Hello again Jonathan! It appears we can finally resume our dialogue. For practical purposes, I will provide a link to my last response to you here, since we’re starting a new thread as the last one was closed due to that no one posted something on it for 6 days.
You provided an admittedly gargantuan response, but I think I can straighten out this response a bit to be more concise. Here we go.
Definition of binitarianism and evolving scholarship
The first issue raised here is the definition of the word binitarianism. You contend that, based off of the words of Culianu (1981) and Segal (1977), the term binitarianism has a different meaning than the one I’m using, and I therefore got our discussion on binitarianism wrong. You therefore say;
In the broader literature, especially on Second Temple Period Judaism and Gnostic studies, it is used to describe the belief in two separate divine beings; typically the one true God, and a lesser divine entity (ontologically and functionally inferior), who is not God. Here Culianu uses the term “binitarianism” in this sense.
In fact, Culianu in your quote even exchanges almost synonymously the terms ditheism with binitarianism:
Graetz and his followers certainly were wrong in their demonstrations, because they confused two distinct concepts, namely ditheism (or binitarianism) and dualism.
And this is where I see the first problem begin. I think it’s quite clear that in older scholarship, these two words were used more or less synonymously. However, today, it couldn’t be more different. The evidence undoubtedly shows that in modern scholarship, the words binitarianism and ditheism are distinguished. The reason why they are distinguished is specifically because ditheism postulates two different gods where under binitarianism you still only have on God, regardless of the plurality of the persons. This could not be more clear. Earlier, I quoted Boyarin pointing out that historically, it was the rabbis who first tried to insist that binitarianism was just ditheism, which means Boyarin obviously uses them as different words with different meanings, in contrast to Culianu who uses them interchangeably.
We could, moreover, almost as easily desribe the developments in the opposite direction, namely, that Christianity insisted on separate persons and rejected Modalism as a response to the rabbinic insistence that binitarianism was equal to ditheism. (pg. 138)
C. Fletcher-Louis (in 2015) outright says the two words are different.
That would have entailed, in effect, a ditheism (rather than a “binitarianism”). (pg. 27, Jesus Monotheism)
And to finish it off, Larry Hurtado’s words will in effect take this point home. I admit I have not read Hurtado’s full book here (since your last month, I’ve been getting a bit addicted to quantum physics and have been spending a little too much time reading those books), but Hurtado also outright says that binitarianism and ditheism are two different things. Here, I will quote him:
This is why I have referred to this Jesus-devotion as a “binitarian” form of monotheism: there are two distinguishable figures (God and Jesus), but they are posited in a relation to each other that seems intended to avoid a ditheism of two gods, and the devotional practice shows a similar concern (e.g., prayer characteristically offered to God through/in the name of Jesus). (Lord Jesus Christ, pp. 52-3)
So, what’s the difference between Segal (1977) and Culianu (1981) and Hurtado (2003), Boyarin (2004) and Fletcher-Louis (2015)? Before I answer that question, I will point out a problem in your quotation of Segal that leads me to think he is not using the terms ditheism and binitarianism synonymously, rather even distinguishes them in your quote:
“At its beginning, Christianity was rather more “binitarian” than trinitarian, emphasizing only Christ and the Father as God. Since Christianity has been suggested as a candidate for the heresy by scholars, we must be prepared to allow that the “two powers in heaven” were complementary instead of opposing deities as one normally expects. The heresy may have been “binitarianism” or “ditheism” depending on the perspective of the speaker, but not necessarily opposing dualism. Thus, propounding a strict definition of the heresy before looking at the evidence will be impossible.” [5]
Here, he says that depending on the perspective of the speaker, this could be viewed as a ditheism or binitarianism, the word ‘or’ clearly meaning they are different (since he would have otherwise bracketed binitarianism into ditheism like Culianu did). You also provide this quote:
“Note that the term “two gods” (ditheism) can be equated with “two powers” (binitarianism) in this passage.” [6]
This is the full quotation though, which appears in a footnote.
Since God never directly says in scripture that He was at the Sea and at Sinai,one must conclude that R. Hiyya is referring to an earlier midrash which resembled the text in
MRSbY or MRI or even to targumic exegesis of Ex. 3 since R. Hiyyaquotes in Aramaic. Note that the term “two gods” (ditheism) can be equated with"two powers" (binitarianism) in this passage.
