Transcendental argument for God’s existence: your response

I have some similar comments as what I replied to T_aquaticus. As I defined God to be supreme and ultimate, then “those who dictate God’s nature” are not somehow higher than God, for this would be a contradiction.
God’s nature as the supreme authority means that He is indeed on a different playing field morally. The “do as I say, not as I do” morality is not inherently wrong for Him by virtue of His supreme authority. As an analogy, I am a teacher. It’s my right to assign final grades in my course, and not the rights of my students, by virtue of my different positional authority. Similar principles apply to God. It is not our right to pronounce spiritual judgment on other people, but it is God’s right. We are not His moral equals.
By the same token, if we are to “examine God’s reasons” for moral commands, as if we could correct Him, we are placing ourselves in the position of ultimate authority. In addition to the spiritual transgression this is (Isaiah 40:13), it contradicts our definition that God is supreme.
Can these principles be applied to the devil? Objectivity, sure, but ultimate supremacy, no. My original argument shows that the ultimate standard must be unique, so since that ultimate is defined to be God, then the “ultimate” part could not apply to any being distinct from God. The comment you quoted was in a conversation focused on the existence of an objective moral standard, not about its uniqueness. My original argument is what argues for uniqueness. A morality defined by the devil (or any other nonhuman being other than God) would be objective, but that doesn’t mean it is of equal authority to God’s.

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If you are arguing that God’s existence is evidence by the existence of an objective morality then the non-existence of an objective morality would seem to be a problem.

False. There would be a subjective morality.

There’s no need to label it the ultimate moral standard. It is just how we determine morality. If the vast majority of people don’t think an action is immoral, then it isn’t immoral. There’s no contradiction.

If Bob doesn’t agree that a moral is an objective standard, the same would apply. An objective morality has the very same problems because people have to agree to adopt them.

For example, Sharia law is said to be an objective morality. So what happens if you refuse to obey Sharia law?

Or morality can change over time. What’s wrong with that? Why stick with a bad moral system just for the sake of consistency?

That’s a big “if”. You need to establish that fact instead of just assuming it. All you are doing is forming a circular argument.

You need to demonstrate, not simply select a definition.

That’s not what I mean. I mean that God’s nature might be immoral. Simply defining God as being moral does not solve the problem. You need to demonstrate that God is moral, not simply define God as being moral.

A shared subjective morality leads to a moral code that is consistent with human empathy and emotion.

Yet another reason why TAG is a bad argument. Humans are humans, so if your argument makes humans into gods then your argument is bad.

If there are objective standards people can still disagree with them just as you disagree with the objective standard of Sharia law.

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“False. There would be subjective morality.” Subjective morality still is a standard. I was talking about any standard, which would include one given by subjective morality. (Yes, I do believe subjective morality exists, just that it isn’t the ultimate standard.)

“There’s no need to label it the ultimate moral standard. It is just how we determine morality.” How we determine morality is precisely the meaning of a moral standard. Since at least one standard exists, then some standard is the ultimate one. (Whichever one that is — that’s the standard I choose to consider in TAG.) If that ultimate one is not subjective, then it is objective. If the ultimate one is subjective, then we are in the situation I was describing in my previous post. I believe my previous post shows the problems if that ultimate standard is subjective. You have tried to sidestep this by changing terminology (“ultimate standard” to “how we determine morality”), but it does not solve the problem.

“If Bob doesn’t agree…” The point here is about culpability. If someone doesn’t agree to follow an ultimate, objective standard, they are morally culpable anyway by virtue of the standard. I showed in my previous post that if they don’t agree with a subjective standard, then they are not morally culpable, so attempts to include punishments in subjective moral systems are unjustified.

“Morality can change over time…why stick with a bad moral system?” So you do believe that morality has time dependence. The intellectual problem comes in comparing systems when they change over time. In comparing them, you would only be able to tell which one is better by justifying one over another, which I have explained before leads either to a contradiction or an objective morality. Or as I said in my previous post, to allow for time dependence in morality, you would have to say that the old system was right at the time that it was used, so atrocities of ancient cultures were actually right at the time. This isn’t the position you seem to be arguing for. If this position thus forces a person to live inconsistently with their stated beliefs, it is indicative of a problem, and that position should be abandoned.

