Roman, I think I can grant most of your preliminary distinctions without granting the ontology you propose.
I agree that bodily identity cannot mean retaining the same atoms, age, or biological configuration, and that sōma pneumatikon is not an immaterial body. Resurrection shows that genuinely human embodiment can exist in a transformed, incorruptible condition, but that only keeps open the possibility that Edenic embodiment differed in some respects from our present condition, it doesn’t positively establish a distinct Edenic physical regime. I also agree that simply affirming a real and embodied Eden does not by itself require us to identify prelapsarian embodiment with what you call ordinary terrestrial Homo sapiens biology plus supernatural protections, what it does require, though, is real human embodiment, a genuine body-soul unity, and Adam and Eve as the first human pair.
Your resurrection question is fair too: “the same soul” is not by itself a complete phenomenological account of bodily identity, but hylomorphism does give an ontological answer: the soul isn’t a pilot inhabiting a body but the substantial form of this human being, and resurrection restores the same human being in a transformed bodily condition. Whatever philosophical questions remain there don’t themselves point toward a single Edenic personal ground.
I also agree with your point about physical detectability, the thomistic arguments for the intellectual soul are metaphysical, not arguments from scientific non-detection, but that again establishes openness, not your particular ontology: “physics does not rule this out” is different from “we have reason to posit this.”
I also understand that your Edenic ground is created, not divine, not an emanation, and wholly dependent upon God, so none of that is my objection.
The real issue is what you mean by “one real Edenic personal ground.” You say that the Adamic and Eveic distinctions are real internal distinctions, but “not yet two separate earthly biological persons.” I want to preserve that qualification: you have not explicitly said that they are not yet two personal subjects in any sense.
So what kind of unity is this?
If it is one numerically individual personal subject, then a one-to-many identity problem appears. If later Adam and Eve are each personally identical with that same subject, then identity branches. If “full personal imprint” is weaker than identity, that avoids the contradiction, but then the imprint explains derivation or resemblance rather than personal continuity.
If instead the ground is something more like a common human nature, archetype, or deeper created unity shared by already distinct subjects, then I can understand that more easily, but then I’m not sure in what sense the ground itself is personal, or what “full personal imprint” adds.
Gregory of Nyssa is useful precisely here, because he can speak of the whole human race as “one man” because he is talking about human nature as a whole, yet he clearly distinguishes individual humans: “the first man” and “the man born from him” are two while sharing the same human nature, so Gregory supports one nature, many persons, not one primordial personal subject differentiating into several persons.
Your proposal also has a structural resemblance to the old rabbinic primordial-Adam traditions. Genesis Rabbah 8:1 Bereshit Rabbah 8:1 | Sefaria Library preserves both the androgynos saying and the two-sided Adam who is subsequently divided. I’m not saying that your Adamic/Eveic distinctions are already masculine and feminine, and certainly not that you are proposing biological hermaphroditism, the resemblance is only structural: a prior human unity with an internal differentiation before the appearance of Adam and Eve as two distinct embodied individuals.
There is also an important difference: in the rabbinic two-sided version the division belongs to Genesis 2 and therefore occurs before the transgression of Genesis 3, so if your Adam and Eve become two personal subjects only in the transition out of Eden, your proposal would actually be more radical than that rabbinic model.
I’m going to ask you this: before the Fall, are Adam and Eve already two numerically distinct personal subjects, although not yet two ordinary earthly biological persons, or are they still internal distinctions within one personal subject?
There is then a second, and perhaps more serious, issue: what causes each later individual soul to exist?
I understand that you explicitly deny fragmentation. No one receives a “piece” of the Edenic ground. Fair enough. But you also say that parents do not produce the soul and that your model does not require each soul to begin through a wholly new creative act.
So there seem to be only two possibilities: If each “full personal imprint” is itself immediately brought into existence by God as a new spiritual soul, then you have not actually eliminated the immediate divine creation of each soul, you have added an Edenic archetypal structure to it; If, on the other hand, the later soul is not immediately created by God, then your proposal is not merely an alternative, it’s something more radical.
That also makes the causal problem more serious, because calling the soul a “full personal imprint” tells me what relation it bears to the Edenic ground, but not what brings a new numerically distinct spiritual subject into existence. If it is not produced by the parents, not a fragment of the ground, not pre-existent, and not immediately created by God, what exactly is its efficient cause?
The inheritance problem doesn’t force your model either, you already correctly say that original sin is neither Adam’s personal guilt nor a positive sinful substance inserted into a new soul, as original sin is a state, a privation, not a positive object transferred from one soul to another, so there is no need to imagine a newly created soul somehow receiving an already-existing “thing” older than itself.
On ‘dust,’ I agree that creatureliness is central to the image. I would only add that Genesis 3:19 explicitly connects being from dust with bodily return to dust, so the imagery also has an irreducibly corporeal dimension
And on your methodological point, I agree: Genesis doesn’t contain an Aristotelian-Thomistic textbook, it doesn’t explicitly spell out “two separately created rational substantial forms informing two terrestrial organisms”, but that cuts both ways: Genesis also doesn’t give us an Edenic personal ground or full personal imprints. Once we move into metaphysics, the issue is which account has clearer categories and fewer unexplained relations.
The narrative itself does exert some pressure, because Adam and Eve are already presented as distinct interlocutors before the transgression: the woman is brought to the man, he addresses her, the serpent addresses her, she acts and gives to him, and they are addressed separately. If there aren’t yet two personal subjects behind those scenes, that requires a fairly substantial non-literal metaphysical translation.
On the Tree and Gethsemane, I think we basically agree: “not my will, but yours” is not the abolition of human freedom but its right ordering toward God.
So my objection is not that your proposal is obviously incoherent, nor that Eden must have had exactly our present biological condition, my objection is that the two notions doing the distinctive explanatory work in your model (“one personal ground” and “full personal imprint”) are also the two notions whose ontological and causal meaning remains least clear.
And the question of the immediate creation of each spiritual soul is not optional at all, in my book.