I don’t think you understand what that agnosticism entails. Either the object, like the moon, exists as a quantifiable reality or it’s an illusion of the one or oneness. It matters very little how you say it, because once you see what the question means, words are far less consequential.
Edit: This post was flagged as off topic. Would whoever flagged it write me publicly or privately so I can explain why it is at the very heart of the topic? I promise not to to disclose any details of a private thread.
Feel free to ask me about it even if you didn’t flag it. It’s a conversation worth having here or in another thread as it is so very relevant to the conversation about faith, science, and postmodernism.
Making that a new topic would be a good idea, Dale - please do that; since at least one forum member has already voted in that direction also with a flag. Let me know if you can’t still access it.
Postmodernism, by its very nature, is hard to pin down. Also, the popular versions of all such movements are rather selective and often incoherent, like what Paul was accused of in Acts 17:18 - picking up random scraps of philosophy that sound appealing. The point that there is subjectivity in all human effort is important, but so is the point that there are definite limits to the associated uncertainty; certain things are unquestionably wrong. Reading a text does has a subjective component, for example. But if you read the previous sentence by making up your own definition for each word, without regard for prevailing usage, then your “reading” doesn’t really have anything to do with the text.
Modernism is largely an outgrowth of Enlightenment thought, often ignoring Enlightenment critiques (e.g., Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason or Hume’s articulation of the is-ought problem). Like the Enlightenment, it tends towards the error of “sounds good to me=truth”, and thus has a similar popular version in practice to pop postmodernism.
Both logical positivism and postmodernism are illustrated in The Porcine History of Philosophy and Religion, though unsurprisingly the cartoons are illustrating particular versions of each.
Instead of modernist or postmodernist self-justification, we need an accurate recognition that our own judgements are fallible and need to be checked as best we can against the available evidence.
Michael Polanyi wrote about the value of following and dedicating resources to an intuition before the data fully supported it. I’m not so sure how his ideas are received today.
Thanks for the tag Kendel. After reading a bit of actual work considered “Postmodern critiques of science,” Like Feyerabend’s Against Method, I’ve come to the conclusion that it is some scientists’ reaction and misunderstanding of postmodernism rather than postmodernism itself that is the problem. I’ve often heard it said that Postmodernism rejects the idea of of truth existing (and thus is self-refuting, because this itself is a truth claim), however I haven’t ready many postmodernists make a claim this strong. Instead, here are a few examples of the kinds of claims I believe many postmodernists make:
People are biased (true)
Our beliefs are a product our environment and upbringing (often true)
Language colors how we see the world (I agree with this to a certain extent)
We should be skeptical of grand metanarratives (I agree)
We gain knowledge through experience, so our “stories” are important (I’d agree to an extent, but I’d argue there are other ways to find knowledge too)
In my (perhaps biased) opinion, many of the reactions to postmodern critiques of science come from people who have a cult-like devotion to Science (and not just the scientific method). Just as postmodernism takes aim at narratives like Christianity (which is used to criticism), it also takes aim at other metanarratives views like rationalism or naturalism (often epistemically and not ontologically, an important distinction). The knee-jerk reaction to criticism of their prized worldview is a tantrum which seeks to discredit, not always understand.
@T_aquaticus mentioned a quote in another thread by Steven Weinberg that explains the philosophical views of many scientists. PoMo often trusts the results of the scientific method but is skeptical of those claiming this is the “only” truth (it would, for instance, be skeptical of the philosophical claims Weinberg describes). Note it is not necessarily claiming there are “multiple” truths, rather there could be other ways of understanding the same truth, or there could be more to truth than we understand.
I never thought I’d actually be “defending” postmodernism, but I do feel it gets unfairly targeted by science worshippers. From another article, “Postmodern criticism of modern science was not without merit. Where science was granted grotesquely inflated and unconditional power, postmodernists pointed to its limits. Where science was used as a guise for value judgments, they pulled the veil off and exposed the hypocrisy”
Bouncing bullets mean somebody’s shooting. If you want a bullet-free world, don’t say Absolute Space, Absolute Time, or that an infinite, eternal cosmos is rational albeit not fully known, much less explicable.