“That’s a big if…circular argument.” Yes, it’s circular. All arguments about ultimates are circular. An ultimate standard must be self-defining because if it were defined by something else, then that something else is the standard. My argument is (designed to be) self-consistent and consistent with the use of everyday language (the definition of God, for example, accords with the general use of the word; more on that in a moment). These characteristics cannot be said of many other kinds of arguments. I have tried to show those about subjective morality are not self-consistent or are not consistent with one’s ability to live them, even in theory (that is, cognitive dissonance or ignorance would necessarily result, which again indicates a problem with that system).

“You need to establish that fact instead of just assuming it…You need to demonstrate, not simply select a definition.” In this instance, my establishment/demonstration of the fact was by definition, so a word about selecting definitions is in order. We have to make sure we use the key terms in the same way, and perhaps the most important characteristic of definitions is to be agreed upon (yes, shared subjective opinion!). The definition I used for God accords with common usage. It was used in a similar form in a famous debate between Bertrand Russell and Frederick Copleston in 1948 (and referenced frequently since), so I’m not going out on a limb by adopting it here. My comments were direct consequences from this definition, so to reject them would be to reject the definition. Doing so would mean that you use the word “God” in a way that hasn’t been elucidated and might be unfamiliar, to the point that we have been speaking this whole time with the same word meaning two different things. That would be an immense problem for a term that plays such a key role in this discussion. It would open the door to doubt the intelligibility of any of our communication thus far. Perhaps we are in that situation, but I hope not.

“God’s nature might be immoral.” The whole question is: what does it mean to be immoral? Your answer has been to define it according to what humans want. Therefore, immorality would be what humans do not want, which is basically what I said in my last post. If you have a different meaning of “immoral” here, then you have equivocated on definitions (in particular, if immorality is not about what humans want, then you seem to imply that you can justify why some actions are better than God’s, and justifiability implies the existence of an objective standard as I defended previously). If you have changed definitions, then I am even more concerned about the intelligibility of our discussion up to this point.

“…consistent with human empathy and emotions.” But not with their intellect (logic), which was my point.

“If your argument makes humans into gods then your argument is bad.” The argument doesn’t make humans into gods. That only occurs if you reject one or more premises, but if you reject the premises, then you haven’t used the argument at all, so the argument cannot be blamed for the subsequent conclusions.

“If there are objective standards people can still disagree with them.” Of course, and this is precisely the practical problem I am addressing by engaging in this discussion. (It is really only a problem if the objective standard is the ultimate one, which I don’t believe is the case for Sharia law. Determining which objective standard is the ultimate one would be an addition to TAG as stated above, which is not included for brevity and to keep the conversation focused. I’ll proceed in this paragraph assuming we are talking about the ultimate, objective standard.) I am trying to convince you (and whoever else is reading) that you should not believe in subjective morality as the ultimate standard. In doing so, I am not saying that subjective morality is wrong only based on your belief or unbelief, as if it would be wrong because enough people are convinced it is. No, I am arguing in a way consistent with my position about objective morality: subjective morality as the ultimate standard is objectively wrong, and thus believing in it is objectively wrong. It is the best thing for a person to do, an objective moral good, to reject what is objectively wrong and accept what is objectively right. Still, people do things or believe things that are objectively wrong all the time. It brings culpability to the person and is not morally acceptable, but it is frequent, even pervasive. My point in engaging in this discussion is to have fewer people fall into the trap of disagreeing with what is objectively right.

I admit that I, too, am guilty of objective moral wrongs: there are things that I know are wrong, and yet at times I do or think or say them anyway—evil is right there with me (Romans 7:21). I am thankful that Jesus offers to save me from the culpability of the objective moral wrongs that I have chosen, and He does so based on the salvific work He completed, not based on my moral righteousness (which is woefully insufficient). I can repent, believe, and be saved (Mark 1:15)! In the end, my hope and plea is that you and many others come to this conclusion about God and Jesus as well.

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Have you made amends, restitution for all your wrong doing? Being forgiven by God is nothing. What about your actual victims?

This will take me a bit off topic, but since you asked…Certainly, making restitution is a Biblical concept – no argument there – and I have done so often.

