I was reading this blog, and thought it raised some questions that would be interesting here, concerning whether God makes choices and deliberates over them. It also could morph into a question of does God answer prayer, for if he does not deliberate and make choices, what good is prayer?
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Maybe one can examine it relative to pre- vs. post-Hellenic influences. Abraham, Moses and much of Judaism occurred in the pre-Hellenic era. Much of (scholarly) Christianity was tied to post-Hellenic ways of thinking.
The god of the philosophers usually does not. Blaise Pascal said with some justification that the god of the philosophers is not the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.
Yep. There have been a couple millennia of apologetics attempting to square the two, but the tension & apparent mismatch remains. (IMHO).
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The essay describes what is essentially an Open Theist view, although there are several nuances that fall under that umbrella. As an Open Theist myself, I do not think the future is fully settled, rather that God knows the future as it really isāas containing some counterfactuals that are truly unknowable until other free agents make (Libertarian) free choices. So, around such free events, I think God has ādynamic knowledgeā, so yes, he chooses how he will act in real time, in a dynamic (relational) way to the unfolding of history.
Re: ādeliberatesāā Yes, but not in a sense that God is āpuzzledā or āconfusedā or āanxiousā about outcomes the way a deliberating human might be. God knows all past and present facts, and has the power and wisdom to respond to all unfolding possibilities so he is never taken āoff guardā by events and in his wisdom chooses the way he will respond to the other āchess-playersā in the game to ensure the best way forward.
Re prayer: Yes, I think God has chosen to partner with human free agents in the way he acts on Earth, giving us real āsay-soā in what happens. Hence, for some actions, he relies on human āco-signersā, i.e., prayers, to determine what to do.
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There seems to be mutually exclusive alternatives where the choice is not between good or bad.
For example, giving free will to humans comes with a real possibility that humans misuse this liberty and do evil things. Preventing all evil decisions would come with a lack of free will - we would be just living automatons. It appears that God has made a decision between the two possibilities. There we can assume some form of deliberation.
It may be misleading to compare the thinking and deliberation of God with the humans. One crucial difference is that we have limited information and capacity to calculate the consequences while God has both full information and full capacity to know the consequences. God can make His decisions immediately, without a need to use time to consider the potential benefits and disadvantages of the alternative choices.
I do believe that God often answers to prayers. How He makes the decisions to answer is an open question for me. God knows both the need and our prayer before we even face the need - He can decide to fulfill the need well before we pray. On the other hand, some answers seem to be tied to our prayers. What happens behind the scenes is something I do not know.
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Yup. As Tertullian lamented āWhat does Athens have to do with Jeruselam?
Personally, I land with Tertullian, thinking that Greek philosophy (and classical theism) obscures rather than explains the God of the scriptures.
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That would seem to devolve into some sort of Calvinism if my understanding of theology is correct. If God is all knowing he already knows what will happen in the future and has already planned accordingly. Are your prayers asking God to change the plan, or were your prayers already part of the future events and the plan?
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At one time-- like driftwood meandering down a streamāI tinkered with the open view but now I see it as another form of God walking in the garden. My answer in the classical sense would be no, not like a human. This seems to be a question of immutability and divine simplicity. For me, God is pure act and the distinction between act and potency requires immutability and divine simplicity. If God had parts, those parts would be ontologically prior to God. This is nothing short of stripping God of his Divinity. Related here is whether or not essence and existence are the same for God. I prefer Feserās view and note that Catholics are not free to accept a philosophical fad that more or less owes itself awareness today to a book written in 1994. Sure, it had a few proponents over the years but any recent surge in popularity tends to go back to this work.
Iād say the article in question doesnāt appreciate the analogical nature of the language we describe God with.
Vinnie
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Just for the record, Open Theistic ideas are not just a ārecent fadā based on a 1994 book. See Greg Boydās article about the view being articulated by theologians as early as the 4th century. In any case, I think ideas (including theological ones) should be evaluated on their own merits not on just whether they have been the majority view at certain periods of history.
