@ManiacalVesalius, here you are (it’s in three posts because of the length; the board won’t let me post it all at once). Sorry for the wait.
**Point one. Binitarianism.
One of the reasons for your recurring misreading of sources is your failure to understand that “binitarianism” is used in different ways in the literature. In Christian studies (especially studies of early Christianity), when used to describe Christian beliefs, it is typically (though not always), used in the sense of God as two persons. That’s the sense in which you keep using it.
However, this is not the only sense in which it is used in the broader literature. In the broader literature, especially on Second Temple Period Judaism and Gnostic studies, it is used to describe the belief in two separate divine beings; typically the one true God, and a lesser divine entity (ontologically and functionally inferior), who is not God. Here Culianu uses the term “binitarianism” in this sense.
"Graetz and his followers certainly were wrong in their demonstrations, because they confused two distinct concepts, namely ditheism (or binitarianism) and dualism. Some Jewish pre-Christian doctrines actually were acquainted with the idea of a second god, who was sometimes held responsible for the creation of the world. This second divine being was usually an angel of the Lord, who obeyed His orders and who by no means had any evil intent towards Him.
That’s very clear; a second divine being (usually an angel), obedient to God and the agent of creation, and that’s described as “binitarianism”. Culianu goes on to call this “ditheism”, while differentiating it from dualism.
“The earliest rabbinic evidence concerning the condemnation of this ditheistic heresy belongs to the IInd cent. A.D., but Philo of Alexandria had previously discussed the hypothesis of two Gods. Therefore, it is possible to state that the doctrine was pre-Christian. It is also possible to state, with absolute certainty, that the doctrine was not dualistic. Radical dualism involves the coeternity of two antagonistic principles, while mitigated dualism involves a discontinuity in the expanding of Being. Jewish binitarianism did not fit either the first or the second kinds of dualism. Nevertheless, some of the Jewish ditheists seem to have believed that the world had been created by an angel of the Lord.” [1]
Again, Culianu describes the idea of a second divine being who is an angel, as both “binitarianism” and “ditheism”. Culianu concludes thus.
“Jewish ditheism is certainly pre-Christian. In the 1st century A.D. or earlier, the binitarian doctrine undergoes the following transformations:” [2]
Note again that here Culianu is using “ditheism” as a synonym for “binitarianiism”. This is not the definition that you use.
You claim to agree with what Schafer says about Second Temple Period binitarianism, but that’s only because you don’t understand how he uses the term. He does not use it with the meaning you ascribe to it. He applies a very different meaning to it. Schafer himself uses “binitarianism” and “Trinitarianism” as speaking of two and three gods respectively (which Trinitarians vehemently reject).
“Many of the debates between the rabbis and the heretics betray a sharp and furious rejection of ideas about God that smack of polytheism in its pagan or Christian guise, the latter making do with just two or three gods—that is, developing a binitarian or trinitarian theology.” [3]
Note that Schafer forthrightly describes the Trinity as “polytheism” in a “Christian guse”. In Schafer’s view, the “two powers” heresy was the belief in “two more or less equal deities”, which he defines as “binitarianism”.
“Hence, a “two powers” heresy in the sense of a dualistic (gnostic) theology would not appear to be the most obvious option, as has often been proposed.10 The more likely option, therefore, is a “binitarian” theology, according to which two more or less equal deities are held jointly responsible for the creation of the world.” [4]
Of course you do not believe that “binitarianism” is the belief in “two more or less equal deities”; you define the word completely differently. However, the definition used by Schafer is found repeatedly in the literature.
You thought that Segal uses the word the way you do. He does not. Segal use the same definition as Schafer, in his classic work “Two Powers In Heaven”. In his view early Christianity was originally binitarian, but Segal describes this as “complementary instead of opposing deities”. Note the plural; you do not believe in plural deities, surely? That’s not binitarianism in your view. Segal notes the “two powers” heresy may have been binitarianism or ditheism.
“At its beginning, Christianity was rather more “binitarian” than trinitarian, emphasizing only Christ and the Father as God. Since Christianity has been suggested as a candidate for the heresy by scholars, we must be prepared to allow that the “two powers in heaven” were complementary instead of opposing deities as one normally expects. The heresy may have been “binitarianism” or “ditheism” depending on the perspective of the speaker, but not necessarily opposing dualism. Thus, propounding a strict definition of the heresy before looking at the evidence will be impossible.” [5]
Again, note that Segal defines early Christian binitarianism as “complementary instead of opposing deities”. This is not the definition you use. Later he notes that the reference to “two gods” in Rabbi Hiyya ben Abba can be equated with binitarianism, making ditheism and binitarianism equivalent in this case.
“Note that the term “two gods” (ditheism) can be equated with “two powers” (binitarianism) in this passage.” [6]
Importantly, Segal says the earliest rabbinic opposition to “two powers” was opposition to the view of a second divine figure who is ontologically and functionally subordinate to God, as an arch-angel, mediator, or principle agent. Note that this is not binitarianism in your definition; this is not opposition to the idea of a “complex Godhead” of God as two persons.
“The earliest isolatable rabbinic opposition to “two powers,” then, is not against ethical dualism, but against a principal angel or mediator” [7]
Segal says it is “apt” to refer to this idea of a subordinate secondary divine figure or mediator who is not God (who is an angel), as binitarianism or ditheism.
While it seems possible that the angelic or anthropomorphic creature has some relation to the problem of theodicy, the helping angel is in no way evil. The portrayal of the second figure does not explain the existence of evil so much as the appearance of a sublime divinity to men. Therefore it is apt to call such beliefs “binitarianism” or “ditheism” rather than “dualism.”" [8]
So Segal uses “binitarian” and “ditheism” as complementary and overlapping terms, to describe two separate divine beings (not a “complex Godhead” of God as two persons), where the second being is not God, and is ontologically and functionally subordinate to the one true God. He refers to this as “complementary binitarianism” to differentiate it from forms of binitarianism which are ditheism or even dualism. [9] This is clearly not what you mean by “binitarianism”. Segal goes on to show how the earliest Church Fathers (starting with Hermas and Justin Martyr), held to a “complementary binitarianism” of two separate divine figures; the Father as the one true God, and Jesus as a separate divine figure in the form of an angel, ontologically and functionally subordinate to God. Again, this is not what you mean when you say “binitarian”.
Confusion between these two definitions is one of the reasons Hurtado cites for his abandonment of the term. When he used the term “binitarian” people kept thinking he was speaking of the belief in God as two persons, but he was not. Hurtado denies that the New Testament teaches a “complex Godhead”, and has specifically opposed Bauckham’s claim that Jesus was seen as part of the “divine identity”. Hurtado does not say the first Christians believed this but just didn’t have the words to say it, he says they didn’t believe it. One of the reasons for this is that he does not believe “binitarianism” in the sense of a “complex Godhead” (one God who is two persons), existed in Second Temple Period Judaism. As I have said, Hurtado’s arguments can get you to ontological binitarianism, but only if you go beyond what Hurtado himself argues. You cannot get there with his arguments alone, because he does not argue for ontological binitarianism.
As we know, Hurtado does not even believe Jesus is worshiped as God in the New Testatment. Hurtado uses “binitarian” in the sense of two divine figures who are two separate beings. For Hurtado, the New Testament teaches there is one God (the Father), who is the creator and source of all things, and Jesus is the unique agent of God’s divine purposes (such as creation and redemption).