But I have to push back against the notion that “being forgiven by God is nothing.” Biblically, this is unjustifiable; Daniel 9:9, Matthew 6:12-15, Matthew 26:28, Acts 2:38, 1 John 1:9, and many, many others show the centrality of God’s forgiveness of us. I think it is not surprising that we need His forgiveness (even if we seek to make restitution in every way we know how). How many times have I hurt someone and not known it? Or are there times that no amount of restitution would be sufficient? How would I repay someone for emotional pain that I have caused? There isn’t a way for me to wipe out the damage in someone else’s heart. Or how many times has my wrongdoing been against God alone (Psalm 51:4)? How could I ever repay Him? I cannot: Isaiah 64:6, Romans 11:35.

To contrast making amends with God’s forgiveness creates a false dichotomy; we ought to seek both. Making amends does not render me innocent. None of us can earn innocence. It must be given by the one who is wronged, and, ultimately, that is God.

To supplant God’s forgiveness with my own ability or efforts to make right my wrongs is to minimize Jesus’ sacrifice, as if I need to (or could) earn my justification. The cross would be worthless. But Ephesians 2:8-10 tells us that we are saved (declared innocent) by God’s grace and not our works – though, once saved, God intends us to do the good works that He has prepared for us (which is why there is no argument on the first point). I say again: praise God that my salvation is based on His works, and not on mine!

Klax, I know you’ve mentioned deconstruction of your faith. Please friend, don’t let your deconstruction cause you to rewrite these foundational Biblical teachings. Don’t replace God’s words with anyone else’s.

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Because that is what I see in reality. Morality changes over time. For example, at one point in history it was moral for men to rule over women, and for women to be denied positions of power. Now, we no longer think that is moral. There were groups of people in the past who thought chattel slavery was moral. We no longer believe that.

You still haven’t demonstrated that an objective standard exists.

Then you don’t have an argument. You have a dogmatic belief. Would this work in a court of law? Can a prosecutor define the defendant as being guilty and have that be a logical and reasoned argument for guilt?

What you have been saying is that morality is objective which means it is independent of what humans want. I have yet to see evidence for the existence of this objective morality.

@chadrmangum - good man. I like, admire your pushback. I start with the possibility of a competent God. Nothing much written about Him by eight or nine guys around the third quarter of the first century clearly does (but it’s there if you want). Let alone the few more who did up to about 165 BCE. Penal Substitutionary Atonement is easily seen in the words of these guys, including reports of Jesus’ words. And I give them all credit, especially Him. They were all completely sincere. But if God is competent in the transcendent, interpreting whatever was said, not in that light, is meaningless. Absurd.

Jesus lived and died by faith. Enlightened pre-Enlightenment faith. He is the only possibly reason for belief in meaning. If those I have irrevocably hurt, including myself, are not fully compensated, restituted, do not obtain equality of outcome in the transcendent, the resurrection, with all humanity, I’m not interested in being forgiven by God who is not directly hurt by anything I have done, apart from as an omnipathic observer.

In Jesus, above all, if at all, He is revealed. I believe as competent.

I am surprised to hear that you believe morality changes over time. In Old Testament times in Canaan, it was acceptable to sacrifice children through fire to Molech (Leviticus 18:21, Jeremiah 32:35). Most people today say that it was accepted in that culture, but that the culture was wrong to accept it. I am led to believe by your reply that you affirm that the Canaanites were actually right to engage in that practice. This comes as a surprise to me.

Circular arguments are not acceptable in a courtroom, nor should they be, because the issues in question are not of ultimate epistemology. They are also not acceptable in fields like mathematics or empirical sciences for similar reasons. Circular arguments should not be accepted in these places because their content is restricted to some smaller epistemological sphere; to move beyond the parameters which define the discipline would be to leave the discipline. But when we consider ultimate epistemology, circularity (via self-defining or self-affirming assumptions) is not only acceptable, but necessary, for there is nowhere “outside” of it that one could go. The ultimate starting point must be part of the epistemology, and thus has nothing to appeal to for justification beyond itself. The only alternative to circularity is irrationality and/or a willingness to accept contradictions, and I presume neither of us is okay with those alternatives.