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In my tradition and belief, the answer is yes. The same freedom of will applies also to God. Genesis 1:26
- Genesis 18:17ā33
- Exodus 32:9ā14
- 1 Samuel 15:10ā11
- Jonah 3:10
- Jeremiah 18:7ā10
- Isaiah 5:3ā4
- Luke 22:42
Are all examples of God thinking things over and evaluating His choices.
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In metaphysics such as these, where there are strong personal commitments toward a particular theological outcome or interpretation, I think we can see how such preferences may affect oneās evaluation about the merits of the various arguments. For example, Feser and Plantinga come to different positions about the coherence of Godās āsimplicityā, but I feel the real difference relates to auxillary theological assumptions each brings about the nature of God. They didnāt start with the God of Philosophy and work downward, but instead include additional, different sets of theistic, Christian ideas & requirements at the start (Crudely, Catholic vs. Protestant in some cases). So, their area of work is not āpureā metaphysics per se, but variants of Christian metaphysics and apologetics. Not everyone readily fits into one particular class or another in how they weight the value of various arguments but I feel there is definitely some correlation with the combination of metaphysics one finds convincing with the theological preferences one starts from. So, I can understand why many areas of philosophy is readily grouped with the humanities in academic settings.
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āSure, it had a few proponents over the years.ā
and continues to do so 
The philosophical/ theological debates are certainly complex. Iām currently taking a class in hermeneutics at Regent College in Vancouverāand it is clear that each person brings a worldview (derived from many sources) to the table when studying philosophy and theology that tends to influence oneās outlook. The question is (one of epistemology generally) whether oneās āpersonal preferenceā is the only (or deciding) factor determining oneās theology (is it all just subjective?). Open theism was a position I ran across later in life although I was raised in an Arminian (Mennonite) theological mileu which always held to libertarian free will. For me, aside from āpersonal preferenceā, Open Theism at the outset aligns more closely than classical theism with the scriptural text (which I hold to be a more authoritative revelation of God than Greek Platonism or the theologizing of later church fathers). It is true that once one tugs at one strand of classical theism like the ādivine simplicityā and finds it to be logically incoherent, as does Plantinga, that other aspects of the classic God like āoutside of timeā and āimpassibleā are also prone to unravelling.
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You could just show how one or more of their respective premises are false or that the their arguments are invalid as opposed to claiming their metaphysical arguments arenāt real metaphysical arguments.
Vinnie
I agree as a very new God believer who is not anchored in any Christian faith, I do not think it appropriate to presume that God must operate in a way that makes sense to us. It isnāt that I think divine choices would be as automatic as the north wind. But I also donāt think it would be an entirely cerebral affair. That is the way it seems to us with our egocentric minds but Iām sure Godās understanding would be more a matter of poetic insight than calculation.
I think real faith requires accepting God on His own terms, hiddenness and all. The main reason Iām no Christian at least what that means here is that I would never accept all the propositions in the Bible and the theology that has led to. We can understand what we are able just as God will understand what He is able. But Iāll never accept all of that text as justified facts. I believe prophetic witness is something more akin to poetry such that those who feel and see more can share with those who see and feel less. But it isnāt a legal document which spells out what both parties are entitled to expect from the other.
Heck I donāt think deliberative thought is even the best we are capable of, why should anyone assume so little of God?
Okay, rant over.
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They are real arguments. However, I see them proffered and accepted somewhat subjectively, depending how one brings in certain outside assumptions. If, for example, Feserās arguments of divine simplicity are valid and logical, why is that so many, also solid philosophers, disagree with the conclusion? And why does the split between such camps often align along philosophers of different religious ācampsā? I donāt see the arguments as āinvalidā or āwrongā per se, but under-convincing. Philosophy has well worn techniques and practices to dig to the heart of questions and help identify possible explanations, but I feel that in much of this area of metaphysics, language, definitions and understanding remain insufficiently specified to reach certain conclusions in many, perpetually addressed cases. At the cutting edge of science, we see strong opinions, preconceived ideas about how somethings āshouldā work, and apparently valid arguments debated all the time. Many ideas turn out wrong or under-supported. For some questions we can strive seemingly forever but not get to an answer. I expect nothing different in metaphysics and theology when we confront questions in the rarified atmosphere around first causes and the source of existence or the possibility of free will. There can be progress made trying to address these questions even if they donāt arrive at a final destination.
