Hi Vinnie. I’m sorry of my comments are unclear and for not making a connection to my early notes in other threads. I appreciate the time you’ve taken to discuss your concerns. Thank you.
So,… years ago I had questions about morality which lead me to reading about metaethics (wikipedia) (philosophy encyclopedia) and other areas like moral epistemology, i.e. sources & derivation of morals). I can say that I was confused and ignorant about the topics and status of the many debates at the start. Now after dabbling in the area, reading synopsis and general works, I understand that my ignorance was fully justified and that there is even more stuff to not understand. The only advancement I think I accomplished is that I’m a little better versed on what I don’t know and where uncertainty remains. My general conclusion about the field(s) is that there is a lot of work to do. Particularly, I do not believe the problems of ‘grounding’ in moral systems or moral foundationalism, have achieved general consensus. For beliefs that we would hope should be a priori and demonstrably objective, I see shortcomings, as do many, many moral theorists. And I’m not at all comparing my amateur assessment to those who’ve spent years in the field: It’s just that it seems the professional field generally recognizes that success remains elusive.
This lack of success over many years (centuries?) does not mean that an a priori system that grounds moral beliefs will not be found or that this means that none exists. It just means there is work to do.
Anyway, do I condemn Hitler’s for his atrocities? Heck yes.
Do I believe I believe his acts were morally wrong? Yep.
Am I moral relativist? Nope.
I accept/own/abide by moral principles that I believe are universal, objective and pertain across the ages. There is just one issue: Acceptance of uncertainty. I cannot prove my principles are universal, objective and pertain across the ages. I will certainly apply them as if they are universal and apply across the ages but, using analytic tools, established philosophical reasoning, and facts about how the world is, I can’t articulate or demonstrate they are objective. And I think we’re all in the same boat, epistemologically speaking. There is a lot of work and many propositions or schools of thought directed at this problem. I do not think anyone has ‘stuck the landing’.
Aside: I have doubts that Nazis and the people who enabled genocide in WWII thought of themselves as moral subjectivists. I would bet many believed they had objectively solid reasons for doing what they did. The same for Pol Pot’s genocide in Cambodia and the crimes under Slobodan Milosevic in the Yugoslav wars. These don’t strike me as the sorts of things relativists would support. A take-home lesson is that beliefs in one’s objective truth can simply be wrong. The strength of belief is immaterial to the question. This should probably surprise no one.
Likewise for atrocities described in the Old Testament. And slavery. Now, I’ve heard a Rabbi say those events and policies were “indefensible and not something the God, I know in my heart, would ever sanction” (might not have been the exact words but the gist is the same). Instead, he said that he believed the people of that time and those who recorded those stories may have thought these acts were something God would accept, applying the local ‘standards’ among peoples of the time, but that they were, in fact, not something God would approve anytime or anywhere. He maintains they were incorrectly attributed to God’s will. To me, that is a logical and consistent application of a moral standard: Though these things are described in the Bible, ascribing those as sanctioned by God would have to have been an error. Contrast his position to the work of numerous others, a subset of theologians and apologists in the past and today, attempting to justify the genocide and slavery described in the Bible as being objectively moral at the time. I believe the Rabbi has it right.
So where does this leave us ignorant humans? Until we can proceed under the assurance of a rock-solid, first-principled, self-evident, moral calculus, I am hopeful that we can reach agreement on the basis of largely shared notions. Murder is wrong is a pretty good conclusion. The are areas like ‘personal freedom of action or thought’, and harm minimization, that we can likely work with. I don’t suspect we’ll be able to make a solid case based on first principles for outlawing liquor sales on Sundays, but we probably can muddle through on super-critical ones.
Basically, I believe there can be objective moral ‘truths’ but I’m agnostic on whether we’ll demonstrate them. Am I surprised at this? Not really. It is a tough nut to crack.