This is ambiguous though, since Segal qualifies his statement with “in this passage” which means that this equating only happens in the midrashic passage being discussed. I will however, for the sake of the argument on this particular point say that he did equate them as you claim, even though the evidence suggests to me he’s clearly distinguishing them here: an important point remains impedes using this scholarship of the time of Culianu and earlier to try to talk about how binitarianism is defined now.
The problem is of course, christology is vastly different from what it was in 1981 and before. The revolution in christology occurred after 1981 with the work of Hurtado and Bauckham (as well as Hengel and Wright), and since then, much more work has been produced on analyzing christology in the NT and defining terms in different ways than would have been familiar with previous generations of scholarship. Thus, it is very apparent why someone might see a different definition of binitarianisim in Culianu’s day between how the term is being used in modern scholarship, especially with all modern scholars clearly distinguishing binitarianism from ditheism (Fletcher-Louis, Boyarin, Hurtado, etc, it is very clear). Thus, trying to use a definition of binitarianism from 1981 and applying it to modern scholarship would be like a physicist in the 1940’s using the definition of ‘quantum mechanics’ from 1910. The field had changed so much that it is simply a mistake in trying to do so. Thus, it’s more than obvious that the definition of binitarianism is exactly in line with what I’m saying for every single person who has been quoted. The way I see it, you also misinterpreted Schafer.
Many of the debates between the rabbis and the heretics betray a sharp and furious rejection of ideas about God that smack of polytheism in its pagan or Christian guise, the latter making do with just two or three gods—that is, developing a binitarian or trinitarian theology.
Schafer is more than obviously saying that to the rabbis and heretics, the binitarians just looked like disguised polytheists to them. You really didn’t need to go to Schafer to figure this one out, since my quote of Boyarin above already says the exact same thing: rabbis were trying to insist that the binitarians were really just ditheists all along. I don’t see how any of this contradicts me. You also go on to say Hurtado thinks Jesus is not worshipped “as God”, though he does say worship is literally incomplete to God if it does not include Jesus. Anyhow, I think it’s more than obvious naming a disagreement between Hurtado and me is quite pointless, since you’re not any more orthodox views than I am, in fact I think I’m more in line with him. Hurtado sees the pre-existence of Jesus as pretty essential, especially since this is the only way Hurtado can see Jesus as the principle agent through which God created the universe, though this explosively contradicts your view. You don’t think Jesus is the Word, however Hurtado elsewhere outright says Jesus in the NT had many titles, one of them being “the Word of God”. In this paper of his he has recently promoted on his blog:
So, for example, Jesus is the one through whom all things were made (by God), and the one through whom the world is redeemed (for God, e.g., 2 Cor 5:19; Rev 1:5-6). Jesus is the “Son of
God,” “the Image of God,” “the Word of God,” shares “the ‘form’ of God,” and has been
appointed ruler on God’s behalf (e.g., 1 Cor 15:20-28). In short, it seems to me that Jesus is
included within the “divine identity” specifically as God’s unique chief-agent! (pg. 10)
You also mention he doesn’t think John 20:28 is historically authentic. But quite frankly, not only doesn’t that matter to me, that doesn’t matter to this debate either. We’re debating whether or not Jesus is thought of God in the NT. And someone would have to head-over-heels combust to try to argue against John 20:28 calling Jesus God. Though, at this point I wont invoke the passage, since it’s clear we have enough points do discuss as it is now.
Since “Jewish Gospels” makes the very argument to which you appealed, then how can you claim that criticism of that specific argument in “Jewiish Gospels” is irrelevant to the point you are making? The criticisms of “Jewish Gospeles” I cited are all criticizing exactly the argument to which you appealed.
