@Daniel_Fisher and @Terry_Sampson,
Ok, you guys! If you’re going to bring in technical apologetics vocabulary and concepts, you need to provide definitions! (In that way, I do claim more ownership of this thread.)
I’d be happy to add resources to the Slide 9 Resources.
It’s Dr. Penner or Penner.
For some strange reason I seem to have an idea that he had a little influence (and I would like to think that if given well-presented evidence, he and others of that era might be more likely to be persuaded of the science than many today [referring to YECism]).
If a person’s acceptance or rejection of the faith is just based on reason alone or subjective personal inclination alone or even in combination, that is not adequate and needs to be honestly faced. They can both contribute, but maybe what makes a persevering faith is more a work in the heart, bolstered by experience and the experiences of others.
Honestly, I was exhausted by this book study and the work that I put into it this summer. Rather than rework work I have already spent a great deal of time on (just writing some posts took well over an hour, as I’m sure it did others), I’ll try to pull from what I’ve already written.
That’s probably more than enough right now.
Thinking a bit more about a direction I had really hoped we could take in “writing chapter 6” is attempting to explore and flesh out more (some things I think we have already begun to) the hints that Penner has given us about elements of an appropriate apologetic. The things I have in mind are:
edification (huge, broad category. Can we look at what kinds of things might be considered edifying, and the like?)
Lived hermeneutic: What are some ways we do and/or could “perform” the interpretation of the texts of our faith?
Dialogue: What could/does this mean. Penner is very vague, I think. What do we bring into dialogue with our faith? What is the process of evaluation that we use to determine the fitness or unfitness of whatever elements we bring into this dialogue?
Scripture and tradition: Penner repeatedly refers to these. How do we handle these? How do we speak about them well/rightly?
Community: Penner seems to see community/the church as abosutely essential for carrying out the Christian life as apologetic. What does this look like? How do we bring it about ? There are many many questions and directions that we can explore here.
I’m sure I”ve forgotten some of them. Please add to the list, if you like.
Is this something anyone else feels the need to hash over?
In keeping with my personal interest in exploring what might be components of Penner’s positive “plan of action”, I wondered how this segment from the recent article by Joseph Graves might help inform (a small) part of the kind of thinking we should be incorperating into our apologetic:
Specifically, I call upon Christians to ask themselves what our role is in helping to bring forth the “beloved community.” Unfortunately, there are too many within the broad tent of our faith who are entirely comfortable with the status quo, or who simply think that we are in the “end times” and Jesus will soon sort everything out. I hold no such arrogance and fall into the “no man will know the moment or the hour” camp.
In the final chapter of my book, I outline a path towards social justice that all people of goodwill can get behind, so that like Amos 5:4 we might “…let justice roll down like waters. And righteousness like an ever-flowing stream.” I also emphasize what is at stake if we don’t do anything. Social justice is our only hope, not just because it is morally right and long overdue but because without it our species will die. We are now in a race between justice and extinction. I conclude that we now have a choice to decide to save ourselves, but this is only possible by learning to love our neighbors the way Christ taught us.
My church settings are averse to the term “social justice.” It’s either “liberal” or someone else’s (securlar) job.
I offer the following thought humbly and carefully, but think it important to the larger discussion:
C. S. Lewis in his article, “The Death of Words,” lamented that the word “Christian” (especially in England) had become so synonymous with other noble qualities that it was at risk of ceasing to be able to denote anything specific about a person’s religious commitments:
it will really be a great nuisance if the word Christian becomes simply a synonym for good. For historians, if no one else, will still sometimes need the word in its proper sense, and what will they do? That is always the trouble about allowing words to slip into the abyss. Once turn swine into a mere insult, and you need a new word (pig) when you want to talk about the animal… The other day I had occasion to say that certain people were not Christians; a critic asked how I dared say so, being unable (as of course I am) to read their hearts. I had used the word to mean ‘persons who profess belief in the specific doctrines of Christianity’; my critic wanted me to use it in what he would (rightly) call ‘a far deeper sense’—a sense so deep that no human observer can tell to whom it applies.
I’m a bit concerned we risk this with the word “apologetic” (i.e., “something that is said or written to defend something that other people criticize,” Merriam-Webster).
I am all in favor of edifying people in as many appropriate ways as we can, living out my faith in all its proper manner of loving God and neighbor, having deep and respectful dialogues with unbelievers, living and speaking about Scripture and Tradition, and doing all the above in the context of a vibrant, open, welcoming and gracious community. But none of the above, strictly speaking, are what has ever been traditionally defined as “apologetic.” Evangelistic to be sure, but not apologetic. Apologetics is the very specific subset (and/or related discipline) of defending, and defending against particular doubts or critiques.