Significantly, Hurtado only uses “binitarian” in a functional sense (not an ontological sense), and regards Jesus in the New Testament as functionally divine (not ontologically divine). Consequently, Hurtado speaks of a “binitarian shape of worship” not a binitarian theology, and has stated explicitly “In short, I am not an exponent of “binitarianism””, and “I don’t recall ever referring to “binitarianism”, but instead to a “binitarian devotional pattern” (and similar phrasing)”. In direct contrast to you, Hurtado does not argue that the New Testament contains “binitarianism” as you define it (in fact he does not argue that the New Testament contains binitarianism at all). He doesn’t even think Thomas’ confession in John 20:28 is historically authentic; he views it as a theological inclusion by the “Johannine community” at the end of the first century.
Point two. Border Lines & Jewish Gospels.
Let’s look at your original reason for appealing to Boyarin. This was your argument.
The works of Segal and Boyarin collectively demonstrate that Judaic monotheism wasn’t as simple “one God one person one everything” – and that the multiplicity of the persons of God, not just the bodies, was known and not at all heretical in pre-Christian Judaism.
That’s very clear. You were appealing to Boyarin’s work to prove that “the multiplicity of the persons of God” was “known and not at all heretical in pre-Christian Judaism”. It is remarkable therefore that to date you have not cited Boyarin actually saying this at all. However, you have been claiming that Boyarin presents evidence for a Second Temple Period binitarianism which regarded God as two persons.
Now here’s the problem.
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You appealed to Boyarin’s argument for Second Temple Period Judaism.
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To date you have claimed that Boyarin does not make this argument in “Border Lines”.
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You have acknowledged that he does make this argument in “Jewish Gospels”.
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You have claimed that criticism of “Jewish Gospels” is irrelevant to this argument.
Since “Jewish Gospels” makes the very argument to which you appealed, then how can you claim that criticism of that specific argument in “Jewiish Gospels” is irrelevant to the point you are making? The criticisms of “Jewish Gospeles” I cited are all criticizing exactly the argument to which you appealed.
So let’s be clear on this. Are you still claiming that Boyarin’s work has proved that “the multiplicity of the persons of God” was “known and not at all heretical in pre-Christian Judaism”? If so, then which of his works do you claim makes this argument? Is it “Border Lines” or “Jewish Gospels” or both, or neither? If you say it’s “Jewish Gospels”, then all the criticisms of that argument in “Jewish Gospels” which I have cited, are relevant. If it’s “Border Lines”, then you’ve just contradicted what you say here.
In fact, now that I’ve read Border Lines, it is dead obvious that they do not make the same arguments whatsoever.
And here.
The argument of Border Lines is utterly different from that of The Jewish Gospels. Border Lines was written to examine how Christianity and Judaism originally separated from each other.
I’ll now summarize the arguments which are found in both “Border Lines” and “Jewish” Gospels. In fact, both of them examine how Christianity and Judaism originally separated from each other. This is explained in the very first page of both books. Here are the arguments common to both books.
- Judaism & Christianity were once one religion, which eventually became artificially differentiated.
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Border Lines (1): “First of all, I will insist that the borders between Christianity and Judaism are as constructed and imposed, as artificial and political as any of the borders on earth. I shall propose in this book that just as the border between Mexico and the United States is a border that was imposed by strong people on weaker people, so too is the border between Christianity and Judaism.”
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Jewish Gospels (1): “In this book, I’m going to tell a very different historical story, a story of a time when Jews and Christians were much more mixed up with each other than they are now, when there were many Jews who believed in something quite like the Father and the Son and even in something quite like the incarnation of the Son in the Messiah, and when followers of Jesus kept kosher as Jews, and accordingly a time in which the question of the difference between Judaism and Christianity just didn’t exist as it does now.”
- Many Second Temple Jews were expecting a divine messiah.
The claim that the Jews were expecting a divine messiah takes up three entire chapters in “Border Lines” (chapters 4-6). This is Boyarin’s argument for a binitarian strain of belief in Second Temple Period Judaism. So the argument which you claim is completely absent from “Border Lines”, actually takes up three entire chapters of the book (you can see this explained in detail here).
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Border Lines (30-31): “Logos theology, in the sense in which I use it here, is constituted by several variations of a doctrine that between God and the world, there is a second divine entity, God’s Word (Logos) or God’s Wisdom, who mediates between the fully transcendent Godhead and the material world. This doctrine was widely held by Jews in the pre-Christian era and after the beginnings of Christianity was widely held and widely contested in Christian circles.”
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Jewish Gospels (1-2): “Jesus, when he came,came in a form that many, many Jews were expecting: a second divine figure incarnated in a human.”
- The term “Son of Man” refers to a divine figure who can be called God.
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Border Lines (141): “We end up with a clear indication of a second divine person, called the Youth (Son of Man), about whom it can be discussed whether he is identical in essence, similar in essence, similar (no essence), or dissimilar entirely with the first person.”
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Jewish Gospels (26): In this chapter, I will show that almost the opposite was the case in the Gospel of Mark: “Son of God” referred to the king of Israel, the earthly king of David’s seat, while “Son of Man” referred to a heavenly figure and not a human being at all."
- The vision of Daniel 7 proves the Jews expected the messiah to be a divine figure.
This argument takes up 24 pages of Jewish Gospels.
- There are two divine figures in Daniel 7 (Border Lines 141, Jewish Gospels 39-40).
- The “son of man” in Daniel 7 is a title referring to God (Border Lines 141, Jewish Gospels 33).
- This use of “son of man” to refer to God, is also found in 1 Enoch (Border Lines 141, Jewish Gospels 52, 73, 77).
- A text attributed to Ravi Akiba (second century), shows he interpreted Daniel 7 as referring to “two powers in heaven”, which Boyarin presents as evidence that early Christians believed the “son of man” in Daniel 7 was one of two divine persons in a binitarian sense (Border Lines 140, Jewish Gospels 40-41).
Remember, you have claimed “Boyarin never argues for a divine Messiah in Border Lines”, But he does, explicitly.
- The visions in 1 Enoch & 4 Ezra (2 Esdras), prove the Jews expected the messiah to be a divine figure.
Once again, we find another argument in “Border Lines” that the Jews expected a divine messiah; he also links Daniel 7 to the Trinity by referring to the " two divine figures are portrayed in Daniel 7, whom we might be tempted to call the Father and the Son".
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Border Lines (141): :We end up with a clear indication of a second divine person, called the Youth (Son of Man), about whom it can be discussed whether he is identical in essence, similar in essence, similar (no essence), or dissimilar entirely with the first person. When he is called or calls himself the “Son of Man” this is a citation of the Daniel text.79 He is called the “Youth,” that is, the “Son of Man,” in contrast to the “Ancient of Days.” These traditions all understand that two divine figures are portrayed in Daniel 7, whom we might be tempted to call the Father and the Son. Evidence for this concatenation of Enoch, Metatron, and the Son of Man can be adduced from 1 Enoch 71, in which Enoch is explicitly addressed as the Son of Man—and Enoch is, of course, Metatron before his apotheosis. Nonrabbinic and even antirabbinic ideas (that is, ideas that the Rabbis themselves."
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Jewish Gospels (71-101): far too much to quote directly
So it is obviously untrue that the two books “do not make the same arguments whatsoever”, and it is also untrue that “The argument of Border Lines is utterly different from that of The Jewish Gospels”.
Now to your responses to specific scholarly critiques.