Nope. Jewish Gospels does not make the argument I’m appealling to. At all. I’ve made it very clear that the only argument here is that Jesus is God in the NT. If I wanted to use Jewish Gospels, I would probably read it first. The argument I’m obviously quoting is Border Lines, which demonstrates binitarianism in Second Temple Judaism. That’s the entire point of quoting Boyarin’s work. I’ve already exhaustively analyzed the criticisms, and I’ve shown that 1) the ones of Schafer, DeCock and almost all of them in general agree with Boyarin that binitarianism existed in this period, just as he said, and 2) all their disagreements are on peripheral points, such as whether or not binitarianism was a majority or overall smaller, or some other small points. And, as is clear, Boyarin absolutely makes the argument that binitarianism only became heretical in the second century. This is pretty clear in his book. He exhaustively analyzes the changes in the definition of the term heresy (hairesis) that occurred between the time of the Book of Acts to Justin, where it went from meaning a simple viewpoint to an unacceptable view contradicting an orthodoxy, and furthermore, he argues that what distinguished Christianity from Judaism in the second century was Logos theology/binitarianism. The Christians made it a heresy not to accept this, and the Jews made it a heresy to accept this. This is all throughout his book.
Is it “Border Lines” or “Jewish Gospels” or both, or neither?
As seen earlier, Border Lines. The Jewish Gospels is interested in proving Trinitarianism and the divinity of the Holy Spirit, which is what it failed to do. As DeCock pointed out on The Jewish Gospels, and I quoted her in my previous response, Boyarin does not show any of this at all, all he did was prove binitarianism existed at this point, and it’s not as if there are any scholars disagreeing with that. See:
Despite Boyarin’s controversial argument that the “germs” of Trinitarian theology were already present in Jewish thought at the time of Jesus, what he actually demonstrates to us is a Jewish binitarian theology, with which few would disagree. (pg. 188)
This quote appeared in my previous response. I think you have misunderstood a number of my points on this. You also misunderstood Boyarin once more:
The claim that the Jews were expecting a divine messiah takes up three entire chapters in “Border Lines” (chapters 4-6).
Sorry Jonathan, not a single one of those chapters argues for a divine “messiah”. The only time a divine “messiah” ever appears or is discussed is in The Jewish Gospels, and the idea of a divine messiah does not appear once in Border Lines or any of the academic reviews of Border Lines. A divine messiah is different from a second divine entity from the Father included in His monotheism, which has nothing to do with messiahship whatsoever. In my previous comment, I exhaustively detailed the argument of Border Lines and the Jewish Gospels, and have contrasted the reviews of the two books to solidify this point. I needn’t requote DeCock explaining exactly what The Jewish Gospels is about. The books simply cannot, on any planet, be equated. One tries to discuss how Christianity and Judaism historically became separate religions, whereas the other is interested in showing Trinitarianism and a divine messiah during the Second Temple Period. You say one more thing here:
Remember, you have claimed “Boyarin never argues for a divine Messiah in Border Lines”, But he does, explicitly.
The visions in 1 Enoch & 4 Ezra (2 Esdras), prove the Jews expected the messiah to be a divine figure.
Huh? Please quote where Boyarin says, in Border Lines, where these passages reveal a divine messiah. I have read these texts and strangely have found no such thing.
You claimed NT Wright’s review “has zero to do with Border Lines”, when in fact it is critiquing an argument which is made explicitly in “Border Lines”; the claim that the Jews were expecting a divine messiah.
As we’ve seen, Boyarin literally never mentions any divine messiah in Border Lines. The closest thing is his mention in pg. 140 that Rabbi Akiva in some second century source (or something) that said that the Son of Man figure is a Messiah. And it’s not like that is a contentious point, since the source he quotes, the BT Hagiga, explicitly says that. But Boyarin has absolutely no discussion of a divine messiah here, he’s simply showing that the Daniel 7 in later centuries was interpreted as referring to a divine figure. And everyone agrees with that.
You say that all Paget and Smith are saying is that Boyarin “hasn’t proven that logos theology was normative in Second Temple Judaism”. But that is very obviously not all they are saying. Paget says Boyarin’s thesis that binitarianism was common in the Second Temple Period, is “contentious
Exactly. They are saying he hasn’t proven it was “normative”. That’s exactly what I pointed out. He did not prove it was normative in the Second Temple Period. That is identical to what I’ve been saying all along. For example, when I said earlier:
James Paget and Mark Smith. Both of these scholars basically claim that he hasn’t proven that logos theology was normative in Second Temple Judaism
And it is not as if I just highlighted the word normative here to draw your attention to it. I have this word bolded in my original response. That’s all Paget and Smith are saying. All your quotes repeat exactly this, it is problematic/not proven to say that this view was normative. You seem to be missing that word.