Hence back to a question I had earlier - did Dr. Penner simply neglect to elucidate how he recommends we should properly/compassionately/edifyingly/personally/postmodernly do actual (traditionally defined) “apologetics”, or does he believe we should not do “apologetics” (as traditionally defined) whatsoever?
If the former, I am sympathetic. If he means the latter (and thereby he/we redefine “apologetic” to mean" witnessing with our life and sharing the gospel in various manners while refraining from ever offering any specific intellectual/rational defense of any aspect of the faith to anyone in any context"), I am dubious.
So, an example, to flush this out and be practical - if I found myself friends with a person who disbelieved the resurrection of Jesus, because such a thought is unscientific, and said that he could never be a Christian because he doesn’t believe that such things could happen - I have no disagreement with what you wrote here, or with anything Dr. Penner wrote… Of course I would want to edify him as a whole person in any way I can, show genuine love to him, have dialogues, etc. But here is the crux of my question: as part of that larger context and as an element within those dialogues, is it ever proper (and if so, how and when) - to introduce certain intellectual/rational explanations/defenses of the resurrection?
If not, then whatever we call this entire endeavor, I respectfully submit it no longer should use the title “apologetics.” And then my concern is solidified that Dr. Penner did not simply neglect to explain how to do apologetics (traditionally defined), but rather he thinks we should not do it whatsoever.
If so, then I withdraw my initial concern, and find I am in essential agreement with him, that apologetics (traditionally defined) must remain a smaller subset of a much larger endeavor of living the Christian life, loving individuals, dialoguing, edifying the individual, etc., but recognizing that part of edifying an individual is (lovingly, tenderly) helping them correct any dangerous intellectual errors they are blind to in any context, including regarding faith - but doing so in a manner of which I would want someone to do for me if I were similarly blind to certain dangerous or harmful intellectual errrors.
Hi Daniel,
Actually, all or most of your questions here have been answered in the book and discussed in the thread. I have many things I need to get to today and will not have time to return to your post for some time. As I mentioned elsewhere, a quick reading of this book is not adequate to grasp what he’s talking about, and the discussion in the thread is already there. Please, take some time to go over both. I know it’s a lot of work. We are the ones who did it.
I’ll try to get back to the thread later today. Maybe by then some of the other participants will have added in their thoughts.
Thanks,
Kendel
I’m reminded here of Paul’s exhortation (and maybe among those Pauline passages you already also quoted above) to us [Christians] to “be ready at all times to give a reason for the hope that we have…” The tone that I hear Paul setting as he speaks that way is one of engaged attentiveness and response. I.e. “Be ready…” has more of a connotation of expectation that somebody will be making a demand on us, than it does that we are to always just be volunteering our convictions to every living listener within earshot. And why would anybody be curious enough to ask us why we are the way we are? Do we live in such a way that people actually see something worth emulating? Or that sparks their interest? Or are we more like the guy on the train that would make it a point to give or wear or voice some outward and obvious sign of his religiosity because that was the surest way to guarantee he would get a pair of seats to himself? In short, if the “living it before preaching it” saying holds no appeal to your conscience - I’m sure you have your reasons - but then if there is not fruit to be seen at all in your life, then on what grounds are you expecting that others should want what you have? I’m with you that numbers are not the only endgame of success in various situations God calls us to. But what fruit would you hope to see then, that might inspire you to wonder what is the source of somebody’s strength and fortitude? If all a person has on display is their partisan politics and denial of obvious truths that everybody else has easy access to, then who would want to be like that?
So what I hear in Paul’s exhortations is that we should be ready to share to the inviting ear our witness and testimony of the truth that we know and have heard - reasoning to the best of our ability for others to understand what it is that Christ has done for us and for them as well. You make much of Penner only referring to Paul speaking with believers instead of how Paul might interact with unbelievers. I’m not sure this is fair since most of Paul’s letters and material that we have is his correspondence with believers. The Athenian discourse Luke describes is more an exception - and even there Paul starts out arguing in the synagogue before heading for the marketplace. It’s curious that if Paul had experienced the success that you insist must have been there in his philosophizing with the high minds of the Areopagus, - it’s curious that we don’t have more correspondence from him then pursuing that manner of apologetics rather than discipling and being an apostle to believing churches. Perhaps he did, and those letters are lost. But it would seem that you might be obliged to fault Paul here for not being more like what you imagine modern apologetics must necessarily include as its central focus. [I know you don’t really “fault Paul” for anything - and would instead dispute my characterization. Just consider it my provocation to you to continue delving in with us here.]
Related to all the above, here might be an interesting passage of Penner’s for you to zero in on and share your thoughts. In Ch. 2 (p. 49 to be more specific) - Penner draws on Kierkegaard’s distinction between “geniuses” and “apostles”. I would be curious to hear from you if you think Penner gets Kierkegaard wrong in how he draws out that distinction.