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You claimed NT Wright’s review “has zero to do with Border Lines”, when in fact it is critiquing an argument which is made explicitly in “Border Lines”; the claim that the Jews were expecting a divine messiah.
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You say that all Paget and Smith are saying is that Boyarin “hasn’t proven that logos theology was normative in Second Temple Judaism”. But that is very obviously not all they are saying. Paget says Boyarin’s thesis that binitarianism was common in the Second Temple Period, is “contentious”, and that the “The sources on which he bases his wide-ranging conclusions about Jewish binitarianism are problematic, as his reading of the prologue of John’s Gospel in terms of a kind of history of Jewish binitarianism”. He also says Boyarin’s effort to suggest that a high Christology would not have been out of place in Second Temple Period Judaism “remains unproven”. None of this is talking about Logos theology.
Smith likewise says Boyarin’s claim that binitarian views were normative in the Second Temple Period “is highly controversial” and “exceeds the available evidence”. Commenting on Boyarin’s thesis that Israel worshiped two gods until one of them was subsumed into the other, re-merging briefly as the “Son of Man” in Daniel 7, Smith comments “Boyarin’s view requires further evidence”. Once again, that’s not about logos theology.
Additionally, as I have pointed out, the “binitarianism” of which Paget and Smith speak is not a binitarianism of God being two persons, but of two divine figures, one of them being the one true God (who is one person), and one of them being subordinate divine figure (such as an angel, personification of one of God’s attributes, or an exalted human).
- You objected to Adriel Shremer’s criticism of Boyarin on the basis that you think he “wants to hold on to his own (highly) idiosyncratic explanation for the rise of binitarian theology”. You didn’t address any of his criticism of Boyarin’s arguments. That’s important, because the criticisms which Schremer makes are ths same criticisms made by other scholars, such as Paget, Smith, Schafer, DeCock, and Hurtado. Schremer extensively criticized Boyarin’s use of later rabbinic commentary, saying that Boyarin’s claim that specific rabbinic texts refer to early Christian views of Jesus as examples of the Two Powers heresy, are “has never been demonstrated”. He also disputes Boyarin’s tendency to read references to Christians into rabbinic texts where they do not exist, and that the dating of one of his key pieces of evidence “is difficult to accept”. Assessing similar rabbinic evidence presented by Boyarin, Schremer describes the reliability of the attributions as “extremely feeble “. Again, this is the same kind of criticism which has been made by other scholars, and you haven’t addressed any of it.
You ask this.
Schafer and DeCock never claim that it is wrong that Rabbi Akiva interpreted Daniel 7 as referring to two divine figures. Akiva, in the texts Boyarin cites, does make that claim. That’s clear. Schafer and DeCock never criticise that. Akiva makes this interpretation. So where is the relevance in this?
The relevance, as I made clear, is that both Schafer and DeCock point out that Akiva is not saying God is two persons. He is speaking of two divine figures. Boyarin presents Akiva’s quotation as evidence that early Christians believed the “son of man” in Daniel 7 was one of two divine persons both in one being in a binitarian sense (Border Lines 140, Jewish Gospels 40-41). Both Schafter and DeCock point out there is no evidence for this interpretation of Akiva.
You say this.
We must remember that I originally wrote that both Alan Segal and Daniel Boyarin’s work demonstrates binitarianism in Judaism by the first century and earlier. In fact, this is virtually consensus because of the two scholars. Both Schafer and DeCock agree with Boyarin that bintarianism existed among the Jews at this time – they just claim that Boyarin makes it seem like he invented this claim, even though he didn’t and that it is well known anyways in scholarship before The Jewish Gospels.
The problem here is that you’re not understanding what they mean. Both Schafer and DeCock use “binitarian” only in the sense of “two divine figures”, and not in the sense of “one God who is actually two persons”. Both of them say that the idea of two separate divine figures is well documented in Second Temple Period Judaism, but only in the sense of the one true God and a divine agent who is separate from Him. DeCock points this out explicitly.
Despite Boyarin’s controversial argument that the “germs” of Trinitarian theology were already present in Jewish thought at the time of Jesus, what he actually demonstrates to us is a Jewish binitarian theology, with which few would disagree. For example, many today are on board with Larry W. Hurtado’s work in One God, One Lord: Early Christian Devotion and Ancient Jewish Monotheism, in which he demonstrates that early Judaism provided early Christianity with the conceptual categories for accommodating the exaltation of Jesus to God’s right hand.
That’s a “binitarian theology” in which Jesus is not God, an “exaltation Christology” in which Jesus is a divine agent of God. DeCock agrees with Hurtado’s view of Jesus, in which Jesus is not one of the persons in a Godhead, and is not worshiped as God. Schafer likewise describes a “binitarian idea of two divine figures”, one of which is not God, but is either an exalted human (such as Enoch), or an angel, or the Word of God. Schafer says this.
It turns out, for example, that the old binitarian idea of two divine figures, presaged in Second Temple Judaism and adopted by the New Testament, lived on in certain circles in rabbinic Judaism, despite its ever more sophisticated formulation in Christian theology with its climax in the doctrine of Trinity. The most prominent example of rabbinic Judaism’s ongoing preoccupation with—and its struggle against—binitarian ideas within its own fold is** the elevation of the prediluvian patriarch Enoch to the highest angel Metatron**, enthroned in heaven next to God and granted the title “Lesser God.”
It is totally clear that when they refer to binitarianism in Second Temple Period Judaism, they are not speaking of one God who is two persons; they are not speaking of a “complex Godhead”.
You posted a lot of positive comments from reviewers of Boarin’s work. Strangely, you included commentary on “Jewish Gospels” even though you kept telling me that this book makes completely different arguments to “Border Lines” and is totally irrelevant to this discussion. I note you quoted only eight scholars, which was interesting. Surely if Boyarin has been as overwhelmingly convincing as you claim, and has overturned the entire scholarly consensus, you would be able to find some evidence for this; much more than only eight scholars.
But what’s even more interesting is that out of your eight scholars, only two of them think that Boyarin has provided evidence for pre-Christian Jewish “binitarianism” in the sense of a “complex Godhead”, in which God is more than one person. Joshua Kulp says this.
“Boyarin demonstrates that previous to these centuries the belief in a complex godhead was not a mark through which Jesus-followers were distinguished from those Jews who did not follow him.”
Joshua Brumbach says this.
“Boyarin provides a serious proposal for understanding complex unity, and how it developed in Early Judaism.”
That’s it. Those are the only two scholars on that list of yours which agree with the argument which is the whole reason why you cited Boyarin in the first place. None of the other scholars describe Boyarin making this argument at all, and none of them use “binitarian” in the sense of a “complex Godhead” in which God is at least two persons.