You objected to Adriel Shremer’s criticism of Boyarin on the basis that you think he “wants to hold on to his own (highly) idiosyncratic explanation for the rise of binitarian theology”. You didn’t address any of his criticism of Boyarin’s arguments. That’s important, because the criticisms which Schremer makes are ths same criticisms made by other scholars, such as Paget, Smith, Schafer, DeCock, and Hurtado.
I have already stated earlier in my previous response that Boyarin has in fact responded to Schremer (or however you spell his name), and that Schremer’s thesis is overall highly idiosyncratic, both in his disagreements with Boyarin and his proposal of how binitarianism actually originated in the Second Temple Period.
The relevance, as I made clear, is that both Schafer and DeCock point out that Akiva is not saying God is two persons. He is speaking of two divine figures. Boyarin presents Akiva’s quotation as evidence that early Christians believed the “son of man” in Daniel 7 was one of two divine persons both in one being in a binitarian sense (Border Lines 140, Jewish Gospels 40-41). Both Schafter and DeCock point out there is no evidence for this interpretation of Akiva.
Huh? That is just flatly wrong. Neither Schafer nor DeCock mention Akiva in their reviews. I have no idea where you’re getting this from.
It is totally clear that when they refer to binitarianism in Second Temple Period Judaism, they are not speaking of one God who is two persons; they are not speaking of a “complex Godhead”.
They are speaking of, that at the very least there are two divine beings included in a single monotheism. In this sense, it is possible for the two divine beings to equal or for one of the divine beings to be lesser and one to be higher. But it’s evident that your use isn’t working.
Reviews of Boyarin?
You say I mention eight reviews. In fact, I mention 10 overall: Michael Carden, Elaine Pagels, Jack Miles, Emmanouela Grypeou, Jed Wyrick, Joshua Kulp, Ra’anan Boustan, Joshua Brumbach, Stuart Miller, and of course Richard Hays who was discussed separately. You claim I included commentary on The Jewish Gospels in my ten reviews. Well, I didn’t, I don’t know why you think I did. All reviews were clearly about Border Lines and didn’t mention the other book (since it hadn’t been published when all those reviews were written, with the exception of Hays book, which doesn’t mention The Jewish Gospels anyways). You say that I should have been able to quote more than eight (ten) scholars if what I was saying is right. Huh? It’s not like anything more than a small minority of academic monographs get ten reviews to begin with. Ten positive reviews is a lot, and that’s not including the reviews of Jacob Neusner and James D.G. Dunn that, while they exist, I do not have access to them since they’re behind a paywall. And to establish this beyond a doubt, I’ve further shown that Boyarin’s book has won the 2006 Award for Excellence in the Historical Study of Religion from the American Academy of Religion, and that it is a classic in the field of NT scholarship with literally over 800 citations. I could go through many of these citations, one after the other showing their agreement with Boyarin, but that would be pointlessly exhaustive. All this shows beyond a reasonable doubt the standing of academia in relation to Boyarin’s book. Lastly, you only say two of the scholars I quote explicitly accept binitarianism in their short reviews. Again, this, to me, sounds like a red herring since the scholars I mentioned, almost all of which aren’t included in your “two”, say things like Boyarin’s book is “characteristically brilliant” (Boustan), that the book is “groundbreaking” (Jed Wyrick), and you don’t even include Hays who flatly says Boyarin’s book demonstrates a multiplicity of the divine person. The endorsements of these scholars is more than enough to show how solid the book is in academia. Just last response of yours, you were saying something alike to the notion that Boyarin’s work is almost entirely rejected and is fringe or something. How the tides have changed! In your analyzation of the reviews, you seem to misunderstand (and selectively quote) all the reviews to try to show they don’t really accept Boyarin’s point. They all do, as they explicitly state. None of those scholars has somehow misunderstood Boyarin’s argument, which is flatly obvious, and/or are operating under different definitions. You seem to strangely think so when you say things like this:
Boustan understands Boyarin as arguing for “the existence of a second divine power who mediates between an otherwise wholly transcendent deity and the material world”; he says nothing about Boyarin proving a case for a “complex Godhead” in Second Temple Period Judaism, and absolutely nothing about binitarinism of any kind
Again, we’ve seen over and over that Boyarin’s use of words like “second god” and “second divinity” are included within monotheism (you appear to repeatedly forget this and that this specific language comes from Philo), and that Boustan is saying exactly what Boyarin is saying here. You are simply confusing yourself by shifting between the terms binitarianism/second god as if either of them exist outside of the range of monotheism or as if the two scholars are mysteriously talking about something different without actually telling us they are. Boyarin contends with the divine multiplicity, and all scholars I quoted agree that Boyarin’s book is largely correct (outside peripheral details where debate exists) and so we only need to find out what Boyarin is saying to see what they agree with.