As others have mentioned, PM is kind of hard to nail down. More to the point, I’m not all that interested diving into the particulars of PM or Modernism. I think I am like a lot of other scientists in being more of a pragmatist than an ideologue. At the same time, a good scientist will be aware of their own foibles, inherent biases, and limitations. For me, one of the first things I do when critically reading a scientific paper is to look for potential biases and methodological errors. I suspect that nearly all scientists do this. Scientists are also human beings from all walks of life, so there is a diversity of beliefs and subjective human experience as well.
@Paulm12 mentioned a Steven Weinberg piece that I have quoted from on occassion. In it, Weinberg talks about how philosophy in general is not much use to him. Rather, he is more of a pragmatist or realist:
I am drawn to what Weinberg wrote because it matches a lot of my own curmudgeonly attitude towards philosophy, so I am a bit biased in that sense. However, I do think this is a common critique of philosophy in scientific circles, that philosophy just isn’t that helpful.
Although not primarily concerned with philosophy of science, philosophical considerations are woven throughout. Weinberg was at the very pointy apex of science, the physicist’s physicist, but his book is a master class of plain language, clarity, directness, and authority. He largely dismisses the importance of philosophy to science, but not due to lack of understanding. His grasp of the ideas he discusses is likely on par or superior to their wordy adherents.
Dismissing the importance of philosophy to science because it does not tell us what results to expect from an experiment is a modernistic category error. The philosophy informs whether it makes sense to expect meaningful results, whether the experiment is ethical, whether we should be open and honest about the results, etc. It does not tell us the science itself - that is science’s job. The same error typifies much of the naïve claims about the Bible and science, both bad critiques of the Bible and bad critiques of modern science for not matching someone’s interpretation of the Bible. These both reflect an underlying scientism - expecting everything to be scientific.
Postmodern critiques of science are quite a mixed bag. As others have already noted, deflating scientism and drawing attention to potentially influences of subjective factors are valid criticisms. However, there are also plenty of “science conflicts with my preferred “truth” so science is bad” critiques. The latter can be quite dangerous in at least two areas. First, teaching the latest politically correct fad (for any political position) rather than an accurate grasp of mathematics and science harms students. Claims that historically underserved groups will be better educated if we deny that math has right and wrong answers or replace our best understanding of biology with one that some person has claimed is more in line with sociopolitical fashion (e.g., Lysenko’s “Stalinist” biology) is in reality harming them and their chances of success in the field. Secondly, denying the validity of our best understanding of science can have harmful effects on policy; at best it wastes time. For example, various purportedly ___ist approaches to biology attack existing work as sexist/racist/elitist. (I do not remember what all ideologies the claims came from; as the claims do not actually promote any genuine concern for women, ethnic minorities, socially disadvantaged people, etc., the claim to be a feminist, etc. approach is of doubtful accuracy.) Controlling the harm done by invasive species gets labeled as intolerant - who designated those species as bad? Meanwhile, they are exterminating native species. If you want a somewhat credible political metanarrative, try labeling the invasive species as colonialists rather than attacking the efforts to help protect biodiversity. Similarly, trying to change scientific names of organisms that someone has deemed offensive often gets more prominence than trying to identify organisms and generate scientific names. Social agendas claim to be scientific, yet are often based on rather poor data, if any.
Philosophers are the ones who love conversations with each other about the best vacation spots and best ways to drive there from here - as well as to advise others on good traveling practices, and the sorts of things traveling commuters have enjoyed - what has or hasn’t worked well.
Whereas the scientists are like the engineers, technicians, and mechanics just building and maintaining the car. They don’t particularly need to care what destinations the owners have in mind (unless it involves altitude or climate considerations of course). But overall the mechanic doesn’t take much interest in a local travel guide to help her diagnose an engine problem.
I would make it more esoteric than that. The philosophers would discuss what travelling means to humans and its deeper meaning. Scientists would just go on a trip without worrying what the philosophers think about the meaning of travelling.
