreative sex itself is a highly unitive and profound act. I do not dispute this. Two organisms come together and physically unite. The helplessness of human babies and vulnerability of women during pregnancy draws people into communities and relationships. But can the unitive goods of sex exist apart from biological procreation? Granted that it is moral for sterile couples to engage in sexual acts, how can we claim otherwise?
We are not simply baby-making machines, nor are our bodies mere instruments for our minds. We know that non-procreative sexual acts need not merely treat the body as a tool for hedonistic pleasure. If I read to a blind person, they are not treating me as a mere instrument or tool (their eyes) for their use. It is an act of love and service. Physical intimacy operates the same way; it involves vulnerability, profound emotional bonding, and the mutual giving of pleasure. These are not just events that happen in the mind; they are deeply embodied realities. To physically comfort, physically pleasure, and physically unite with a spouse in non-coital ways is a genuine giving of the embodied self. As proponents of the PFA themselves admit, merely refraining from the use of a specific biological faculty is not a perversion of it. In these intimate acts, the couple is actively engaging the broader unitive faculty while simply allowing the specific reproductive mechanics to remain dormant.
Just as the male sex organ can be used independently for procreation and to go to the bathroom, why can’t the broader human sexual faculty be used for unitive bonding outside procreation? Why must these ends be seen as in conflict? This is not using sex for mere selfish pleasure, or debasing oneself like an animal and succumbing to hedonism. It is about rational humans using their embodied agency to bond, form a relationship, and grow closer together. In Thomist thinking, lower biological faculties are strictly subordinated to higher rational faculties, and lower goods are subordinated to higher goods. Given the Principle of Totality, why should we suddenly abandon this hierarchy when it comes to sex? If lower biological mechanics must serve the higher rational good of the whole person, then utilizing the broader sexual faculty to achieve the higher good of intimate unity isn’t a perversion of natural law—it is the fulfillment of it. I believe this applies to both monogamous heterosexual and homosexual relationships.
My verdict:
The PFA is much stronger than people think. Those who reject it out of hand do not understand it and critique with a completely foreign standard. Often that foreign standard is a more problematic one like utilitarianism or sometimes the PFA is approached with the mistaken notion that mere consent and not hurting someone automatically makes something good or acceptable. Not to mention that reductio ad absurdum arguments are not as potent as some make them out to be. Arguing the PFA would show infertile couples should not have sex would not necessarily demonstrate the PFA is wrong. It might merely demonstrate PFA advocates are inconsistent in their application of the principle. Gum chewing and diet soda type arguments are typically attacking straw men as Feser notes.
The PFA is not as rigid as sometimes assumed. While bulimia or the Roman vomitorium is wrong, you can throw up food if you have an upset stomach or swallowed something non-digestive. The PFA tries to avoid two extremes: pure biological reductionism and platonic dualism. For A-T Christians, a human being is a hylomorphic composite of form and matter. We cannot treat our bodies as mere physical plumbing and say the mind is the true person as many modern ethicists do. That is to succumb to dualism and view the essential aspect of a human as being a platonic ghost infused into a meat puppet. Rejecting our physical natures over psychological feelings is to reject a part of human nature. Our psychological ends are certainly real, but in an A-T framework morality is tied into the objective ends or telos of what it means to be human.
The chief objections against the PFA are two-fold from my perspective. Does it swerve too close to biological reductionism and have to avoid some problems via what looks like theological hair splitting? Does it overemphasize the parts (matter) at the expense of the whole human (matter and form)? Does it then fail the hylomorphic view of reality it is meant to uphold? Can sex have a unitive end and purpose outside only making babies? A lot of commentators think it does. But can this be made consistent with the objective framework of moral natural law?
The second major problem is a lot of us just don’t like its sexual ethics. My wife went through two rounds of vulvar cancer with surgeries, so I doubt I need to say anything more than that, except I’m not sure why biological accidents should prevent us from engaging in other intimate activities. Most people masturbate; many people have sex while intentionally thwarting the procreative end of it via condoms, contraception, pulling out or non-coital sexual acts. Most of us presumably have homosexual friends or family members and it’s difficult for us to see how consensual activities between loving adults aimed at unitive bonding can be wrong. We have honestly, whether you think it is for better or worse, been indoctrinated into a subjectivist system that defines what is moral as anything that doesn’t obviously hurt someone. We engage in utilitarian and consequentialist cost/benefit analysis and objective natural law is quite foreign to us. That doesn’t make it wrong. It rests on Aristotelian-Thomist metaphysics, namely hylomorphism and the idea that final causality or teleology is intrinsic to the nature of things. We can critique or reject the PFA but it must be done on its own terms (as Arroyo attempted), or we must show how hylomorphism is false and/or things do not have baked in ends or telos given their nature. Most critiques of the PFA online are simply uneducated caricatures.
