Jon,
I read the long answer, and it was not tedious at all. Not having my own website though, I guess I will have to continue to abuse BioLogos space.
Before we get to the philosophical issues, I have to point out that many of your objections are directed at evolutionary psychology itself. Would it be too strong to say that you think it is all a lot of hooey? If so, I’m not qualified to argue with you. In another recent thread on this site there was an interesting discussion of what non-experts like myself should do when we observe disagreements among acknowledged experts. I claimed that though we cannot pronounce on the specific claims made by either side, we can (if we have a broad-based education) identify when a consensus exists within a given scientific community, and we are rationally obligated to accept the conclusions of the consensus. And that raises the question of whether there is a consensus regarding the biological inheritance of behavioral traits (and cognitive traits too). It seems to me that there is, though I will admit that it is not as strong as the consensus that exists in favor of common ancestry. I have often been impressed by the criticism that adaptive explanations for human behaviors are far too easy to offer, and are exceedingly difficult to confirm. It is easy, and tempting, to dismiss them all as “just so stories,” and I have a great deal of sympathy with that concern. However, for my purposes I don’t need them to be adaptive, just inherited. If they turn out to be spandrels, non-adaptive themselves but somehow attached to some other genetic traits that are adaptive, what is that to me? I am assuming is that behavioral (and cognitive) tendencies are genetically inherited, and that’s all I am assuming. I am doing that as a non-expert who is surveying the field of evolutionary psychology with both philosophical and spiritual interests, and the result of the survey is that I may take it on good authority that behavior and belief are genetically inherited. So I have to bow out of your dispute with the evolutionary psychologists, and just ask that you take it up with them. I will continue to observe as an interested non-expert. [As an aside, I see that you have already done that by commenting on Justin Barrett’s post on this website about a year ago. For those who are interested, that post contained a link to an overview of “EP” entitled “Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer” by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, with an excellent list of references. Would you at least agree that their primer is a very informative survey of the current state of the field, even though you think the entire field is misguided?]
Ok, so here are the philosophical problems I have. You wrote that “any behaviour we observe in human society now can, of course, only be attributed to evolution by the circular reasoning that if it is present it must have evolved. Which is the whole question at issue, if sin might not have evolved.” Respectfully, there is no circular reasoning being employed at all. We are trying to explain the sinful behaviors we now observe in human society. There are two alternatives: genetic inheritance and cultural inheritance (or some combination of both). Let us assume for now that we might be able to eliminate cultural inheritance as a fully adequate explanation (I think we can, but all that’s needed here is the possibility that we can). Then genetic inheritance might play some role, even if it turns out to be a minor role. But a genetic inheritance might have evolved. Hence sin might have evolved. No circularity at all, and the conclusion is at least a plausible possibility that we must take seriously. And to answer one of the questions you used as a sub-heading: Yes, evolved behaviors are consistent with sin.
There is a point at which I think you are obscuring a question of considerable importance. In your discussion of cuckoos you wrote… “isn’t it selfish and immoral to push the host’s eggs out of the nest and fool her into feeding you? I answer, ‘Not if it’s in your God-given nature to do so, nor even if a blind evolutionary process rewards it by reproductive success.’ It’s just the right way to be a cuckoo.” The word “right” in your last sentence cannot be a moral term. It is a biological norm, to be sure, but it can’t have moral content unless cuckoos have some sort of moral understanding. So let’s assume they don’t, so that this behavior is not immoral for them (because no behavior could be immoral for them). But for any being with even a very rudimentary moral understanding, such behavior is immoral. If we can imagine a morally aware cuckoo, that poor bird would immediately conclude that it is in its God-given nature (so let’s give this cuckoo a divine awareness too) to behave immorally. In fact, that seems to be our condition precisely. So this example does not show that sinful behavior cannot be a product of evolution. It merely shows that the behavior is not sinful until a moral and spiritual consciousness is present. But that’s precisely the point.
You also wrote that “an equally effective and more rational solution would be biological, and one could easily argue that we’ll soon be in a position to fix any genetic disorder on a mass scale. All we have to do is identify the genes responsible for our evolved self-aggrandisement, modify them accordingly, and we’ll have solved the problem of sin at a stroke, and generated selfless love for God as a useful by-product. If you think that’s irreverent or facetious, tell me why it wouldn’t work as well as the passion of our Lord, given sin’s ontologically physical nature?” I believe this is the same objection that Denis Alexander makes to any attempt to give a genetic account of original sin. It’s not irreverent, and it’s not facetious, because if one’s account of sin has the consequence that Christ’s atonement is unnecessary, then of course it must be rejected by all Christians. But if a genetic account of original sin has this problem, then so does every other. To see why, consider that every account of original sin must include some means by which sinful condition is transmitted. Again, a genetic means and a cultural means seem to be the two obvious candidates. But even if we could think of others, they would all be subject to this same alleged objection. Why? Because we will always be able to imagine ways in which the means might be thwarted, and then possibly attempt to thwart it. And if we succeed, we would (according to this objection) render Christ’s atonement unnecessary. But this argument can be generalized to every possible means of transmission. Once we think we know how sin is transmitted, we can begin to devise ways to prevent its transmission. And if that bare possibility renders Christ’s atonement unnecessary (and I certainly don’t think it does), then every possible means of transmission would likewise render Christ’s atonement unnecessary. So this objection must be abandoned. As an additional attempt to explain why the atonement can never be rendered unnecessary in this way, I will call attention to my original suggestion, which was that we are in this miserable condition because God knows that we would fail any test administered in ideal circumstances. That fact about us, by itself, requires an atonement. And that fact never changes. Christ’s atonement will always be necessary, even if we should get better at preventing the transmission of sin.
Regarding chimps and bonobos, I just have to add this. It doesn’t matter that the split between them occurred after they split from humans. I think it’s terrific that bonobos don’t exhibit the aggressive and potentially sinful behaviors that chimps do. Good for them (that’s not a moral “good”). But when we ask what we humans are like, it is quite obvious that we are more like the chimps than the bonobos. It might have been nice if our evolutionary past had led to a more bonobo-like condition. But it didn’t, it led the other way. We do know this, because we observe ourselves with the chimp-like tendencies. And once we have the moral and spiritual consciousness to recognize what we are like, we see that we are sinful.
Finally, I have to object to the characterization at the end of your essay of the view that there are “evolutionary sinful behaviors.” You wrote that “it requires denying or ignoring aspects of the Scriptural accounts and logically leads, more or less inevitably, to a complete recasting of the story told by Bible.” No, that’s just not correct. And you are falling into gross rhetorical excess here, of the sort that you normally avoid (from what I’ve read of your posts). The account in Genesis is indeed being regarded as non-literal, but surely that is not a “complete recasting.” What the story tells us is that we have been born into a fallen world, that we are somehow responsible for that condition, and that we are in great need of redemption. That is true, even if there was no actual test carried out in ideal circumstances, but we were instead brought into this condition on the basis of how we would respond to such a test. That is the only difference. The rest of the story of redemption plays out in exactly the same way. Hardly a “complete recasting.” Please.