One extra way to look at this - the laws “that” govern reproduction and evolution both (and of course many other aspects of reality) are statistical: stick one of the hundreds of eggs produced in a female lifetime with the gadzillions of sperm produced by the male, and the production of children is pretty lawlike.
Mutate, drift, select, and certainly change will happen; and maybe the dice are loaded enough that Life survives rather than going extinct. That in itself indicates a designed world, but to get Mona Lisa you intend you need more than a law that says paint on canvas can be hung on a wall.
Late to the party, so forgive the scatter-shooting approach.
Despite your caveat, which is appropriate, it is my observation that far too many ID proponents mislead the general public into thinking that there is no such thing as scientific consensus on common descent, that a great number of scientists (dare I say a “consensus”) question the validity of the entire theory. For example, on p.8 of Doug Axe’s article on Lignin, he says, “More significant than gaps in evolutionary understanding are the growing number of scientific observations that seem to call the whole theory into question.” What constitutes a “growing number”? Is the evidence of recent years calling the whole theory into question? Really?!?
Once more, this is just my own observation, but Nelson is not alone in this. The attitude often seems to be that any criticism of evolution is a good criticism, and any ID theory is a good theory, and all of them will be defended to the death and put forth as “evidence” long after they have been falsified. Whatever happened to adjusting or abandoning a theory that does not stand up to criticism? Isn’t this part of the scientific endeavor? Isn’t that how the whole enterprise moves forward?
I realize it is a “sacred cow” in Christian apologetics these days, especially to people like Norman Geisler, and it is certainly valid, as well as worthwhile, to point out the limitations of the scientific method, but this whole approach is a dead end. We, as Christians, will never succeed in turning back the clock to institute a pre-Enlightenment approach to science. We will never convince scientists to abandon the scientific method (methodological naturalism). There has to be a better approach than beating your fists against the wall and crying, “No fair!”
Yes, because they accept methodological naturalism as the proper way to “do science.” You may be correct in your reasoning, but until the scientists can be convinced that their method is flawed, nothing will change. A dead end.
Strictly speaking, the Bible says nothing of “signs of design” in nature. Psalm 19 is a hymn of praise to God, not an argument for his existence. It, like Gen. 1:1, assumes his existence from the first line. Rom. 1 does contain an argument, but the conclusion that Paul reaches is the opposite of what many ID advocates assume. Douglas Moo, whose commentary on Romans is widely recognized as the finest in the English language, puts it this way:
"The last clause of v. 20, “so that they are without excuse,” states a key element in our interpretation of vv. 19-20. For Paul here makes clear that “natural revelation,” in and of itself, leads to a negative result. That Paul teaches the reality of a revelation of God in nature to all people, this text makes clear. But it is equally obvious that this revelation is universally rejected, as people turn from knowledge of God to gods of their own making (cf. vv. 22ff.). Why this is so, Paul will explain elsewhere (cf. Rom. 5:12-21). But it is vital if we are to understand Paul’s gospel and his urgency in preaching it to realize that natural revelation leads not to salvation but to the demonstration that God’s condemnation is just: people are “without excuse.”
If it is true, as you say, that God’s design is deducible from nature, doesn’t Paul assert here that people already possess such knowledge? Why is it necessary to demonstrate something that Scripture says people already know? Has such knowledge done them any good so far?
As Paul makes clear, all people everywhere have an innate understanding that there is a “designer” behind it all, but such knowledge has only a negative result, rendering them without excuse. Personally, I would rather see people come to a saving knowledge of the truth, which only comes through Jesus Christ. (Case in point: Antony Flew. Stand next to him at the last judgment and see how “theism” works out for him.)
Hold on, guys. The ID proponent is not doing theology, but the EC is? I would humbly propose that both are equally involved in theology.
On a positive note, I love John the Baptist’s “stupid hypothetical sister.” Haha. What a great example, and a very important point!
Changing gears, I have a hard time understanding why any Christian would prefer to demonstrate the existence of a designer rather than the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. Is it because any talk of the one, true God of the Bible in their theories would disqualify their arguments from being considered “science”? Isn’t this the definition of “accommodation”? Perhaps I’m missing something.
What an interesting direction! Eddie is right, and although I know he is no fan of Pascal in these discussions, the two of them agree on this. It is one thing to tell a Christian that all he has to do is look around and see evidence of God everywhere, but it is quite another to tell that to someone who does not see through the eyes of faith.
I am very much in agreement with Swamidass on this, however. I mentioned earlier that, in my judgment, trying to change methodological naturalism and return to a pre-Enlightenment “golden age” are both dead ends. I do think, however, that there is a way forward, which Swamidass has hinted at.