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Boustan understands Boyarin as arguing for “the existence of a second divine power who mediates between an otherwise wholly transcendent deity and the material world”; he says nothing about Boyarin proving a case for a “complex Godhead” in Second Temple Period Judaism, and absolutely nothing about binitarinism of any kind
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Wyrick understands Boyarin as arguing for “a Jewish worship of a helper divinity, variously referred to as Logos, Memra, and/or Sophia”; note that Wyrick’s definition of “binitarianism” is one true God, who is assisted by “a helper divinity” who is not God, and he says nothing about Boyarin proving a case for a “complex Godhead” in Second Temple Period Judaism
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Miller says only "Boyarin devotes much attention to the notion that there is a divine power that was perceived as wisdom, or “the Word,” which he believes can be traced to first-century Judaism, and says Boyarin believes this belief was drawn on by the author of John’s gospel, and that’s all he says about the subject; he says nothing about Boyarin proving a case for a “complex Godhead” in Second Temple Period Judaism, and absolutely nothing about binitarinism of any kind
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Miles says Boyarin “suggests that the view Rabbinic Judaism would eventually proscribe as “two powers in heaven” was once legitimately Jewish, while the view Christianity would eventually proscribe as “Judaizing” was once legitimately Christian”, and that’s all he says on the subject; he says nothing at all about a “complex Godhead” in Second Temple Period Judaism, and absolutely nothing about binitarianism of any kind (remember, this is the guy who wrote a blurb for the book)
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Grypeou says “The succession in rabbinic authority was constructed on the invention of rabbinic orthodoxy as opposed to the heresy of “Two Powers in Heaven.”", and that is literally all she says about the subject; he says nothing about Boyarin proving a case for a “complex Godhead” in Second Temple Period Judaism, and absolutely nothing about binitarinism of any kind
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Michael Carden understands Boyarin as arguing for “a Jewish worship of a helper divinity, variously referred to as Logos, Memra, and/or Sophia”; note that Carden’s definition of “binitarianism” is one true God, who is assisted by “a helper divinity” who is not God, and he says nothing about Boyarin proving a case for a “complex Godhead” in Second Temple Period Judaism
Remember, you said this.
The works of Segal and Boyarin collectively demonstrate that Judaic monotheism wasn’t as simple “one God one person one everything” – and that the multiplicity of the persons of God, not just the bodies, was known and not at all heretical in pre-Christian Judaism.
That’s very clear. You were appealing to Boyarin’s work to prove that “the multiplicity of the persons of God” was “known and not at all heretical in pre-Christian Judaism”. It is remarkable therefore that to date you have not cited Boyarin actually saying this at all. To save us both some time, please tell me which of Boyarin’s works makes this claim, and what evidence he cites in support of it.
So I say again, Boyarin has made extremely bold claims which have convinced very few people at all (so few that you could only find one person who agreed with his specific novel claim), and only highly qualified assent has been given to any of his claims. This is mainly because he did not present any actual evidence that God was viewed as a “duality of persons” at any time during the Second Temple Period. Hurtado states bluntly, “there is no indication of any duality in the worship practice of 2nd temple Jews”.
By the way, have you looked for all the references to Boyarin in the first volume of “Jesus Monotheism”? I have. He receives hardly a mention. The most significant reference to him is this complete rejection of his claim regarding the “son of man” in Enoch.
“So D. Boyarin’s claim that the Enochic Son of Man is a “divine person,” and “a Son alongside the Ancient of Days, whom we might begin to think of as the Father” (Jewish Gospels, 77) is misguided.” [10]
The only mention of Boyarin in connection to binitarianism is this.
“Daniel Boyarin (in his Border Lines and Jewish Gospels) goes even further: there was a binitarian strand of Jewish theology already in pre-Christian Judaism (attested especially in Dan 7 and the Similitudes of Enoch).” [11]
But wait, you have told me that “Border Lines” and “Jewish Gospels” have completely different arguments, and “they do not make the same arguments whatsoever”. Yet here is Fletcher-Louis claiming that both books argue "there was a binitarian strand of Jewish theology already in pre-Christian Judaism ", and saying that both books appeal to Daniel 7 and the Similitudes of Enoch. How is it that Fletcher-Louis didn’t come to the same conclusion as you? How could he say that this same argument was made in both books, using the same passages, when you have insisted “they do not make the same arguments whatsoever”?
Fletcher-Louis does not comment on the precise nature of Boyarin’s “binitarianism” (nor does he say whether or not he agrees with it), but importantly there is no mention at all of Boyarin having convinced everyone of a doctrine of a “complex Godhead” in Second Temple Period Judaism, nor does Fletcher-Louis ever appeal to any such claim by Boyarin. Maybe Fletcher-Louis missed the memo that you received, about how all the scholars now believe that Second Temple Period Jews believed in a “complex Godhead” of God as more than one person?
Finally, yes I have already read Boyarin’s paper on the Memra, and it’s just an earlier version of the same arguments he recycles in “Border Lines” and “Jewish Gospels”.
Point three. Boyarin & binitarianism.
This is related to the descriptions of binitarianism at the beginning of this post. In a previous post I cited these phrases from Boyarin.
“two divine figures” (Jewish Gospels, 39)
“two divinities” (Jewish Gospels, 40)
“two divine figures in heaven” (Jewish Gospels, 40)
“a second divine figure” (Jewish Gospels, 43)
“a young God subordinated to an old God” (Jewish Gospels, 51)
“Son as a “Second God”” (Border Lines, 90)
“a second God” (Border Lines, 92)
“a “second” God” (Border Lines, 113)
“second god” (Border Lines, 116)
“second god” (Border Lines, 122)
“two divine powers” (Border Lines, 123)
“second god” (Border Lines, 125)
“second God” (Border Lines, 138)
“two divine figures” (Border Lines, 141)
“two divine figures” (Border Lines, 301)
Your very odd response was this.
So how can any of the quotations you provide be evidence of something like ditheism in Boyarin?
They are not evidence of something like ditheism in Boyarin. I did not present them as ditheism in Boyarin at all. If you had read the rest of what I wrote right after those words, you would have known that I stated repeatedly, very strongly, that this is not ditheism in Boyarin. Why did you even ask that question, when it was totally irrelevant to what I wrote? The point I made is that these are examples of Boyarin’s “binitarianism” which is not “a complex Godhead” of one God with two persons. Boyarin’s “binitarianism” is usually (but not always), two separate divine beings, only one of whom is the one true God, while the other is an ontologically and functionally subordinate divine being such as an exalted human, an arch-angel, or a hypostasis of one of God’s attributes. None of these is “binitarianism” in the sense of “a complex Godhead” of one God with two persons.
As I have pointed out, this is exactly how Boyarin’s description of Second Temple Period Jewish “binitarianism” is understood by scholars such as Schafer, Hurtado, DeCock, Boustan, Brumbach, Carden, Wyrick, and others.
The ambiguity of Boyarin’s use of the term “binitarian” is seen even more distinctly when he represents it as a synonym of ditheism, as he does here.
“Goshen-Gottstein has somehow misread my work to imply that the issue of “Two Powers in Heaven” “stands at the heart of the parting of the ways.” My argument is entirely opposite from such a notion, since I am suggesting strenuously that binitarian/ditheistic notions of godhead are a shared retention between later Jews and Christians of an earlier theological approach and not one formed in one of the later communities and either accepted or rejected by the other one.” [12]
In “Border Lines” he explains that when he uses the term “Logos theology” he is not speaking of one specific kind of theology, especially not one specific Christian belief in God as two persons. Instead he uses the term “Logos theology” in a very general sense, to cover various different theologies which he describes as “binitarian”.
“The Gospel of John, according to this view, when taken together with the Logos of Philo and with the Targum, provides further important evidence that Logos theology, used here as a general term for various closely related binitarian theologies, was the religious koine of Jews in Palestine and the Diaspora, their theological lingua franca, which is not, of course, to claim that it was a universally held position.” [13]
In “Border Lines” he uses “binitarianism” to describe the following.
