MarkD, I should be around when you are ready. I didn’t give my qualifications. I think it was assumed in some replies that I am not a physicist. I don’t think qualifications matter to truth at all. Physicists disagree about a whole lot of things, like is there a firewall around black holes, is it MOND or dark matter and all their qualifications mean nothing to what actually exists. Only data can answer the questions, not a proclamation that one is a physicist therefore…whatever conclusion one wants to stake out. But someone should realize that few nonphysicists read the articles I have been reading and quoting.
I believe strongly now that consciousness is a very special thing, and quite different from what is normally assumed, that it arose as an epiphenomenon of the brain–which is just a word for we don’t know. Consider our attempts to create artificial intelligence which can translate for us. Anyone who has used these translators knows how flawed they are and that tells us something about the difference between computers and consciousness. Consider Searles objection to artificial intelligence:
Consider yourself locked in a room and people are slipping to you strings of Chinese characters. You have a big look up table that tells you if I get this symbol, I need to output those Chinese symbols. Searles says:
“I get small bunches of Chinese symbols passed to me (questions in Chinese), and I look up in a rule book (the program) what I am supposed to do. I perform certain operations on the symbols in accordance with the rules (that is, I carry out the steps in the program) and give back small bunches of symbols (answers to the questions) to those outside the room. I am the computer implementing a program for answering questions in Chinese, but all the same I do not understand a word of Chinese. And this is the point: if I do not understand Chinese solely on the basis of implementing a computer program for understanding Chinese, then neither does any other digital computer solely on that basis, because no digital computer has anything I do not have.” John R. Searles, “Consciousness as a Biological Problem,” in John R. Searles, The Mystery of Consciousness, (New York: A New York Review Book, 1997), p.11
I speak Mandarin (badly but can get by). I have an understanding of the language that a computer can’t have. And I can listen to a sentence and occasionally determine the meaning of an unknown word by its context in the Chinese sentence.
Then there is the qualia problem. Called the hard problem. Why do we feel?
“Even for a system of whose qualia I have near-perfect knowledge, myself for example, the problem of qualia is serious. It is this: How is it possible for physical, objective, quantitatively describable neuron firings to cause qualitative, private, subjective experiences? How, to put it naively, does the brain get us over the hump from electrochemistry to feeling? That is the hard part of the mind-body problem that is left over after we see that consciousness must be caused by brain processes and is itself a feature of the brain.” John R. Searles, “Francis Crick, the Binding Problem, and the Hypothesis of Forty Hertz,” in John R. Searles, The Mystery of Consciousness, (New York: A New York Review Book, 1997), p. 28
And then there is consciousness which pops up in quantum, in unexpected ways and in unexpected places.
“Consciousness is admittedly hard to define objectively, but each of us has a clear intuitive understanding of what he means by being conscious. One can compare the human brain with a very sophisticated computer, and indeed a computer can perform many of the functions of the brain, but it does not seem easy to imagine a computer being conscious. This problem is far from physics, but it does connect with the argument to which we have been led, because knowing that a measurement has disclosed a certain event is the same thing as becoming conscious of the fact, and this is precisely what makes us contract the state function.” Rudolf Ernst Peierls, Surpises in theoretical Physics, Princeton University Press, 1979, p. 33-34
This is another physicist formulating quantum with consciousness. Peierls view is that quantum is about knowledge and that requires someone who knows:
“The moment at which you can throw away one possibilitiy and keep only the other is when you finally become conscious of the fact that the experiment has given one result…You see, the quantum mechanical description is in terms of knowledge, and knowledge requires somebody who knows”; Sir Rudolf Peierls, The Ghost in the Machine, p. 73-74
All this hubbub arises from one simple fact. The Schrodinger equation is unitary–it doesn’t have a mechanism for collapse contained in it. In physics we have equations for how electrons move in magnetic fields, how balls fall, or roll down a ramp with friction, how pendulums move, but we have no equation for collapse. The Schrodinger equation just pumps out the continued evolution of the wavefunction. Thus the mechanism of collapse is quite different. I will end with what Rosenblum and Kuttner say about this, which I find interesting even if other don’t.
which-box experiment brief description. Send a particle down through a half silvered mirror which splits the particle and sends half to one box and half to another box. See which box contains the particle by slitting a slot in one of the boxes and waiting to see what comes out. If nothing does, slit the second box. Then take a pair of which-boxes and slit them simultaneously and see if the particle is in both boxes. In these, it is in both boxes. The choice of how to examine each pair of boxes determines what is found and no reference to quantum collapse, interference or whatever is referred to with these boxes.
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“The most common argument that consciousness is not involved in the quantum experiment is that a not-conscious robot could do the experiment. However, for any experiment to be meaningful, a human must eventually evaluate it. A programmed robot sees no enigma. Consider the human evaluation of the robot’s experiment:
“The robot presents a printout to the human experimenter. It shows that with some sets of box pairs the robot chose a which-box experiment, establishing that the objects were wholly in a single box. With other sets of box pairs, choosing the interference experiment, it established that the objects were not wholly in a single box.”
“On the basis of this data, the human experimenter could conclude that certain box-pair sets actually contained objects wholly in a single box, while others contained objects not wholly in a single box. However, a question arises in the mind of the experimenter: How did the robot choose the appropriate experiment with each box pair set? What if, for example, the robot chose a which-box experiment with objects not wholly in a single box? A partial object was never reported.”
“Without free will, the non-conscious robot must use some ‘mechanical’ choice procedure. Investigating, the experimenter finds, for example, that it flips a coin. Heads, a which-box experiment: tails interference. The experimenter is troubled by the mysterious correlation between the landing of the coin and what was presumably actually in a particular box-pair set.”
'To avoid that inexplicable correlation, the experimenter replaces the robot’s coin flipping with one choice method she is most sure is not correlated with the contents of a box-pair set: her own free choice. … In the end, the robot argument establishes nothing.” Fred Kuttner and Bruce Rosenblum, The Conscious Observer in the Quantum Experiment, in Lana Tao, ed., Quantum Physics of Consciousness, (Cambridge: Cosmology Science Publishers, 2011), p.160-161
I stand by the view that consciousness is something special. As physicist Stephen Barr says:
“But this was only one of the remarkable reversals produced by the quantum revolution. In the opinion of many physicists-including such great figures in twentieth-century physics as Eugene Wigner and Rudolf Peierls-the fundamental principles of quantum theory are inconsistent with the materialist view of the human mind. Quantum theory, in its traditional, or “standard,” or “orthodox” formulation, treats “observers” as being on a different plane from the physical systems that they observe. A careful analysis of the logical structure of quantum theory suggests that for quantum theory to make sense it has to posit the existence of observers who lie, at least in part, outside of the description provided by physics. This claim is controversial. There have been various attempts made to avoid this conclusion, either by radical reinterpretations of quantum theory (such as the so-called “many-worlds interpretation”) or by changing quantum theory in some way. But the argument against materialism based on quantum theory is a strong one, and has certainly not been refuted. The line" of argument is rather subtle. It is also not well- known, even among most practicing physicists. But, if it is correct, it would be the most important philosophical implication to come from any scientific discovery.” Stephen M. Barr, Modern Physics and Ancient Faith, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), p. 27-28