Circularity in ultimates is thus unavoidable for both you and me (and anyone else who might be reading). What’s important, then, is to recognize where that circularity comes in so that it can be analyzed or evaluated. That is, if circularity is necessary, are all starting assumptions equally valid? No, as some lead to problems (with themselves) down the line. Above I tried to show that the assumptions in subjective morality arguments (and hence the associated circularity in them) lead to self-contradictory conclusions, indicating that that starting point is worse than its alternative(s).

You ask for evidence of objective morality. I have argued for the existence of an objective morality by explaining the impossibility of the contrary, namely contradictions in holding to subjective morality as the ultimate standard. I utilized a logical argument to defend this. There’s nothing strange or lacking in that endeavor. (Whether I have erred in using the method is a different issue, but that isn’t your critique. You say that I haven’t provided evidence for my claim, but this critique does not recognize that logic, when applied properly, is sufficient evidence.) When you ask for evidence, then, I presume you mean empirical evidence. To require empirical evidence and reject logical arguments outright would be an arbitrary requirement and impossible to use consistently (how could we avoid deduction at all times? We have both already used it many other times in our discussion). Do you reject the validity of the argument, “X should be accepted because its negation is impossible,” because it doesn’t provide enough (empirical) evidence? I doubt it. A logical argument is evidence.

We both empirically see subjective morality. The question is whether that is the ultimate standard or not. Is there more than meets the eye? I have given a logical argument which says that there is.

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I don’t doubt God’s competence (Numbers 11:23, Jeremiah 32:26). The difference in our views is not in regards to God’s competence, but in His plan (specifically His salvific plan). Incompetence would be an inability to execute His plan. Neither one of us doubts that He can execute His plan; we just have different views on what His plan is. My view is that He is competent enough to tell us genuine truth in Scripture, even through faltering human vessels. I think my view of salvation is backed by a common sense reading of what has been revealed in Scripture, as well as confirmation in interpretation through good portions of church history (though of course not universal agreement). I don’t know where your view of God and His plan has been revealed, but it doesn’t seem to me to be Scriptural.

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His incompetence would be in not being able to save all of creation that suffers His necessary abandonment.

It is a fact that morality changes over time, it is not a matter of belief. Look through the morality proscribed in the Old Testament and ask yourself if you still follow that morality. For example, is it still ok to beat your slave as long as the slave doesn’t die? The Old Testament condones slavery, so do you also still condone slavery?

The existence of an objective morality is not a question of axioms. It should be demonstrable by the very definition of objective.

All you have offered is incredulity that a subjective morality would work. That is opinion, not evidence. An objective morality should be able to be demonstrated independent of your inability to accept subjective morality as a reality.

I am asking for inference from objective evidence which should exist if morality is objective.

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I’ll respond briefly to your question about the Old Testament in a moment, but first I want to emphasize that my objective morality argument is an existence proof (the existence of an objective ultimate moral standard). I have not undertaken to defend any one particular moral system, nor even to defend the claim that an existent objective morality is knowable. Certainly I’ve made it clear that I am unashamedly a Christian, but that stance of mine has been only tangential to the central point of our morality discussion. Thus to ask for a defense of a particular moral system avoids the central issue. Whether or not I can give an adequate defense of the Mosaic Law (or any subset of it) is irrelevant to the argument of objective morality’s existence. So before your question about slavery, let me respond to your other points.

“The existence of an objective morality is not a question of axioms.” I disagree. If we are engaged in an intellectual discussion, then axioms are very relevant. Particularly since our discussion pertains to various “ultimates” in the human intellectual enterprise, axioms are more than relevant: they are indispensable. To dispense with axioms because you would prefer to use a different way of knowing is to remove the foundation from whichever way of knowing you want to choose.

You say that objective morality’s existence should be “demonstrable,” “able to be demonstrated,” and verifiable through “inference from objective evidence.” The logical argument given previously was the demonstration, the objective evidence. You seem to deny this, but you have not yet explained why. You have not outwardly rejected logic or my argument, but you also say that I have not offered evidence. These can’t be simultaneously true. Your response seems to ignore my argument entirely.