- The idea of one true God, who is accompanied by a personification or hypostasis of one of His attributes (such as His Word/Memra or Wisdom/Sophia), which acts as a mediator or agent of God (but is not God); this is not what you mean when you say “binitarianism”
“various second-God theologies of Jews, including Logos, Memra, Sophia, Metatron, and others” [14]
- The idea of one true God, who is accompanied by a second divine figure (a separate entity who is not God), who is ontologically and functionally subordinate to God, such as an exalted human or an arch-angel; this is not what you mean when you say “binitarianism”
“a binitarian, who holds that the angelic viceregent, Metatron, is to be worshiped” [15]
- The later Christian idea of one God who is two persons; this is what you mean when you say “binitarianism” (but he only uses this once)
“binitarianism (the ante-Nicene predecessor to trinitarianism)” [16]
So when he uses terms such as “Logos theology” and “binitarianism”, he isn’t even referring to the same thing each time. Meanwhile, you blithely assume that every time he uses “binitarian” and “binitarianism”. he means the belief that God is two persons. That is completely misguided.
I quoted a quotation from Boyarin and asked if you agreed with it. Your reply was very weird. You said this (I have highlighted the weird parts).
Wait, what is exactly controversial here? It’s a fact that some early Jews accused Christians of ditheism. This is obvious. It is so obvious that Boyarin doesn’t even find the need to provide a reference, even though he provided a reference for the sentence that comes directly before this. Jews accused bintarian Christians of ditheism. The entire quote is pretty and simply correct.
The problem with your answer is that it does not address anything in the quotation at all. The quotation from Boyarin said absolutely nothing about Jews accusing Christians of ditheism. This is another case of you just skim reading. Here is the quotation again. Please read it properly this time.
"In the first and second centuries, there were Jewish non-Christians who firmly held theological doctrines of a second God, variously called Logos, Memra, Sophia, Metatron, or Yahoel; indeed, perhaps most of the Jews did so at the time. There were also significant and powerful Christian voices who claimed that any distinction of persons within the godhead constituted ditheism.”
I have highlighted the key points to make it clearer for you. You’re saying that entire quotation is correct?
Finally, when I pointed out that Boyarin qualifies his use of “divine” by saying that when he refers to Jesus as divine he means functionally divine, not ontologically divine, you said that wasn’t relevant because he said that about his use of “divine” in “Jewish Gospels”. How is it not relevant? Are you claiming that in “Border Lines” he uses the word “divine” in relation to Jesus in a completely different sense? If so, where’s the evidence?
The fact is that “Jewish Gospels” was written in 2012, five years after “Border Lines”. It therefore represents his current thought about Jesus in the New Testament. So even if you’re going to argue that in “Border Lines” he used “divine” ontologically when referring to Jesus (which you will have to prove), in “Jewish Gospels” he explicitly does not. So you cannot claim Boyarin argues that Jesus is represented as ontologically divine in the New Testament, because Boyarin doesn’t believe this, and actually says the complete opposite. It’s clear that not reading “Jewish Gospels” has been very detrimental to your understanding of Boyarin’s views.
Point three. Hays & Hurtado.
This was one of the instances (and there have been a few), in which you claim to disagree with me, then say the same thing I actually said, but with different words. Let’s start with Hays’ statement.
“[Boyarin has] provocatively destabilized conventional beliefs about what first-century Jews could and could not have believed about the multiplicity within the divine identity.”
Do you think the phrase “provocatively destabilized” means “This is something he has said which people will agree with”, or “This is something which people will disagree with”? Something else? What does “provocatively destabilized” mean to you? On the same topic, what do you think “provocative” means in the sentence “In spite of some provocative ideas that would have deserved a more careful study”, written by another reviewer you quoted?
I gave an example of Hurtado using coded language to describe a book he was reviewing, and showed how a casual reader misunderstood Hurtado’s language as enthusiastic endorsement. I knew the reader was wrong, and had misread Hurtado, and Hurtado himself corrected the reader saying that his apparently enthusiastic language was not intended to be an endorsement. This was a clear example of Hurtado using coded language, which was misunderstood by a reader who was unfamiliar with the language scholars typically use when reviewing each others works.
You then described this in exactly the same way, saying “the person you cited who misunderstood Hurtado’s review simply does not understand the difference between a positive review, which scholars do all the time for books they disagree with if they consider it well-argued and scholarly, and actual endorsement, where one does not simply call a book “lively””. So you agreed with me, despite claiming you disagreed with me.
As if that wasn’t bad enough, after agreeing that the reader had misunderstood Hurtado, you claimed “It appears as if you also missed this distinction here”. That is a completely nonsensical statement, since I had explicitly made that distinction. This looks like another case of your skim reading habit.
Point four. John 1:1.
I will repeat what I said. Even if a Greek word appears in a text with one meaning 90% of the time, this does not tell us anything about what it must mean in the remaining number of instances. We only have grounds to conclude that it is most likely to mean the same thing if it is used in the same context, with the same syntax and grammar. In this case, we would need to compare John’s use of the anarthrous θεός in John 1:1 to all John’s other uses of the anarthrous θεός in the same context.
I have already quoted Murray saying there are 83 instances of θεός in John, and only two of them cannot refer to the Father.
“Of these 83 uses of θεός, the only places where the word could not refer to the Father are 1:1 (second occurrence, referring to the Logos); 1:18 (second occurrence, referring to μονογενὴς ;-see chapter III §§B-C); 10:34-35 (both plurals); and 20:28 (addressed to Jesus).” [17]
According to your reasoning, since 81 of them refer to Father then the other two must also refer to the Father, and not to Jesus. In fact you previously made exactly this claim. But they don’t refer to the Father; they refer to Jesus. So your statistical argument fails completely.
If you spend time with professional Greek translators, you will see that these statistical arguments are turn up from time to time and are regularly debunked. I spent years on the BGreek email list, and every now and then statistical arguments would come up. People would argue that since a Biblical writer used a word X number of times with the meaning Y, then it must mean Y in the place under discussion.
Every time these arguments would come up, professional translators would shoot them down. Here’s a quotation from a post by one of the email list members, criticizing this argument (note that this is exactly the argument you are making).
“Too often, statistical factors are called into play, even in traditional grammar. “The vast majority of the time X functions as Y, therefore in this context the evidence leans toward reading it as Y.” The exegesis of hOUTWS in John 3:16 is a good example of such argumentation.”
See here), a long review of a paper based on statistical analysis, helping to explain why “statistical frequency can be very misleading, if not totally unsystematic”. Grammarians still argue over the meaning of phrases in Paul, and they don’t use statistics to try and settle the issue because everyone recognizes there just isn’t a large enough Pauline corpus to make such determinations. The idea of applying that argument from statistics in a single book, especially heedless of syntax and context, is just ludicrous.
As I said, in this case, we would need to compare John’s use of the anarthrous θεός in John 1:1 to all John’s other uses of the anarthrous θεός in the same grammatical context. But this is the only passage in which John uses the anarthrous θεός to describe the Logos, so we can’t do that. Regardless, none of the grammarians who make judgments on this passage make this “statistical” argument that you make, and none of the standard theological commentaries or Bible translation guides make this “statistical” argument of yours either. You might want to think about why.
Meanwhile, in his commentary on 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Gordon Fee says this about the anarthrous θεός in 2 Thessalonians.
“The Ezekiel passage is a prophecy against the king of Tyre, who “in the pride of [his] heart” said, “I am a god; I sit on the throne of a god.” Using Ezekiel’s language and imagery, Paul thus reminds the Thessalonians that the evidence of the Rebel’s arrogance will be to “set himself up in God’s temple, proclaiming himself to be God.”” [18]
Fee points out that the anarthrous θεός actually indicates that Paul may actually mean “divine” here, rather than “God”.
