This is a companion discussion topic for the original entry at https://biologos.org/blogs/jim-stump-faith-and-science-seeking-understanding/divine-action-naturalism-and-incarnation
We need to be able to cope with either approach.
One, where miracles are merely more exotic applications of natural law ⌠and/or
Two, where miracles are a SUSPENSION of natural law.
2 posts were split to a new topic: Monism and dualism
Thank you for citing Athanasius. He was a wonderful theologian, who appears to been the source of the Nicean Creed and certainly the one who stood up almost alone for it as the Bishop of Alexandria when it was under severe attack. The Trinity has been the under attack for a long time, but it stands and the fads and heresies, while have not disappeared, for the most part have been driven underground.
It is my view that God gave us the Trinity for a reason. The Trinity is our understanding of Who God is, and since humans are created in the Image of God, we cannot understand ourselves and our world without understanding the Trinity and ourselves as triune.
It was Athanasius who recognized that the Son was equal to the Father, and not almost equal, but fully equal. Now he did not do this based on philosophy, because the rationale of philosophy and theology said that nothing and no one was equal to God, the Father. He came to this conclusion simply based on the logic of Godâs revelation through Godâs Word/Logos.
The logic and revelation of the Word also dictate that the coequal Father and Son be united by a Third coequal Person, the Holy Spirit, thus revealing Godâs relational nature to humanity. It is only in the last century that science in the form of Einsteinâs theory of Relativity has come to the disorienting conclusion that nature is relational and not absolute. We are still trying to come to grips with this new understanding of reality, which goes against philosophy as we know it.
There is a distinction between grace and nature in the West because we see grace as personal and divine. while nature is mechanistic materialistic. What needs to be added is the organic which serves as a bridge between the Person al and Divine, and the materialistic and mechanistic. This triune form works much better than trying to remake God into Nature, or remake Nature into God, which is what humans normally try to do.
Knightâs approach to divine action has been intriguing to me for some time now, and I find myself wondering how his Eastern Orthodox perspective might (or might not!) be congruent with other metaphysical models. That is, Knightâs approach to divine action is all about shaking up the old dichotomies, questioning the âinterventionist vs. noninterventionistâ model precisely because it is question-begging in its assumption of a near-deistic metaphysical framework. So he develops his divine action model from an Eastern Orthodox perspective, but is that EO perspective necessary for a robust theistic naturalism? For example, many in the Radical Orthodoxy camp (drawing upon Augustine and co.) would reject standard debates about divine action for the same reason as Knight: all of creation is inherently involved with presence and activity of God, and to speak of God âbreaking inâ presupposes that God could ever be absent. And again, Amos Yong writes from a pneumatological/pentecostal perspective to make the same point: divine action is as normal as it gets, for all creation is inherently involved with the Spirit. So, I do wonder: are all these metaphysical models working with a common core? This is an important question, I think, as it helps relieve fears that Knight is simply pitting âEast against West.â
Sarah, I think youâre absolutely right - there are those of many traditions seeking to move beyond that crude and unbiblical Enlightenment ânature/supernatureâ divide - Hugh McCann would be a voice for the Catholic tradition on that (drawing on the Western tradition of Augustine and Aquinas, of course).
What Iâm slightly wary of in Knightâs piece is the stress still placed on the ânaturalâ, and in particular the current scientific paradigm of ânatural lawâ, which seems to relativise the personal involvement of God. Almost inevitably one tends to end up seeing Godâs activity forensically: âGod acts through lawsâ. And thereby even the miraculous (even the Incarnation?) can become an expression of a âhigher natural lawâ - rather than seeing even the âlower lawâ as an expression of Godâs personal involvement in his world, a viewpoint Iâve been exploring for a couple of years and more
Iâve also been looking at this on my blog recently in a series of posts on Michael Dentonâs recent book on âemergent lawsâ in evolution (as reviewed favourably by Darrel Falk), which in its own way too seems to err towards ânaturalisingâ God, rather than âre-divinisingâ nature. I find it interesting that a number of people questioning the nature/supernature divide find themselves returning to the old Aristotelian concepts of natures and fourfold causality for their inspiration: itâs just easier to think out of the box when you donât focus on âlawâ.
Perhaps one way of expressing the difference (in interpretation, if not in intention) is to ask whether âGod set up the world with comprehensive natural laws when he first created itâ or whether âGod personally governs the world, which he creates in eternity, rationallyâ.