But wait, you have told me that “Border Lines” and “Jewish Gospels” have completely different arguments, and “they do not make the same arguments whatsoever”. Yet here is Fletcher-Louis claiming that both books argue "there was a binitarian strand of Jewish theology already in pre-Christian Judaism ", and saying that both books appeal to Daniel 7 and the Similitudes of Enoch. How is it that Fletcher-Louis didn’t come to the same conclusion as you? How could he say that this same argument was made in both books, using the same passages, when you have insisted “they do not make the same arguments whatsoever”?
You’re clearly holding on to small details to try to show a large correlation between the two books. None of the tiny similarities mentioned here at all refute the enormous and overarching differences, and the fact that it has been definitively shown that the criticism you cited of The Jewish Gospels can’t be extended to Border Lines.
They are not evidence of something like ditheism in Boyarin. I did not present them as ditheism in Boyarin at all. If you had read the rest of what I wrote right after those words, you would have known that I stated repeatedly, very strongly, that this is not ditheism in Boyarin. Why did you even ask that question, when it was totally irrelevant to what I wrote? The point I made is that these are examples of Boyarin’s “binitarianism” which is not “a complex Godhead” of one God with two persons. Boyarin’s “binitarianism” is usually (but not always), two separate divine beings, only one of whom is the one true God, while the other is an ontologically and functionally subordinate divine being such as an exalted human, an arch-angel, or a hypostasis of one of God’s attributes. None of these is “binitarianism” in the sense of “a complex Godhead” of one God with two persons.
Why do you keep using the term “complex Godhead”? This needn’t be called a ‘Godhead’ if that bothers you, nor need it be ‘complex’. Anyhow, Boyarin clearly contended that, just as all scholars says here, binitarianism is two divine beings as one person, in one monotheism. Again, I will quote Boyaryin explicitly saying that everything about the language of “second god” or “second divinity” between the Father and the Logos never precluded or got outside the range of monotheism.
It becomes apparent, therefore, that for one branch of pre-Christian Judaism there was nothing strange about a doctrine of a deuteros theos, a “second” God (although to be sure, Philo uses this “shocking” term only once), and nothing in that doctrine that precluded monotheism. (pg. 113)
Hays review makes it even more explicit, flatly pointing out that Boyarin is talking about a multiplicity of the divine persons. Again, not a single scholar has any problem understanding Boyarin’s definition. You are the only person I have seen making such a fuss over the definition of this word. It seems to confuse no one else, and no one but yourself has something to pick over Boyarin’s use or acceptance or argument with his binitarianisim (which is just the regular binitarianism). You go on to quote Boyarin saying binitarianism was the anti-Nicene predecessor of trinitarianism, which seems to make what I’m saying even more obvious. You then claim I misunderstood this quote:
"In the first and second centuries, there were Jewish non-Christians who firmly held theological doctrines of a second God, variously called Logos, Memra, Sophia, Metatron, or Yahoel; indeed, perhaps most of the Jews did so at the time. There were also significant and powerful Christian voices who claimed that any distinction of persons within the godhead constituted ditheism.”
I simply do not see which part is supposed to refute my argument(s) at all. Jewish non-Christians held to doctrines of a “second God” (again, the term comes from Philo, who does not mean it in a polytheistic way), and independently of this, Christians were saying you can’t separate the two persons of God otherwise you’re a ditheist, which is a heresy.
Finally, when I pointed out that Boyarin qualifies his use of “divine” by saying that when he refers to Jesus as divine he means functionally divine, not ontologically divine, you said that wasn’t relevant because he said that about his use of “divine” in “Jewish Gospels”. How is it not relevant? Are you claiming that in “Border Lines” he uses the word “divine” in relation to Jesus in a completely different sense? If so, where’s the evidence?