My approach is more in line with that of Wittgenstein. Let science do its thing. Science is concerned only with “facts,” so the only statements that science is allowed to make are empirical statements. But as Wittgenstein noted, “even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all.” Science has nothing to say about what is transcendental, which is just another name for everything that really matters! Ethics, aesthetics, religion, the meaning of life. Music, art, literature, philosophy. These may not contribute to our store of verifiable facts, but they do contribute to our understanding of life.
Since it was my own 2 penn’orth, I can speak as an evolutionary creationist if I choose, I think! ID claims to be a scientific endeavour, and is argued to be a philosophical one, but really isn’t a theological one because it neither draws on theological premises, nor makes conclusions about its designer. Whether they’re really closet creationists or anything else doesn’t alter that position. They don’t even qualify, strictly, as natural theologians, for unlike Paley they draw no conclusions about God.
Evolutionary Creation, on the other hand, is an enterprise to bring a rapprochement between science and Christian theology. It has no reason not to use the Bible, academic theology or any other aspect of Christianity in its work.
That difference is demonstrated by the fact that an EC is justified in saying, “I just know by my faith that God is behind evolution” (though someone might want him to go further to explain how), whereas the roof will fall in if Doug Axe claims the common intuition of design is the only argument ID needs to make its case.
Joni the Baptist, whose existence has been suppressed by the Church, went about dressed in locusts and wild honey, and ate camel hair and leather belts. Unfortunately, since she stayed in the wilderness, there was no water wherewith to baptise the penitent, so the early Church invented the tale of John to match the Old Testament prophecies which Joni loused up. Didn’t know I was a John the Baptist mythicist, did you?
Hi Eddie.
I believe Ian Musgrave originally noted work in an earlier article, circa 2008.
In humans many of sequences previously characterized as ORFans appear to have homologies to non-coding regions, suggesting known mechanisms of recombination and transposon movement in their origins. New ‘genes’ from old sequences; not new sequences entirely, as Nelson suggested.
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[quote]
I note that you and Joshua are rejecting Paul Nelson’s argument, but that both of you claim that it is an intelligent argument. Yet in the end, isn’t it an eliminative argument, and thus negative?[/quote]
Many arguments can rephrased as a negation but I won’t dive too deeply into that rabbit hole of discussion. In this case, Paul is proposing that a designer specifically introduced new genes that didn’t exist previously. He identified these as the ORFans found in the various sequencing initiatives. The null hypothesis in this case would be that we expect to find x% of ORFans if natural mechanisms were at work. Paul expects >x% (x% natural + y% ‘designed’) at some level of statistical significance. The positive utility of Nelson’s claim is its specificity – with the caveat that I don’t think he indicated a specific numbers of ORFans expected – and the fact that it could be definitively tested with data expected to come in over a short period.
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Perhaps. This example is definitely along the lines of SETI and cryptography.The initial identification of a potential ‘message’ would could be statistical deviation from expectations. But that would only indicate an unknown phenomena that required further investigation. The decoding of the sequence itself into an interpreted message is what would allow us to infer actual intelligence. For most other cases in biology where an orthogonal ‘message’ (like the case I suggested) aren’t found, Dembski’s EF is much more of a problem to apply.
Eddie,
In many of your responses, I can see you advocating mainly that people give ID a chance. I’m fine with that. Debates about whether an argument is “positive” or “negative” aside, I’d really like to see good, testable, proposals from ID theorists. We can argue whether ID opponents have proposed reasonable test cases, but the fact is, we all really need to see good test cases period.
I have to say that most proposals so far have either lacked specificity or testability. We can disagree about that, but that’s how I see it. That’s have many scientists see it. The cases has not been made that the ‘design’ in the evolution of biological organisms is distinguishable from ‘natural’ mechanisms.
I think ‘design’, such as it may be, is likely expressed at a different ‘metaphysical level’ (pace Swamidass’ comments). It’s not a statistical phenomenon accessible to the tools of science but more of a holistic viewpoint. It’s like looking for hidden meaning and signs (e.g. reading chicken entrails), and missing the big picture.
Still, is it possible that a designer (or designers) left some mark in various species that can be definitively identified by science? Might we find some ‘scientifically approved’ instance of design in a chicken or an amoeba? Perhaps. To date, I have not seen a solid case made. And it hasn’t convinced most others. But certainly keep working at it if you’re like.
Thanks, and best wishes for you as well, Eddie. I bicker a lot (ask my wife… hmm… no, please don’t), but would certainly be happy to have you as a neighbor.
Okay, I’m going out on a limb here, so you guys who have read more than me and understand the theories better than me may have to step in.
In my (possibly ill-informed) opinion, the “design argument” should be a cumulative one, made by piling up many, sometimes disparate, pieces of evidence that all point in the same direction. However, each individual ID theorist seems to think they have put their finger on the “one thing” that will cause the evolutionary “house of cards” to crumble, and so they are led to over-reach.
