Let me jump in–speaking only for myself, not for BL, although I am actively involved with BL so I am part of the group Grudem and the others are evaluating.
I’ll make two replies.
First, I believe in the bodily Resurrection of Jesus (and many other genuine miracles also, but let me name only that big one). And–everyone else who works for BL also believes in the bodily Resurrection (and other miracles). So, everyone who works for BL believes that God “intervene[s] or act[s] directly to cause … empirically detectable change[s] in the natural behavior of matter.” Unlike (say) John Haught and many other contemporary theologians who work on “science and religion,” I believe that a video recorder outside Jesus’ tomb would in fact have recorded the presence of his glorified body, constituting empirical evidence of “changes in the natural behavior of matter.” I say this without any qualification. By itself, this should be sufficient to refute Grudem’s definition, insofar as it is alleged to apply to BL. For some reason (I won’t speculate about anyone’s motives), critics of BL’s position just seem unable to see this very obvious fact. Speaking as an historian of science & religion (who probably reads more theology than most historians or most scientists), IMO there just is no viable definition of “Deism” that maps onto BL. None. Let’s please lay this one to rest (he says, hopefully, but doubtfully).
Second, my own view is that God actively guides evolution and many other natural phenomena, but I probably conceive of this differently than Jim–and in ways that Jim might find problematic (perhaps for good reasons). I won’t try to elaborate on objections Jim might raise; he is absolutely capable of doing that, far better than me. I make this point only to indicate to our critics that this is one of those questions (divine action in natural history) on which people in the BL fold have multiple understandings. My view is basically a gussied-up version of Asa Gray’s famous view, that “variation [in evolution] has been led along certain beneficial lines.” As best I can gather, Gray meant that God had personally ensured certain specific outcomes in the history of life, by tinkering (if I may use that word) with mutations. That is also my position. Owen Gingerich holds a similar view: see my review of his book, God’s Universe, here: https://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/05/300-all-things-bright-and-beautiful. So does Robert Russell: see his chapter in this book, https://biologos.org/resources/books/perspectives-on-an-evolving-creation/. As I’ve come to expect from him, Russell spells out his position in a detailed, nuanced manner. For a glimpse of Russell’s overall view of divine action, see this: https://biologos.org/blogs/archive/series/the-god-who-acts-robert-john-russell-on-divine-intervention-and-divine-action. With regard to the specific case of God guiding evolution, Russell picks up on an observation by physicist William Pollard, namely, that one important place where quantum uncertainty has macroscopic consequences is genetic mutations. Pollard was right: we know that radiation is cause of mutations, and radiation often arises from quantum-level events. Russell then argues that God could genuinely cause certain quantum events (without being seen as “intervening” in nature, since such activity would not break any physical laws or be empirically detectable) that would in turn lead to certain specific mutations.
Anyway, that is the position I presently like best, in terms of mechanisms that flesh out my belief that God guides evolution. As Russell emphasizes, however, such divine action is objective, but not empirically detectable. (Gingerich takes a similar attitude.) My own view on this question is not a counter-example to Grudem’s definition, since he insists that God’s actions be empirically detectable. (Of course I already showed why his definition of TE just won’t work for BL.) On the other hand, my view in spirit contradicts Grudem’s definition: I believe that, if God did not sometimes act in the way described here, then evolution would not have produced human beings and many other specific organisms.
IMO, what I just said gets at what is really the most fundamental point of difference between BL and ID. It’s not whether God works miracles (we all believe God does), it’s not whether the universe is designed (we believe it is designed), and it’s not even about methodological naturalism (every single scientist I know believes that science can understand only natural causes, not supernatural ones). It’s about whether inferences to design are fully scientific, or more philosophical/theological/metaphysical in nature. It should be clear to readers that I believe in drawing design inferences from certain natural phenomena; if not, I wouldn’t have blogged Polkinghorne’s splendid essay: https://biologos.org/blogs/ted-davis-reading-the-book-of-nature/belief-in-god-in-an-age-of-science-john-polkinghorne-part-one. However, like Polkinghorne, I don’t believe such inferences follow necessarily from the evidence, in some straightforward scientific manner. Unless I’m just totally misreading ID proponents, they do in fact believe something like that–and, they have to have that type of epistemic force and confidence in order to advance the cultural reforms that go hand in hand with their view that science requires belief in an “intelligent designer.”
I hope that if I am mistaken to draw this distinction, someone from Discovery will visit here under their own name and provide a corrective. No arguments by proxy, please.