“All you have offered is incredulity that a subjective morality would work. That is opinion, not evidence.” My argument was logical in nature, showing a contradiction in the subjective morality view. Logic is neither incredulity nor opinion. Again, I do not deny the reality of subjective morality; different cultures have had different senses of morality over time. I deny the claim that subjective morality is the ultimate standard, at least if we are to assume any justifiability in morality, which we apparently both do.

Now, let me respond briefly to the question about the Old Testament; I ask that you do the same with my example of Molech in my previous post. Pre-disclaimers: I consider this incidental to our main thesis, and my fellow Christians may disagree with me on some points here, so don’t take this “to the bank.” Slavery in the form that we know it today in the West (or, at least speaking from my American perspective) was not condoned in the Bible. Given the cultural and societal infrastructure present at the time and their economic structure which they referred to as slavery, God’s Old Testament commands were morally good. Economies and cultures change, and therefore so can cultural expressions of moral uprightness, but the underlying principles of what makes it moral or immoral do not change.

Specifically in reference to the Old Testament, some of its laws were not part of the “core” of objective morality. Moral law, civil law, and ceremonial law were all part of it as God used the Mosaic Law for multiple purposes simultaneously. He was teaching the people principles of objective morality while also giving them pragmatic laws to help their nation function more smoothly (and other purposes too). For those of us removed from ancient Israel by a few millennia, not every law should be taken in the same way, just as today’s laws about murder and laws about street parking are not on the same moral playing field.

Romans 3:20 and Galatians 3:19 tell us that one of the primary purposes of the Mosaic Law was to prove to people their own natural sinfulness and their need for a Savior. With the benefit of this hindsight, it isn’t a surprise that laws with different purposes, and hence at different “moral levels,” were given. God’s law ought to show us how desperately we need His help (Romans 3:23, 6:23).

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I know that that is your position. My point was that God might purpose something other than universal salvation. He wouldn’t be incompetent if He “fails” to accomplish something He never intended to accomplish. You evidently assert that His purpose is universal salvation, but I do not know how you defend that assertion. It doesn’t seem to be Biblical to me, and so far the defenses that you have hinted at seem to be more about your preference regarding the meaning of love, not a divinely revealed (Scriptural) conception of God’s love.

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I know that that is your position. My point was that God might purpose something other than universal salvation. He wouldn’t be incompetent if He “fails” to accomplish something He never intended to accomplish. You evidently assert that His purpose is universal salvation, but I do not know how you defend that assertion. It doesn’t seem to be Biblical to me, and so far the defenses that you have hinted at seem to be more about your preference regarding the meaning of love, not a divinely revealed (Scriptural) conception of God’s love.

You could almost make an argument for God’s providential dealings with us out of that, couldn’t you. (Tongue planted in facetious cheek. ; - )

If He doesn’t intend universal salvation, then He’s evil.

It doesn’t matter how one reads the hope, fears, ambiguities of any ancient text. What one’s epistemology brings to its authors’.

We all know what love is, we all want it, we all need it, we all deserve it, no matter how disordered we are by human experience. God owes it. He knows He does. If He thinks He doesn’t, He’s not God. Not Love.

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You haven’t given any evidence for the existence of an objective morality. That’s the major problem here.

If a moral system is an axiom then it is dogmatic, not objective. If I claim that the weight of a rock can be objectively measured I am not saying that a 20 kg weight is an axiom. If a morality is objective then you should be able to evidence it, not simply assert it is true without any evidence.

It stopped being logical when the contradiction was with your credulity. An argument from incredulity is a logical fallacy. Your only argument is “well, I don’t see how a subjective morality would work”. That’s not a logical argument.

The slavery in the Bible was chattel slavery where you own a person. Even more, the Bible condoned the beating of unruly slaves, and this was considered moral as long as the slave didn’t die from the beating. It is the same as the slavery systems that we are familiar with in more modern times.

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I thought he did at the top – ‘ought to’ is a moral imperative in the instances given, and the instances are not subjective:

I don’t agree with Don Carson about the Lord’s Day of rest, but I do about God’s love.
 

Who says they should? Especially if they can’t. Which is human normal. This is completely subjective and worse. Counterfactual. Therefore you are immoral.