I recommend Dr. David Bradshawâs essays on The Philosophical Theology of St. Cyrilâs Against Julian" (PDF) "The Philosophical Theology of St. Cyril's Against Julian," Phronema 29 (2014), 21-39. | David Bradshaw - Academia.edu
Also his "âThe Concept of the Divine Energies.â The link for this is New Page 1
In Paulâs epistles the outworking of divine purpose and power is called energeia, a term first used by Aristotle. For Aristotle, the term had various applications: energy, active, operation or effectiveness, but the earliest application, according to Dr. David Bradshaw, pertains to activity as the exercise of a capacity. Dr. Bradshaw writes, âFor example, Paul refers to himself as âstriving according to Christâs working (or energy, energeia), which is being made effective (or actualized, energoumenÄn) in meâ (Col. 1:29). Here it would seem that the divine energy serves two distinct functions. It is at work within Paul, transforming him, so that from this standpoint he is the object of Godâs activity; at the same time it finds expression in Paulâs own activity, so that he may also be seen as the agent or conduit through whom God is working.â
In Paulâs writings this concept is linked to another Aristotelian concept - that of telos: the realization of an entityâs end purpose; the actualization of potential. It is clear that without the divine energy, without the divine power at work in us, that we can accomplish nothing of value. In this, Paul echoes Jesusâ own words: âApart from Me, you can do nothing.â (Jn. 15:5)
As an Egyptian, Athanasius was familiar with the Re-Horus-Hathor narrative in which the âsonâ was regarded as equal to and of the same substance/essence with the Father. This constituted the Proto-Gospel for the Horite Hebrew.
The author is here advocating (in FAR too many words) for a view that there are âlowerâ laws of nature which are able to be studied by science, but also that there exist âhigherâ laws of nature which cannot be studied by science, and which intrinsically draw nature toward order and good. Thatâs probably how this post got onto Biologos.
The divine is expressed somehow in this âupperâ layer. OK, this is not a particularly new idea, often seen in pantheism.
But in any case, there still exists, in the Christian view, a God who is able to act and think. The Bible is clear in the distinction between God and all that has been made.
If we accept that Biblical view, one can then argue that there is only one layer beneath God, the layer of created matter and natural law. Or one can argue that there is also a second (âhigherâ) layer, perhaps this drive to order and goodness.
But Knight goes too far: âIf we begin with this questionable picture of God separated from created thingsâŚâ But yes, I think the Bible is clear about God being separated from created things, so there is nothing questionable in that picture at all. And âwe must overcome our tendency to begin with ⌠the assumption that this God is essentially âoutsideâ the creation.â But if he is not âoutsideâ the creation, how did he start it?
I think there is philosophical argument to be made (not that I agree with it) for this âmiddle groundâ of so-called âhigher laws.â But this author argues that this middle ground IS God.
In summary, this author seems to be arguing for pantheism in Christian language.
Marty,
Your point is well taken. I too found a leaning toward pantheism here. Spinoza articulated something very similar to this idea in speaking about laws of nature.
As for the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, it is futile to attempt a scientific explanation for this sacred mystery which has never been apprehended by even the most brilliant minds. That God became Man and dwelt among us, fully human and yet fully God, is not explicable. Others have framed this as something outside breaking inside, but that is inadequate. St. Paul points in the right direction when he speaks of Christ as the Lamb slain from before the foundations of the world. C.S. Lewis appears to have considered timelessness as evidence that there is no outside entity breaking into the material world. He wrote, "We are so little reconciled to time that we are even astonished at it. âHow heâs grown!â we exclaim, âHow time flies!â Itâs as strange as if a fish were repeatedly surprised at the wetness of water. And that would be strange indeed; unless of course, the fish were destined to become, one day, a land animalâ. (Reflections on the Psalms. Harcourt, Chapter 12) Lewis elaborates on this: "There are no ordinary people. You have never talked to a mere mortal. Nations, cultures, arts, civilizations - these are mortal, and their life is to ours as the life of a gnat. But it is immortals whom we joke with, work with, marry, snub, and exploit - immortal horrors or everlasting splendors.â (The Weight of Glory)
I think the author has a point, that we need to re-think our framework to thinking about these issues, but in some instances I think not far enough. As other authors (like Plantiga) have pointed out, part of the problem is our cultural heritage and language. To focus on just one point that I havenât seen brought up elsewhere and which I think is a good window on the issue, the continued use of the term âscientific lawâ in the posts and discussions is starting to grate on me. Personally, I would prefer the term banned from discussions like this, because of misunderstanding/misleading nature. I am trained as a physicist and currently work on incorporating the nature and history of science into my university conceptual physics course, so I am familiar with education research literature about teaching students about the nature of science. From my own experience and literature on teaching such, âscientific lawâ:
- is only used by scientists (at least the circles Iâve interacted in) anachronistically to refer to things from a few centuries ago. We teach students about Newtonâs and Boyleâs laws, but Maxwellâs and Einsteinâs equations. Of the top of my head, I canât think of anything from the twentieth or twenty-first century that scientists typically use âlawâ when talking among themselves.
- There are widespread misconceptions about it (at least among college students) that it refers to âscientific theoriesâ that have been âprovedâ (see Lederman, Abd-El-Khalick, Bell and Schwartz) rather than a highly predictable observation.
- Reinforces a (erroneously) deductive view of science where âscientific lawsâ are viewed as certain and unchanging and reveal deep truths about the physical world, and perhaps something distinct from Godâs action.
A scientific law is nothing more than a highly predictable, repeatable description of the pattern of natural phenomena that can often be described with a mathematical formula. The terms âscientific lawâ and âmiracleâ pretty much mean the same thing as the classical formulation of âordinary providenceâ and âextra-ordinary providence,â but the latter terms carry a very different connotation, which I would claim is more consistent with biblical teaching. I my opinion, the term âscientific lawâ is an anachronistic term that exists mainly in popularizations of science that confuses more than it helps.
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