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I donāt think itās all just subjective. Many discussions Iāve seen operated along the lines of, āI can see propositions 1 & 2 are OK, but in the third stepā¦.ā So, there is back & forth and movement in particular directions. However, we are kidding ourselves if we donāt suspect our own notions are free from bias and blind spots. Of course, another option is that the answers still remain uncertain, leaving us free to color in what we want.
This is one aspect where creationists have had a positive effect on my viewpoints. If seemingly rational people, working with similar data can reach such wildly different, and incorrect positions, then how can I assume Iām not blinded in some similar way in some other case. Iām sure I must have some unrecognized, unconscious biases. My wife claims to have pointed out many to me, and while sheās clearly been wrong about those, Iām certain I must have some that I canāt seeā¦ 
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Thanks for the comment. I agree that we must contend with unconscious bias whether tackling questions in science or in theology and approach both arenas with the humility we could be proved wrong in the future. However, there are mechanisms in science (experiments, empiricism and math) that are there to deal with ādifferent viewpointsā of the researchers and to ensure consistency. Similarly, analytical theology, through its use of logic and propositions as you indicate above, can indicate whether some theological/philosophical ideas are logically coherent or not āin a way that is not subjective. Not all theological questions can be parsed in a logical/mathematical way, but Dr Alan Rhoda is an open theist/analytical theologian who presents an objective case (i.e. using logic) to deduce that open theism is the only framework (compared to Molinism, Arminianism and determinism) that is compatible with libertarian free will for both God and creatures. Because I canāt find a flaw in that logic (and coincidentally because I think an open future also makes the most rational and straightforward sense of the scriptural data) I currently hold to open theism. So, I think thereās something more rigorous than just āsubjective personal biasā going for open theism.
That is a good step forward on the path to wisdom.
We (including me) are often blind to the weaknesses in our thinking. That is true even for the most logical thinkers.
One weak spot is often the pretheoretical (intuitive) and presuppositional assumptions that form the foundation for our thinking. These are treated as axioms, statements that are established or self-evidently true - we can count on them without a need to prove them.
The problem is that there are very few universally āestablishedā or āself-evidently trueā assumptions - my axioms are not necessarily the same as your axioms. That hints that some of the basic assumptions may be false.
One problem may also be that we often think with our āheartā instead of our ābrainsā. Worldviews are matters of āheartā, not matters of ābrainā. If something clashes with the convictions of our heart, we tend to protect the stability of our mind, including mental health, by discarding the claims that threaten to collapse our mental world. We hear the claims and yet, cannot take or understand them as our mind just jumps to something that may save my worldview. Sometimes that is good, often not because it maintains false illusions.
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It is always good to see multiple views. The Theopolis Institute website had a conversation about divine simplicity between several scholars. Ryan Mullins opened by criticizing the doctrine and responses were given from Peter Leithart, Joe Lenow, and Ed Feser. Mullins was given the final word and all the responses are linked on the left. I think this short intro from Feser is helpful for those unfamiliar with all the philosophical jargon going into the debate. It was Feserās first response and I know he continued the discussion with another response on his blog to Mullins final word. His first two points are worth noting:
Though its critics often treat the notion of divine simplicity as an unimportant curiosity, there are good reasons why the Church Fathers, the medieval Doctors, and two ecclesiastical councils regarded it as essential to orthodoxy. For one thing, it is a consequence of Godās ultimacy. For anything composed of parts is ontologically posterior to those parts, and can exist only if something causes the parts to be combined. Hence if God were composed of parts, there would have to be something ontologically prior to him and something which combines those parts, thereby causing him to exist. But there is nothing ontologically prior to or more ultimate than God, and nothing that causes him. To be the uncaused cause of everything other than himself is just part of what it is to be God. Hence God cannot be composed of parts but must be absolutely simple.[1]
For another thing, divine simplicity safeguards Godās uniqueness. Where there is a distinction between a thing and its nature or essence, then that thing will not necessarily be unique. For example, there is a distinction between a given particular triangle and triangularity as a common nature or essence. Given that distinction, something other than that particular triangle might share that same nature or essence, so that there can be more than one triangle. By contrast, according to the doctrine of divine simplicity, there is no distinction between God and his nature or essence. God just is his nature, so that it is not something that he could have in common with another thing. And if there cannot be anything else that has the divine nature, then there cannot even in principle be more than one God. In this way and others, divine simplicity protects monotheism.