The proof is in the pudding. Why is there no such qualification of terms in Border Lines? Finally, Hays:
Do you think the phrase “provocatively destabilized” means “This is something he has said which people will agree with”, or “This is something which people will disagree with”? Something else?
I think it’s pretty obvious, especially in the context where Hays said it. First, scholarship was pretty astute over how they rigidly say the divine person as having no multiplicity in the views of first-century Jews. Then, Boyarin comes along, and this entire idea is destabilized. That Boyarin’s book has so destabilized and broken earlier views in scholarship is also obviously reflected by the overwhelming agreement of scholars with Boyarin’s thesis in the reviews, the academic award the book won in 2006 and it’s 800+ citations. You once again go to Hurtado’s non-coded review. Again, Hurtado never says anything coded in that review. He made positive statements about a book, but did not endorse it. That’s what he did. There’s nothing coded. Seriously. Hurtado was pretty clear, as was Hays. Quite frankly, if you think Hurtado’s review was coded, you have understood it just as much as the person Hurtado was replying to.
Other stuff
I will repeat what I said. Even if a Greek word appears in a text with one meaning 90% of the time, this does not tell us anything about what it must mean in the remaining number of instances. We only have grounds to conclude that it is most likely to mean the same thing if it is used in the same context, with the same syntax and grammar. In this case, we would need to compare John’s use of the anarthrous θεός in John 1:1 to all John’s other uses of the anarthrous θεός in the same context.
I must simply disagree on this point. If we have a word, and in its usage it overwhelmingly means the same defintiion (i.e. theos meaning God), and we come across an example that might appear slightly ambiguous and not outright clear, there is absolutely no reason for arguing that it must have a different meaning. Again, John even uses theos twice in John 1:1, in the exact same passage, context, syntax, grammar, and everything else you want, and we both agree that in the other use of theos in John 1:1, it means God. And in every other context, all of them with the exception of Jesus saying “you are gods” (which is ironically, out of all the uses of theos in John, the one that is most dissimilar to 1:1 in context and grammar) mean ‘God’. There is a clear consistency, and thus clear rational reasoning allowing us to translate it as God here. This does not compare with theos referring to the Father, since in the two instances where it is not used to mean the Father, it is outright clear. John literally tells us that these two uses of theos do not refer to the Father, just like how John outright tells us that theos in John 10:34 does not mean God. The context gives it away. On the other hand, you don’t have any context to fall back on in John 1:1 to contrast it with uses of theos elsewhere, like we have for contrasting theos with the Father in the examples you cited. And to conclude, I am not arguing that, as you claim, this means theos must mean God. I’m saying that means it probably means God. I’m simply showing my position has more evidence to support it. Thus, the argument from “statistical analysis isn’t always right” wont work, since I’m not implementing any certainty into this argument. It’s just that, another argument. And Paul possibly, ambiguously meaning ‘divine’ in some random passage in Paul is quite irrelevant and does not substantiate your position. Do you really want to go to the statistics of theos in Paul too and come to the same 99% figure we’ve seen in John? And lastly, you did not mention my other comments on translating it as God: the context! It is pretty clear. The Word is with God at the beginning, the medium of all creation, and that the Word has a relationship with God that no other being holds. Furthermore, another thing you did not address was this: you claimed that the Word created Jesus, and I responded that it could not be more clear that this is wrong and that the Word is Jesus, exactly as Hurtado, Ehrman and all the others all point out:
In fact, this is all wrong, since John 1 never says that the Logos created Jesus. Ever. It doesn’t say that. It says that the Logos, the Word, is Jesus. The Logos became flesh. What became flesh was the Logos. See that? Jesus is the Word in John 1. That’s exactly what it says, it couldn’t be more clear.
Anyways,
On other matters, yes you previously did say that Jesus is the same person as the Father. Not only did you say “Jesus is the Father”, when I challenged you on this (pointing out that this is “confusing the persons”, and quoting Trinitarian theologians saying this), you doubled down, said it was not confusing the persons, and cited the Scutum Fidei in defense of the claim that Jesus is the Father, without realizing that the Scutum Fidei expressly denies that Jesus is the Father. I hope you agree now that Jesus is not the Father, and that the fact that 81 of the instances of θεός in John which do refer to the Father, does not indicate that the remaining two instances of θεός in John must also refer to the Father.