“Gk. ὅτι ἐστὶν θεός; although the English translations have consistently rendered this as “God,” in light of the anarthrous θεός, it is possible that Paul intended simply that “he was a god,” or “divine.”” [19]
So in this passage Fee recognizes that the anarthrous θεός is not a reference to the one true God; it has a qualitative sense which suggests the meaning “divine”. He has absolutely no qualms making this suggestion in a context in which it doesn’t refer to Jesus.
On other matters, yes you previously did say that Jesus is the same person as the Father. Not only did you say “Jesus is the Father”, when I challenged you on this (pointing out that this is “confusing the persons”, and quoting Trinitarian theologians saying this), you doubled down, said it was not confusing the persons, and cited the Scutum Fidei in defense of the claim that Jesus is the Father, without realizing that the Scutum Fidei expressly denies that Jesus is the Father. I hope you agree now that Jesus is not the Father, and that the fact that 81 of the instances of θεός in John which do refer to the Father, does not indicate that the remaining two instances of θεός in John must also refer to the Father.
The point I made is that use of θεός in John 1:1c is not necessarily identifying Jesus as God. Not only can it be understood to mean “divine”, the grammar alone does not get you to “God”. [20] You even agreed with this (eventually), saying, “the grammar, on its own, does not get you to ‘God’ and leaves room for ‘divine’”. So that’s really the end of the matter.
We have evidence from Second Temple Period Judaism that the anarthrous θεός was used to differentiate between “the one true God”, and anything else which could be called θεός but was not actually God. Philo describes it this way.
“There is one true God only: but they who are called Gods, by an abuse of language, are numerous; on which account the holy scripture on the present occasion indicates that it is the true God that is meant by the use of the article, the expression being, “I am the God (I);” but when the word is used incorrectly, it is put without the article, the expression being, “He who was seen by thee in the place,” not of the God (t**ou Theou), but simply “of God” (Theou**);” [21]
Philo spoke of the Logos being with God, and being θεός. But for Philo the Logos was not an independent being, nor a hypostasis of God, nor a person in a multiple-person God. So we have a first century witness to the fact that the anarthrous θεός was used in Second Temple Period Judaism (even in the first century), to refer to that which was not the one true God, but that which could be called “god” or “divine” in some sense.
This is even more significant given the fact that Philo used θεός to refer to God’s Word (which he of course wrote as Logos). Philo was perfectly happy calling the Logos θεός (without the article), because to Philo the Logos was divine; it was God’s reason, wisdom, thought, and word, the power with which God created the world.
“Indeed, Philo’s logos has many of the attributes of the Word in the Johannine prologue: e.g., (a) the logos is theos/divine (On Dreams 1.228–30); (b) the logos is the instrument of creation (On the Cherubim 125–27; cf. 1 Cor 8:6; Heb 1:2); (c) the logos is associated with light (On the Creation 31) and life (On the Creation 24, 30); (d) the logos makes God known (On Dreams 1.68–69; Allegorical Interpretation 3.169–78); (e) the logos enables humans to become sons of God (Confusion of Languages 1.146–47; Thomas H. Tobin, “The Prologue of John and Hellenistic Jewish Speculation,” CBQ 52 [1990]: 252–69).” [22]
So this is the socio-cultural background to John 1:1. This is literally evidence for how a first century Jewish audience of the text would have understood John’s description of the Logos. Remember, this background is the reason why even Boyarin doesn’t believe Jesus is referred to from John 1:1-13; he believes it’s only the logos up to that point. In order to argue that first century Jews would have actually understood John to mean something else (specifically a pre-existent Jesus who was part of a complex Godhead of two persons), then you must present evidence that a first century Jewish audience of the text would have understood it that way. Where is that evidence?
Point four. Staples paper.
This is Staples’ argument.
“But, as this study will demonstrate, the doubling in these passages is much more significant: the double κύριος formula would have been distinctly familiar to a first-century Greek-speaking Jewish audience as an unambiguous way to signal the presence of the Tetragram (as opposed to the more ambiguous single κύριος) in the first century Greek Bible, suggesting that through the use of the κύριε κύριε formula both Matthew and Luke represent Jesus as applying the name YHWH to himself.” 3
In my previous post, before I had read Staples’ paper, I wondered how he explained, in the context of the parable of the virgins, that it is the virgins who are calling the bridegroom “lord lord” (I am using “lord lord” throughout this section, to reflect Staples’ view not mine). Since Jesus is basing this parable on Jewish custom, and since “lord lord” is addressed by the bridesmaids to the bridegroom, are we really to believe that it was Jewish custom for the bridesmaids to refer to the bridegroom as “Yahweh”? Now I have read the paper, I find that Staples does not address this at all. He never explains what it would mean for bridesmaids to address the bridegroom as “lord lord”. This is a serious oversight.
I also expressed interest in what Staples said about this verse.
Luke 6:
46 “Why do you call me ‘Lord, Lord,’ and don’t do what I tell you?
Despite the fact that Jesus is apparently saying that the people to whom he is speaking were literally calling him “lord lord”, there is actually no record of anyone in any of the gospels ever calling Jesus “lord lord”. Not his followers, not his disciples (either before or after his resurrection), nor anyone else.
Once again, Staples does not address this at all. Note that this is not an argument from silence. This is not a matter of saying "There isn’t any record of anyone calling Jesus “lord lord”, therefore Staples’ argument is wrong. The point I am making is that if Staples’ interpretation of the passage is correct, then people really did address Jesus as “lord lord”, specifically to identify him as Yahweh. This being the case, we would expect to find evidence of people addressing Jesus as “lord lord” or speaking of him as “lord lord”, specifically to identify him as Yahweh, because that’s what Staples says they did. When you claim people did X, but there’s no evidence of them doing X, then you have some explaining to do. It doesn’t mean you’re necessarily wrong, but it does mean you need to explain why your claim accounts for the data more efficiently than other hypotheses.
However, there is no record of anyone in the New Testament addressing Jesus as “lord lord”, or speaking of him as “lord lord”. As Staples himself notes, there are only four uses of “lord lord” in the entire New Testament. This is a great contrast to the usage found outside the New Testament. Staples notes there are 84 instances in the LXX alone (Rahlfs’ edition), where it substitutes for adonai yahweh, and several more in the intertestamental literature. But in the New Testament we find this formula only four times. Not only that, but when the New Testament quotes Old Testament passages which used adonai yahweh, it doesn’t use the"lord lord" formula.
When we move on to the Apostolic Fathers, we don’t find any of them referring to Jesus as “lord lord” either. The only use of it in the Apostolic Fathers (just once), is 2 Clement 4.2’s quotation of Matthew 7:21. So there is literally no evidence whatsoever that anyone addressed or referred to Jesus as “lord lord” while he was on earth, or during the first century, or even to the end of the second century.
None of this is very surprising when we consider that all the pre-Christian evidence Staples presents for the use of the “lord lord” formula, is in the form of Greek texts translating from Hebrew or Aramaic source texts by Christians. So we know it was a scribal convention when rendering Hebrew/Aramaic texts into Greek texts. Consequently there is a serious disconnect between his source material and the conclusions he is drawing from it. Unless Matthew and Luke are quoting an earlier Aramaic or Hebrew text of Jesus’ words, and translating it into Greek, there’s no direct correspondence between the evidence for this scribal translation convention, and the instances of “lord lord” in Matthew and Luke.