The truthfulness of an argument does not rest on whether others believe it. Thatās not how philosophy or logical arguments work. Consensus can be right, consensus can be wrong. What matters is whether or not the premises are true and the argument is valid. If both of those are met, we must accept that the argument is true.
Feser and Plantinga (and others like Craig, and Moreland) have different ontological frameworks. A better debate between Feser and Plantinga could be over the validity of constituent ontology. But that means it is not correct for the latter to critique the doctrine of divine simplicity from his own framework which I believe he does. This is caricature. Stanford article is a solid primer. Modal collapse seems to be one of the more robust challenges to divine simplicity. A couple of things can happen.
Feser needs to show DDS is coherent.
Plantinga can attempt to show DDS is incoherent.
Feser can try to argue DDS from Act/Potencty [I think he does so very well!]
Plantinga can try to show how the argument is not true [I donāt think he can]
Feser can show how rejecting DDS has dire consequences for beliefs.
Plantinga can attempt to show how this is not the case.
What standard could make Godās choices wrong? Where did that standard come from? Did it pre-exist God? Why does God defer to it? Could God have made the wrong choice?
Maybe there is a more compelling case where God deliberates and responds to fresh information to make choices in Genesis 2:18-23:
18 Then the Lord God said, āIt is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a helper as his partner.ā 19 So out of the ground the Lord God formed every animal of the field and every bird of the air and brought them to the man to see what he would call them, and whatever the man called every living creature, that was its name. 20 The man gave names to all cattle and to the birds of the air and to every animal of the field, but for the man[d] there was not found a helper as his partner. 21 So the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon the man, and he slept; then he took one of his ribs and closed up its place with flesh. 22 And the rib that the Lord God had taken from the man he made into a woman and brought her to the man. 23 Then the man said,
God deliberates and decides itās not good for man to be alone. He didnāt already know this. So he thought it would be be best to make him a helper (was God right to do so?). So he creates all sorts of different animals and parades them before Adam to be named. In doing so, God surveys the scene, processes all the information (spiritually of course) and realizes none of them are going to be a suitable mate. When plan A is ruled out by empirical observation, God moves on to plan B and he makes a companion from Adamā side.
This all seems highly silly to me as a literal description of God. There are also plenty of examples of God walking, talking, repenting, being grieved to his heart, seeing, smelling and so on in the Bible. We have to be cautious in how we deal with anthropomorphic and analogical language in scripture. And if I were looking for evidence of God deliberating and changing in response to new information, I would have actually went with the parable of the persistent widow. Did Jesus teach us to continually plea and pester God until we get Him to change His mind?
Olsen asked good questions. We all believe God is creator, God is loving, God cares and so on. The question is what does it mean to say God loves? Clearly the dopamine levels are not increasing whereas the serotonin collapses. God doesnāt have a body. The issue for divine simplicity is how can we understand God as personal and I believe Aquinas and other Thomists show that we can. But itās not the way people think.
As Barry Miller writes, āNewcomers to the writings of Aquinas are often taken aback by his claim that, although the relation of creatures to God is a real one, the converse is not true, for the relation of God to creatures is merely what he calls a relation āsecundum rationem,ā and which I have called a Cambridge relation. Of course, there is nothing strange about a relation being real in one direction but not in the other, for that is precisely the case with the relation between observer and observed. The observer-observed relation is a real one, whereas the observed-observer is not. Mutatis mutandis, the same can be said in regard to properties: the property of observing is real, but that of being observed is merely a Cambridge one. What is so arresting about Aquinasā view is that the asymmetry between being observed and observing is said to obtain between creating and being created, and that the property of creating is said to be no more real than that of being observed (or being spoken of). Yet, such is the unavoidable consequence of the simplicity doctrine. But is it true?ā
Olsenās piece really didnāt even make an attempt to dialogue with anything written on the subject and comes off like an argument for geocentrism. As a professor of theology, I would expect more from his blog post.
Vinnie
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