For example, ID information theorists are not content to draw the analogy between DNA code and computer code, drawing the obvious inferences; no, they push the analogy too far and insist that nature cannot create new information. Why? Similarly, ID mathematicians try to establish the statistical impossibility of life evolving, but they push their initial assumptions to the limit to try to make their case. Even with more conservative assumptions, the chances are extremely improbably, if not necessarily “impossible,” as they defined impossible. Again, why? Why make questionable assumptions? The same seems to hold with some of the irreducible complexity arguments, and those more familiar with the literature could find even more examples, I’m sure.
It seems to me that if these arguments had been made in a more modest fashion, they would carry much more weight, and the cumulative effect would be much greater than it has been so far. Am I speaking out of ignorance, or does this make sense?
It seems to me that the “impossibles” are more often attributed to ID arguments by their opponents, than claimed by themselves.
Off the top of my head, for example, Dembski’s “universal probability bound” is just that - a question of probabilities that become far less plausible than design, even if one generously reduces them by orders of magnitude (which, incidentally, Dembski usually does compared to non-ID probabilities he cites from the literature). Now, of course, that does not mean the starting assumptions are right, but that’s a question for discussion. But he’s completely in agreement with the argument that no set of information is impossible (and that any string is as likely as any other) - but that the set of functional information is so much smaller that “cheating” is hugely more likely.
Likewise, Meyer’s most discussed work overtly stresses “inference to the best explanation” methodology, usually by describing the problems with the alternatives already discussed in the existing literature. I can’t recall him using the language of “impossibility” at all.
The one exception amongst the big boys of ID, in my limited experience, is Behe. That seems to be because the form of his argument for “irreducible complexity”, however well or otherwise his examples match it, is one of deductive logic, where there appears to be a logical contradiction in positing a stepwise evolutionary pathway.
Incidentally, most replies to him have proposed hypothetical possible partial solutions that weaken the logical force by suggesting possible loopholes. That certainly makes “impossible” less tenable in a deductive argument, but of course does not provide an actual chain of efficient causation, nor address the probability question.
Regarding IC, Sy Garte gives a good example that struck him forcibly back in his college days: the transcription of DNA requires tRNAs, of twenty different flavours, each matching one coding triplet to an amino acid. That’s twenty separate evolutionary stories required, to make twenty related, but highly specialised, RNA molecules for the twenty amino acids constituting life.
But those tRNAs have to be synthesised by RNA polymerase III, an enzyme complex (which is itself part of a more complex transcription apparatus) - which is, of course, a protein made up of the very amino acids that require tRNA to transcribe them…
It’s actually more complicated than that, of course. Now Sy is not an ID proponent, nor does he say its evolution is impossible, but there is a chicken-egg problem there which rather invites such a description.
So much for “impossible”. But I agree with you that the design argument is cumulative (though remember that, for me, it is axiomatic: unlike ID I’m less interested is demonstrating design to unbelievers than seeing how Christian creation doctrine applies in the world of science).
I’d say, though, that opposition to ID’s cumulative argument (IC [Behe], UPB [Dembski], weakness of non-design mechanisms [Meyer], fine tuning at both cosmic and smaller scales [Denton], metaphysical arguments for First Cause [Torley], form [Sternberg], biosemiosis [Johnson], near-universality of “design instinct” [Axe]…) comes through attacking each aspect by every means available from careful refutation to ad hominems and misrepresentation, without addressing the cumulative case much.
That may be inevitable - it seems ID proponents often similarly attack individual aspects of evolutionary naturalism rather than the cumulative case… though I have seen frequent discussions of the weakness of its underlying Epicurean assumptions, far more than I’ve seen critiques of the actual metaphysical assumptions underlying ID (I must add that “Epicurean”, however, as a term, seems to be N T Wright’s preferred pejorative rather than that of any actual ID people I have read).
Thanks for the clarification. That makes more sense. It also is fairly close to what I was trying to say, which is that science may be adequate to explain physical causes, and it may succeed (though I doubt it) in producing a unified, purely naturalistic account of origins, but even that still doesn’t answer humanity’s most important questions.
I think it is extremely unlikely that science will abandon methodological naturalism, almost as unlikely as hoping that scientists will one day “wake up” and question the assumption that science is adequate to explain origins. This is especially the case when so much advance has been made in just the last decade. Perhaps in another 100 years, if the problems are still intractable, things will change, but for now, it’s hard to see it happening.
I still think the most productive approach is to educate the public on the limits of science. Make them understand the “narrowness of method” that prevents science from arriving at the truth.