But is there any evidence that it was an oral form of address for God? Could Matthew and Luke be reporting Jesus saying “lord lord” in Greek? This is possible, but there is no evidence that this was an oral form of address for God at any time in the Second Temple Period. Could Matthew and Luke be repeating an oral tradition of Jesus saying adonai Yahweh in Aramaic, and then translating it into Greek? This is possible, but once again there’s no evidence for it. Additionally, given the taboo against pronouncing the Tetragrammaton during the Second Temple Period, it is incredibly unlikely.
You make this claim.
Staples literally documents all of the uses of this phrase in the first place.
Actually he literally doesn’t. He doesn’t even give a complete list of all the uses of the phrase in Second Temple Period literature. He doesn’t even give a complete list of all the uses of the phrase in the LXX. He says this.
“In all, the double κύριος occurs eighty-four times in Rahlfs’ LXX, including eleven times in the Psalms and seven times in the Minor Prophets and Jeremiah. It appears an additional five times in Jewish pseudepigrapha, four in the Testament of Abraham (9.4; 10.6, 9, 11) and once in the Apocalypse of Moses (= Life of Adam and Eve) 25.3. Of these references, only 2 Macc 1.24, 3 Macc 2.2 and Esther C2 (13.9 = 4.17b) are from works originally written in Greek, and each of these is an invocation to the God of Israel clearly echoing the translation of אדני יהוה elsewhere in the Greek Bible.” [23]
Note that he doesn’t actually document each instance, nor does he assess each instance individually. He tells us how many times it appears in the LXX, and briefly describes the distribution pattern, but he does little more than that. One of the reasons why this post has taken me so long is the amount of time I had to spend fact checking Staples’ work, mainly because he didn’t document his findings.
In fact the translation of the divine name and titles in the LXX is wildly inconsistent even single books. Ezekiel contains the greatest number of inconsistencies, including using a single kyrios for adonai yaweh, instead of a double.
“Skehan surveys the evidence for the tetragram at Qumran, Masada, and in early Greek MSS. There is no need here to repeat in detail what he has written. In his final section, “Greek Texts of the Prophets,” the author calls the reader’s attention to the fact that in LXX Ezekiel adonai Yhwh is represented by a single kyrios, a rendering also encountered in other prophetic books, notably Isaiah and the Minor Prophets. In 15 instances, however, Pap. 967 reads kyrios ho theos, which is equivalent to the qere, adonai elohim. This same translation is found in 9 out of 23 occurrences of adonai Yhwh in the Minor Prophets.” [24]
As a whole, the LXX translates adonai yahweh in a range of different ways; a single kyrios, a double kyrios (or kyrie), and kyrios ho theos.
“Be it sufficient to note that for Hebrew adonai Yhwh single kyrios and kyrios ho theos as well as the vocative kyrie kyrie, are amply attested in the prophetic corpus as original LXX— precisely what we already know from the Pentateuch.” [25]
“A Hebrew original אֲדֹנָי יהוה could therefore have appeared in writing as κύριος יהוה (sometimes written in Old Hebrew script), and this would be pronounced sometimes as κύριος κύριος, sometimes as κύριος ὁ θεός and surely sometimes also simply as κύριος.” [26]
So it certainly isn’t true that adonai yahweh is consistently represented with a double kyrios/kyrie in the LXX. But what about the usage of the double kyriios/kyrie in the LXX and other Second Temple Period literature? Staples makes this claim (italics are his, annotation in square brackets is mine).
“The distinctiveness of this repetition is further reinforced by the fact that in every extant example in pre-Talmudic Jewish literature outside the Gospels, the double κύριος serves as a Greek rendering of אדני יה. [adonai yahweh]” [27]
So he claims that it in these texts, it always serves as a rendering of adonai Yahweh. However, this is not true either. In the literature to which Staples refers, the double kurios serves as a Greek rendering of the following Hebrew phrases.
- adonai yahweh; Staples cites many instances of this, which is not in dispute
- yahweh yahweh (Exodus 34:6); Staples does not mention this
- yahweh elohim (Deuteronomy 10:17, Philo “On the Confusion of Tongues” 173:5); Staples cites the usage in Philo but does not mention that it is a quotation of a passage in which the double kyrios is being used to translate yahweh elohim, not adonai yahweh
- yahweh (1 Chronicles 17:24, Jeremiah 28:62 LXX, which is 51:62 MT); Staples does not mention these
There are other cases in which it is not clear what the double kurios/kurie is translating, but it is clear that it is not translating adonai yahweh.
In Ezekiel 23:32 LXX there is the variant αδωναι κυριος κυριος (adonai kurios kurios), and whatever kurios kurios stands for here, it cannot stand for adonai yahweh since adonai is already transliterated in this place with the Greek αδωναι.
In Apocalypse of Moses 25:3, kurie kurie appears in the very obvious context of an impassioned plea for salvation.
Apocalypse of Moses 25:
3 κύριε κύριε, σῶσόν με, καὶ οὐ μὴ ἐπιστρέψω εἰς τὴν ἁμαρτίαν τῆς σαρκός.
Apocalypse of Moses 25:
3 But thou shalt confess and say: ‘Lord, Lord, save me, and I will turn no more to the sin of the flesh.’
Staples cites this usage, but does not mention that it is not a quotation of adonai yahweh from the Old Testament. Staples also cites Philo’s use of kurie kurie in “On the Confusion of Tongues”, saying “The double κύριος also occurs once in Philo, at Conf. 173, which suggests that Philo read the double formulation in his Torah”. Here’s the quotation from Philo.
Confusion of Tongues 173:
5 But Moses, perceiving their design, says, “O Lord, Lord, King of the gods,” in order to show the difference between the ruler and those subject to him,
However, Staples does not tell us that this is a quotation from Deuteronomy 10:17, which does not use adonai yahweh; it uses yahweh elohim. So Staples shows that the LXX and other Second Temple Period (and pre-Talmudic), Jewish literature uses the “lord lord” formula to translate adonai Yahweh in many places. However, he does not tell us that the LXX didn’t do this consistently, and he does not describe all the instances in which the double kyrios/kyrie is used to translate a Hebrew word or phrase which is not adonai yahweh.
Again, in the additions to Esther, we find kurie kurie in a passage in which it is not translating adonai yahweh; instead we find it in the context of an impassioned plea.
Esther C:
1 Καὶ ἐδεήθη κυρίου, μνημονεύων πάντα τὰ ἔργα κυρίου,
2 καὶ εἶπεν Κύριε, κύριε, βασιλεῦ πάντων κρατῶν, ὅτι ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ σου τὸ πᾶν ἐστιν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ἀντιδοξῶν σοι ἐν τῷ θέλειν σε σῶσαι τὸν Ισραηλ·
The fact that we have kuriou twice in the genitive in the first two clauses, and then a doubled vocative in the third clause, indicates that kurie here is not being used in the third clause as part of a compound name; it is an impassioned repetition of the title used twice previously.
Staples actually mentions that the earliest Greek witnesses to the LXX show that kurios was not typically used to translate the Tetragrammaton.
“Discoveries of earlier Greek manuscripts, however, have shown that these older manuscripts tend not to include κύριος, instead employing other means of communicating the Tetragram.” [28]
He also acknowledges that both Origen and Jerome bear witness to this fact.
