Thorns and Thistles: An Object Lesson

@jlock
@Jon_Garvey

I’d be curious to read that book, Jim. It sounds fascinating.

I hope you don’t mind me sharing a fragment of your article, Jon. I thought the quotes from Augustine, thorns, and “the big picture” to be quite insightful, and relevant to this discussion :slight_smile:

">>>Augustine
Augustine of Hippo (354-430) is one of the most influential theologians in the Church’s history. Since
John Hick wrote Evil and the God of Love his theodicy has frequently been cited, and almost equally
frequently deemed inadequate to account for natural evil. This is not surprising as Augustine did not
intend it to deal with the natural world, but “for the spiritually damaged subject”20. Since Augustine
is such an important figure, and his teaching on nature is scattered widely and extensively in his
work, I will give a number of quotes. First, let’s address how he deals with Genesis 3 itself:

The very fact, after all, that everyone born in this life finds the search for truth impeded by
the perishable body is what is meant by the toil and grief which the man gets from the earth;
and the thorns and thistles are the pricks and scratches of tortuous, intractable problems, or
else the anxious thoughts about providing for this life, which frequently choke the word and
stop it bearing any fruit in man…21

Note that his treatment is allegorical and spiritual: the thorns and thistles of life are “really” that
which stops the word bearing fruit in our perishable lives, as in the parable of the sower. Nature he
handles from other angles. In his autobiographical Confessions he prays his theology as it affects him
practically from day to day:

To you nothing at all is evil, not only to you but to your creation at large, because there is
nothing outside to break in and upset the order you have imposed on it. But in parts of it
some things do not harmonise with other parts, and are considered evil for that reason. But
with other parts they do harmonise and are good, good in themselves… Let it be far from me
to say: “These things should not be”, for if these were the only things I could see, I should still
long for the better, and should be bound to praise you for these alone. [But when I understood from Scripture the praise arising from all things both in earth and heaven] I did not now long for better things because I considered everything.22

Here we see the core of his thinking – that we see evil in creation only because we lack the big
picture both of God’s purposes, and of creation’s functioning. He goes into more detail in The City of
God:

This cause, however, of a good creation, namely, the goodness of God—this cause, I say, so
just and fit, which, when piously and carefully weighed, terminates all the controversies of
those who inquire into the origin of the world, has not been recognized by some heretics,
because there are, forsooth, many things, such as fire, frost, wild beasts, and so forth, which
do not suit but injure this thin blooded and frail mortality of our flesh, which is at present
under just punishment. They do not consider how admirable these things are in their own
places, how excellent in their own natures, how beautifully adjusted to the rest of creation,
and how much grace they contribute to the universe by their own contributions as to a
commonwealth; and how serviceable they are even to ourselves, if we use them with a
knowledge of their fit adaptations,— so that even poisons, which are destructive when used
injudiciously, become wholesome and medicinal when used in conformity with their qualities
and design; just as, on the other hand, those things which give us pleasure, such as food,
drink, and the light of the sun, are found to be hurtful when immoderately or unseasonably
used… But we do not greatly wonder that persons, who suppose that some evil nature has
been generated and propagated by a kind of opposing principle proper to it, refuse to admit
that the cause of the creation was this, that the good God produced a good creation.23

The same idea of the “big picture” is here, but there are several new things to note too. First is that
he only considers “harm” in relation to humanity. Though he must have been as aware of nature’s
harshness to its own as we are, he simply saw no theological problem to address there, and no
“privation of good”. Secondly we find the biblical idea that some things may harm us because we
deserve punishment: yet the things that execute such punishment are not in themselves evil, but
good. The third is that he regards those who see evil in God’s present creation as heretics. It is hard
to see that he would not apply his final sentence to those who see either Satan or evolution as an
“opposing principle” in nature, responsible for its “evils” independent of God’s determining will. In
this, of course, he is following in direct line from Irenaeus and his condemnation of the Gnostics –
who were almost the only people attached to the early Church talking about evil in the natural
Creation.

Later, Augustine justifies the goodness even of animal death, which must surely be instructive if we
seek to understand evolution as a work of God:

But it is ridiculous to condemn the faults of beasts and trees, and other such mortal and
mutable things as are void of intelligence, sensation, or life, even though these faults should
destroy their corruptible nature; for these creatures received, at their Creator’s will, an
existence fitting them, by passing away and giving place to others, to secure that lowest
form of beauty, the beauty of seasons, which in its own place is a requisite part of this world.
For things earthly were neither to be made equal to things heavenly, nor were they, though
inferior, to be quite omitted from the universe. Since, then, in those situations where such
things are appropriate, some perish to make way for others that are born in their room, and
the less succumb to the greater, and the things that are overcome are transformed into the
quality of those that have the mastery, this is the appointed order of things transitory. Of
this order the beauty does not strike us, because by our mortal frailty we are so involved in a
part of it, that we cannot perceive the whole, in which these fragments that offend us are
harmonized with the most accurate fitness and beauty. And therefore, where we are not so
well able to perceive the wisdom of the Creator, we are very properly enjoined to believe it,
lest in the vanity of human rashness we presume to find any fault with the work of so great
an Artificer… Therefore it is not with respect to our convenience or discomfort, but with
respect to their own nature, that the creatures are glorifying to their Artificer. Thus even the
nature of the eternal fire, penal though it be to the condemned sinners, is most assuredly
worthy of praise.24

Augustine even doubts the commonly understood implication of Genesis 3:18:

Concerning thorns and thistles, we can give a more definite answer, because after the fall of
man God said to him, speaking of the earth, Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to you. But
we should not jump to the conclusion that it was only then that these plants came forth from
the earth. For it could be that, in view of the many advantages found in different kinds of
seeds, these plants had a place on earth without afflicting man in any way. But since they
were growing in the fields in which man was now labouring in punishment for his sin, it is
reasonable to suppose that they became one of the means of punishing him. For they might
have grown elsewhere, for the nourishment of birds and beasts, or even for the use of man.25

Finally, a word from his work on original sin, which may serve to hinder us from being too ready to
compare animal behaviours with human immorality, and so draw the conclusion that “original sin” is
in fact an evolutionary phenomenon with natural evil simply merging into moral evil:

God’s work continues still good, however evil the deeds of the impious may be. For although
“man being placed in honour abideth not; and being without understanding, is compared
with the beasts, and is like them,” yet the resemblance is not so absolute that man actually
becomes a beast. There is a comparison, no doubt, between the two; but it is not by reason
of nature, but through vice — not vice in the beast, but in nature [i.e. the difference between_ _animal and human nature]. For so excellent is a man in comparison with a beast, that the
man’s vice is the beast’s nature.26 <<<

From Jon Garvey’s article, God’s Good Creation.

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