I do not know why you are trying to insist I’m doubling down or changing my mind. I said Jesus is the Father, in the sense of being, not person. Quite frankly, at best you’ve shown I might have been ambiguous (although I think I said countless times earlier that they are not the same being). There’s no point debating this point. I’ve explained what I mean here. Insisting I did not have this meaning will not lead to one argument refuting another.
Anywho, regarding the anarthrous use of theos in John 1:1, you argue from Philo that this means “a god” rather than “God”. Maybe this was true for Philo’s grammar, but it is untenable when discussing the Gospel of John. Another anarthrous use of theos in John appears right there in 1:18:
John 1:18: No one has ever seen God. It is God the only Son,[a] who is close to the Father’s heart,[b] who has made him known.
Right there, “No one has ever seen God” without a definite article. I have also read elsewhere that using the definite article in 1:1 could have been seen with modalistic underlinings, and thus it’s not surprising to see an avoidance.
Since Jesus is basing this parable on Jewish custom, and since “lord lord” is addressed by the bridesmaids to the bridegroom, are we really to believe that it was Jewish custom for the bridesmaids to refer to the bridegroom as “Yahweh”? Now I have read the paper, I find that Staples does not address this at all. He never explains what it would mean for bridesmaids to address the bridegroom as “lord lord”. This is a serious oversight.
Woah, woah, woah, please send Jason Staples an email (he responds) or ask him about this on his blog (he responds). You have flatly misunderstood the text. It is not that the bridgegroom is YHWH, it is that Jesus is YHWH here. The bridgegroom, in this parable, happens to be Jesus. There is no oversight whatsoever. And to make it more obvious that it is Jesus who is “Lord Lord” and not the bridgegroom, Jesus is also called Lord Lord in two other verses in the Synoptics.
Despite the fact that Jesus is apparently saying that the people to whom he is speaking were literally calling him “lord lord”, there is actually no record of anyone in any of the gospels ever calling Jesus “lord lord”. Not his followers, not his disciples (either before or after his resurrection), nor anyone else. Once again, Staples does not address this at all. Note that this is not an argument from silence. This is not a matter of saying "There isn’t any record of anyone calling Jesus “lord lord”, therefore Staples’ argument is wrong. The point I am making is that if Staples’ interpretation of the passage is correct, then people really did address Jesus as “lord lord”, specifically to identify him as Yahweh. This being the case, we would expect to find evidence of people addressing Jesus as “lord lord” or speaking of him as “lord lord”, specifically to identify him as Yahweh, because that’s what Staples says they did.
How you don’t consider this as an argument from silence is beyond me. Staples isn’t saying Jesus was regularly called “Lord Lord” in His daily life or whatnot. He’s just saying that in these specific Synoptic verses, Jesus is given the title Lord Lord. That much is irrefutable. Indeed, your point literally entirely evades this. And what does it mean to be called ‘Lord Lord’ at all? It means you’re Adonai YHWH.
It doesn’t mean you’re necessarily wrong, but it does mean you need to explain why your claim accounts for the data more efficiently than other hypotheses.
Of course it doesn’t mean I’m wrong. It just means that Jesus only ever discussed being Lord Lord on few occasions. It’s also important to note that out of the three times Jesus is Lord Lord in the Synoptics (Matthew 7: 21-2, 25:11; Luke 6:46) two of them appear in apocalyptic contexts of what will be said to Jesus on the Day of Judgement (or something), which appears to show this is more of a divine title for the exalted Jesus at the end of the world (or something) rather than an everyday term used by His followers, which should further solve your problem. There are many odd things in the Synoptics, this one needn’t be a problem. And to add, Staples discusses the apocalyptic context of Lord Lord at length in his paper, which I think you should revisit. To end with, Staples paper simply discusses what Lord Lord would have meant in the Synoptics, given what it meant everywhere outside of the Synoptics. It’s pretty akin to your argument from outside of John (regarding anarthrous theos) to show what something in John would have obviously meant to any reader.