“In any case, these older manuscripts validate the witness of Origen and Jerome that the oldest and most reliable Greek manuscripts of their day represented the Tetragram in Hebrew characters rather than writing κύριος.” [29]
He also acknowledges that the single kurios/kyrie became the standard translation of adonai yahweh in the Old Greek, not the double.
“This use of the single κύριος eventually became the most common solution for rendering אדני יהוה and its variants elsewhere in the LXX (196 times in Rahlfs), though given the tendency of some early manuscripts to leave a space where the Tetragram appears (e.g. P.Ryl. III.458), one wonders whether many of these examples of a single κύριος were the result of such spaces (or perhaps dots or some other placeholder) eventually dropping out in the process of transmission.” [30]
However, although he acknowledges the single kyrios/kyrie became the standard for translating yahweh, he still argues that the double kyrios/kyrie was used distinctively in the Old Greek to translate adonai yahweh.
“In all, the double κύριος occurs eighty-four times in Rahlfs’ LXX, including eleven times in the Psalms and seven times in the Minor Prophets and Jeremiah. It appears an additional five times in Jewish pseudepigrapha, four in the Testament of Abraham (9.4; 10.6, 9, 11) and once in the Apocalypse of Moses (= Life of Adam and Eve) 25.3. Of these references, only 2 Macc 1.24, 3 Macc 2.2 and Esther C2 (13.9 = 4.17b) are from works originally written in Greek, and each of these is an invocation to the God of Israel clearly echoing the translation of אדני יהוה elsewhere in the Greek Bible.” [31]
Nevertheless, he does not show any evidence that the New Testament writers followed this convention. Staples’ study used Rahlfs’ LXX; he just ran a standard search query on the electronic text. That’s ok, but using a conservatively homogenized critical text published in 1935 does have its limitations. Staples acknowledges this, noting that Rahlfs’ “primarily relies on Codex Vacticanus”.
“‘Numbers based on Accordance Bible Software 10.2 (Orlando: Oak Tree Software, Inc., 2013) searches of Rahlfs’ critical edition, which primarily relies on Codex Vaticanus.” [32]
This is important, since Rahlfs’ doesn’t use P967 (since it wasn’t published at the time), which is one of the oldest and best witnesses to the Old Greek, and because P967 (dating to the third century), proves that the earliest form of the LXX overwhelmingly did not use the double kyrios/kyrie formula; it used the singular, almost without exception. This is particulalrly apparent in Ezekiel.
“Whatever may be the individual problems of this old tradition, G967 is able to make two things quite clear: 1) This oldest Greek evidence, known to us in these old witnesses and the Old Latin tradition which confirms it, seems predominantly to have read simply κύριος where M has the double form of the name. Those passages in which G967 also reads a double form, but which, seen as a whole, are infinitely few in number, are early signs of the secondary intrusion of the double form into the Greek tradition. 2) The reading of simple κύριος occurs initially in G967 also in chapters 40–48, where GB, [Codex Vaticanus 1209] with the exception of a single occurrence, consistently has the double form of the name.” [33]
Staples only acknowledges this in a footnote, quickly dismissing the signficance of P967.
“Interestingly, P.Beatty 967 lacks the double κύριος, employing only the single κύριος and fifteen instances of κύριος ὁ θεός, none of which occur in the later manuscript tradition; see Skehan, ‘Divine Name’, 35–7. However, J. Ziegler, ‘Die Bedeutung des Chester Beatty-Scheide Papyrus 967 für die Textüberlieferung der Ezechiel-Septuaginta’, ZAW 61 (1948) 76–94 argues that these examples represent secondary alterations in the process of transmission.” [34]
In case that’s not clear, Staples dismisses the oldest evidence for the standard practice of translating adonai yahweh in the Old Greek, on the basis of a single reference to a paper written in 1948. Modern scholarship however is very firmly against him.
“A major issue in assessing the homogeneity and unity of LXX Ezekiel concerns the variation of the Greek where the Hebrew has the double divine name ('“g’o’nay yhwh, e. g. 224). Many LXX manuscripts vary internally in their rendering of the divine name, but it is significant that the earliest text, P. 967, is largely consistent in its use of the single word kurios. This has important implications.” [35]
This indicates that the original practice in the Old Greek was to render adonai yahweh with a single kurios/kurie, rather than the double.
“On balance, it is likely that the double name usage is original to the Hebrew, and that the single word kurios was the original LXX practice, with a later, albeit uneven, tendency in the Greek to assimilate to the Hebrew’s double divine name.” [36]
This is highly influential on Staples’ case, since out of 84 instances of the double kurios/kurie in the Old Greek, 58 of them are in Ezekiel. Now we know that the double kurios/kurie, was originally not in Ezekiel LXX, and was not the original practice for the Old Greek either. Consequently, most of Staples’ alleged evidence for the claim that the double kurios/kurie was commonly used in Second Temple Period literature to translate adonai yahweh, turns out to be non-existent. in actual fact, we find that adonai yahweh was overwhelmingly translated with something else.
Is there an alternative explanation for the data which actually does have evidence? Yes there is, and Staples actually acknowledges it; “it is true that geminatio sometimes does function as a
pathos formula”. [37] However, he says this cannot explain all the evidence.
“Whereas the doubling in Matt 7.22 or 25.11 could be dismissed as merely signalling heightened emotion as suggested by Luz, there is no indication of heightened emotion or affection in the statement ‘not everyone who says to me κύριε κύριε’ (7.21)”. [38]
So he acknowledges the case or geminatio in Matthew 7:22; 25:11, and presents no evidence that there is “no indication of heightened emotion or affection” in the statements in Matthew 7:21. This is not a way to make a strong case.
Staples does not mention the fact that a double vocative is a typical feature of Luke/Acts.
- Luke 8:24, “Master, Master”
- Luke 10:41, "Martha, Martha:
- Luke 13:34, “Jerusalem, Jerusalem”
- Luke 22:31, “Simon, Simon”
- Luke 23:21, “Crucify, crucify”
- Acts 9:4, “Saul, Saul”
- Acts 22:7, “Saul, Saul”
- Acts 26:14, “Saul, Saul”
Consequently, there is a more efficient explanation of Matthew and Luke’s double kurie than the supposition that Jesus was referring to himself as Yahweh; rather, it’s a standard double vocative as an exclamatory formula. This is an explanation for which there is actual evidence.
Staples fails to present evidence for his core claims.
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He claims a first century audience would have understood the double kurios as a reference to Jesus as adonai yahweh, but fails to present evidence for this. He does not demonstrate that a first century Greek audience would have been thinking in both Hebrew and Greek, his appeal to Ezekiel LXX evaporates in light of the fact that Ezekiel LXX overwhelmingly did not use a double kurios for adonai yahweh, and his claim that the double kurios was only used for adonai yahweh in Second Temple Period literature is demonstrably untrue.
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He claims the double kurios was used as an exorcism formula, but fails to present any evidence of it being used in this way. In contrast, when we find Jesus invoked in healing or exorcism we find the name used is “Jesus” (Acts 3:6 “in the name of Jesus”, Acts 16:18 “in the name of Jesus Christ”, Acts 19:13, “by Jesus”), and kurios is not used.
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He claims that the double kurios amounts to calling Jesus God, but fails to provide any evidence that anyone in the first century or beyond understood the double kurios this way. He does not provide any instances of anyone in the New Testament addressing or referring to Jesus with the double kurios, nor does he note that no such reference occurs in any of the Apostolic Fathers either.