This, to me, assumes that science and scientists can provide answers about truth in regard to origins. I think our challenge, as Christians, is not to change the scientific method so that scientists can finally discover the truth; our challenge is to point out that science cannot provide those answers, so we must look elsewhere for the purpose and meaning of our existence.
You’ll probably have to explain this to me. Is the work of structuralists accepted by the scientific establishment? If so, doesn’t this mean that science does not completely reject the kind of approach you are advocating?
Jon, you are mistaken in two ways. First, you are talking about translation of RNA, not transcription of DNA.
Second, and more importantly, there are not “twenty different flavours” of tRNAs. There are 64 codons, some pairs work with a single tRNA because of third-base wobble. There are multiple tRNAs for some amino acids. On top of that, there are >100 amino acid residues in proteins because of multiple posttranslational modification systems.
By your criteria intelligent design should have one start codon, one stop codon, and codons for 62 amino acids without wobble.
I think you have inadvertently offered a scientific ID hypothesis that distinguishes a flavor of ID from evolutionary theory–with an empirical prediction that turns out to be false.[quote=“Jon_Garvey, post:153, topic:5673”]
…there is a chicken-egg problem there which rather invites such a description.
[/quote]
Well, any thorough description of the chicken-egg problem would need to explain why the enzymatic center of the ribosome, peptidyl transferase, is a ribozyme. That makes perfect sense in the RNA World without ID (evolution can only modify something so important and non-redundant around the edges) but makes zero sense in terms of ID, since RNA is an inferior catalyst.
Meyer simply makes the false claim that peptidyl transferase is a protein. So despite an entire chapter devoted to the RNA World hypothesis, he just happens to characterize the single strongest evidence for the hypothesis in a completely false way. Ignorance cannot be an excuse, as Meyer even cited Wally Gilbert’s single-page News&Views paper in which this prediction was clearly stated (Nature 319:618, 1986)!
“But a few RNA enzymic activities still exist, the two described recently, and possibly others in the role of ribosomal RNA or in the splicing of eukaryotic messenger RNA.”
Meyer has neither acknowledged nor corrected the false claim.
I think we are all grateful for your willingness to point out our terminological errors, and even to keep a record of whether published authors have acknowledged your corrections. I should, indeed, have referred to “translation”.
Likewise, my simplification of matching the number of tRNAs to the number of amino acids, for the purposes of a seven line example. 3rd base wobble means there are at least 31 flavours of tRNA necessary for the 64 possible codons. Perhaps that’s relevant somehow.
You’ll have to spell out, though, for my benefit, how that affects the circularity issue I raised: those 31 tRNAs still have to be produced by a protein enzyme made of the amino acids for which they code.
I’m not sure of the relevance of raising the question of peptidyl transferase again, though (apart from linking it to Meyer’s erroneous designation). You seem to be arguing that the presence of a ribozyme in the ribosome makes RNA world a possibility. Though that’s a long way from establishing it as a reality, if we grant RNA world’s existence, how would that explain the many flavours of tRNA? Are you saying that ribozymal activity was capable of synthesising tRNAs in the absence of proteins, and that the RNA polymerases were merely a later refinement? Or that proteins could originally be translated by ribozymes without tRNAs, so that the whole current system arose as a refinement? Or what.
My point is that your example serves as an ID hypothesis. It’s what you expect an intelligently-designed system to be. But it’s not like that.[quote=“Jon_Garvey, post:158, topic:5673”]
You’ll have to spell out, though, for my benefit, how that affects the circularity issue I raised: those 31 tRNAs still have to be produced by a protein enzyme made of the amino acids for which they code.
[/quote]
Do they? Or more accurately, did they before DNA and protein?
[quote=“Jon_Garvey, post:158, topic:5673”]
I’m not sure of the relevance of raising the question of peptidyl transferase again, though (apart from linking it to Meyer’s erroneous designation).[/quote]
It’s an initial step in addressing the chicken-egg problem, of course. I would describe it as false, not erroneous. If it was erroneous, it would have been acknowledged and corrected years ago.
[quote]You seem to be arguing that the presence of a ribozyme in the ribosome makes RNA world a possibility.
[/quote]No, I am stating that it is consistent with the hypothesis that the protein synthetic machinery started as entirely RNA.
More importantly, it was an empirical prediction made before the discovery was made, which is the way real science works, not by “arguing” about the data we already have while pretending that there are no predictions to be made.
Here’s the thing, though: can you come up with an ID hypothesis that explains this objective fact better than the RNA World hypothesis does, and that makes empirical predictions about information you don’t have? Or lacking that, what is the “inference to the best explanation”?
This is the part I never see them do, which indicates that what they’re doing isn’t science. Quite apart from what Behe said. And quite apart from the fact that anyone who can’t say how old the earth is, isn’t doing science.