Anyways, you go on to say that every once in a while, Lord Lord is translated from something that isn’t Adonai YHWH (but all your examples still unambiguously refer to the one God of Israel), such as Exodus 34:6 and others. I don’t see the point. Are you arguing Lord Lord could have meant YHWH Elohim in the Synoptics rather than Adonai YHWH? I don’t see how that would be doing anything other than shooting yourself in the foot, but anyways, it’s pretty clear that Lord Lord almost unanimously comes from Adonai YHWH with a few exceptions, which is expected in every type of translation. I also don’t know the point of you mentioning the Adonai Lord Lord passage. By the way, you mention something that I simply do not see:
In Ezekiel 23:32 LXX there is the variant αδωναι κυριος κυριος (adonai kurios kurios), and whatever kurios kurios stands for here, it cannot stand for adonai yahweh since adonai is already transliterated in this place with the Greek αδωναι.
From this LXX website, Exodus 23:32 reads:
οὐ συγκαταθήσῃ αὐτοῖς καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς αὐτῶν διαθήκην
I don’t see the Adonai Kurios Kurios here. Especially since Adonai is Hebrew, whereas Kurious is Greek. What would the two words be doing together? Anyways, I don’t see it in Exodus 23:32.
So he acknowledges the case or geminatio in Matthew 7:22; 25:11, and presents no evidence that there is “no indication of heightened emotion or affection” in the statements in Matthew 7:21. This is not a way to make a strong case.
Huh? This is a strange statement, since Staples simply says there is no evidence for there being any heightened emotion in these passages. The burden of proof is obviously on the one who wants to claim that any of this is actually taking place, given there’s no such indication. Concerning P967, here we have another interesting situation. Firstly, even if we entirely exclude Ezekiel, we still have over 40+ uses, hardly breaking down Staples argument. Secondly, Staples refers to scholarship suggesting P967 actually has alterations. Though it is old, it doesn’t look like there’s anything refuting it, and that Staples agrees with it in 2018 means that it is an argument that must still be addressed in 2018. Otherwise, Staples could have argued the exact same thing in his paper without mentioning the 1948 paper. It’s much easier to just refer to someone who has already made the argument. Why would Staples arguments on the alterations be incorrect? Your response to “modern scholarship” disagreeing with Staples appears to be only one reference to someone who doesn’t discuss the possibility of alteration of P967. So, 1) There is scholarship that must be addressed on P967, and 2) Even with it, there is still a plentiful number of cases with Lord Lord being used, exactly in line with what Staples says, so not much changes.
- He claims the double kurios was used as an exorcism formula, but fails to present any evidence of it being used in this way.
Huh? This is the only discussion of exorcism/healing in his paper:
Verse 22 further underscores the connection of the double κύριος with the divine name, revealing that, as with the names of other deities or angels in the ancient world, the κύριος κύριος formula can be invoked to perform works of power (cf. the casting out of evil spirits by the ‘name of κύριος Jesus’ in Acts 19.13). Indeed, the condemned protest that they have performed cosmic acts of power (δυνάμεις) such as exorcism and prophecy ‘in your name’ (7.22), which might initially be assumed to be ‘Jesus’
This clearly concerns just a peripheral possibility to Staples argument that these verses show Lord Lord being used in a context for Jesus where it is used in an exorcism context. It is possible that the double formula is to be used in exorcism/similar contexts, or that the double formula only appears here in a context that just so happens to mention exorcism/healing/etc. It’s hardly relevant overall.
He claims that the double kurios amounts to calling Jesus God, but fails to provide any evidence that anyone in the first century or beyond understood the double kurios this way.
This appears to be a red herring, as he shows that almost all uses of Lord Lord in the ancient world come from Adonai YHWH, with perhaps the precious few exceptions you mentioned. A phrase has the meaning of what it was translated from. That is all that is needed to be shown to carry Staples argument. And to add on, you take the seeming perspective of this being simply an “exclamatory formula”, the heightened emotion interpretation, but you entirely sidestep Staples arguments revealing that this is actually not at all the intended use of the phrase on pg. 15, by pointing out that the context fits much better by understanding this title as an address/invocation to grant access to the kingdom. That is, in order to get into the kingdom, one must know and address Jesus as “Lord Lord”, or perhaps a similar title that yields the same theological significance. If it was simply intended of heightened emotion, it must be quite a coincidence that it only appears in apocalyptic context where the salvation of the listener is being discussed.
This is only the first comment, do not reply yet. Since your responses are incredibly long, I will post a second response later. I will send you a message when I am done sending my responses so that you can respond yourself. Until that time, this comment (and others) may be modified.