[feel free to peruse our chapter 2 discussions way above if you want a preview of thoughts we’ve already hashed out here along these lines. You then have the advantage of already knowing how we’ve been thinking on these things.]
Merv I think you might have forgotten to leave the quote.
Regarding being prepared to give a good account of the reasons for your belief I would note there is a pretty noticeable difference between giving reasons for your belief and giving reasons why I should share those beliefs. By far the former is more palatable than the latter speaking for just one non theist, and all the more so if it arises naturally out of an amiable exchange of ideas where interest is shown on both sides. Given how averse so much of the population is to public speaking I would think it would be an approach more believers could embrace as well. And really it should be all believers who are able and willing to give reasons for belief, not just trained debaters.
I’m sympathetic. What’s more I think there is something to be said for not having the same fast answer ready to dish out to all comers. In a conversation give and take and flexibility Is to be expected. I think a willingness to be present and honest is more than enough, and no small accomplishment. A willingness to be open without feeling compelled to be persuasive would go a long way toward winning trust and a desire to know more.
Actually, I started looking at that section to see what part would be a good quote, and just decided … the whole thing seems to be worthy of attention. So I left my post just as a reference so that he could read as much of it as he is inclined for himself.
Indeed! That is a pretty good summary of my point too. Thanks for reinforcing it.
Yes.
A nutshell abstract of this “yes” appears in the introduction of the book, where he gives an overview of each chapter. The details are in the chapters, but this does indicate where he’s going, particularly in the abstract of Chapter 3:
Chapter 3 (“Irony, Witness, and the Ethics of Belief”) links the possibility of a postmodern apologetics to the concept of irony. Rather than framing the issue in terms of an apologetic defense of Christian belief, I prefer to consider a postmodern apologetics in terms of the concept of witness-a prophetic witness, to be clear-for it orients us to the task differently and generates a completely different set of goals. Here edification-or building" up the self-replaces “,winning the argument” as the goal of Christian witness (apologetic discourse). This type of postmodern Christian witness is sensitive to the fragility of faith in our secular condition. It is not focused on a defense of the propositional truth of Christian doctrine, but performs an ironic poetics of truth. What we discover is that the shift away from the (modern) epistemology of belief as the paradigm for Christian witness toward a hermeneutics of belief also opens up an ethics of belief that, in turn, deepens the critique of modern epistemology. How we believe-not just what we believe-is important to our belief being justified.
But what of this notion of a "poetics of truth’'? What sense can we give that? And how in postmodernity can there be any substantial talk of truth once we have adopted a hermeneutical perspective?
In chapter 4 (“Witness and Truth”) I further clarify the approach to truth involved in my Kierkegaardian account of Christian witness and relate it to propositional truth. I begin by noting that the goal of traditional apologetics is to justify the objective truth of the propositions of Christian doctrine. Christianity, the “essentially Christian,” is therefore assumed, implicitly or explicitly, to be captured in these propositions. The Christian truths defended by such modern apologetics are taken to be ahistorical, unsituated, abstract, and universal. I then use Kierkegaard’s concept of truth as subjectivity to launch a critique on apologetic propositionalism and to provide an alternative way to think about Christian truth. To possess Christian truth is always to confess it to be true, to win its truth existentially for oneself. This is not a disavowal of the cognitive content of Christian witness; it is a shifting of our perspective about a given truth claim so we think of it in terms of what Paul Ricoeur calls “attestation.” As I develop it, this account of truth and truth-telling is agonistic it involves a struggle to stake our truth claims and make them true of us. Christian truth, then, often involves suffering on the part of the witness, and martyrdom-the act of laying down one’s life-is the ultimate form of testimony to the truths that edify us.
In chapter 5 (“The Politics of Witness”) I connect the ethics of belief (chapter 3) with an ethics of witness, which gives us the resources to attest to Christian truths in a way that is sensitive to a person’s particular cultural and social location and does not perpetrate injustice in the name of Christian truth. Here I expose the possibilities of violence in Christian apologetic discourse at both the personal level (when apologetic arguments are used to treat their interlocutors as the “faceless unbeliever”) and the social level (when Christian apologetic practice merely reinforces and defends a given set of power relations operative within an unjust social structure). In this latter situation, Christian apologetics ends up reinforcing the dominant ideology in a society and the gospel loses its ability to confront the culture in a prophetic sense. In contrast to this, the postmodern prophetic witness that I advocate is “person-preserving” and involves Gabriel Marcel’s concept of sympathy, which propounds a fundamental concern with others as persons, not things. This is a noncoercive form of witness that is itself a form of ideology critique, of both the culture within which it is embedded and the Christian subculture out of which it emerges. This form of witness is political in two ways. First, it is political in the deep sense that Christian witness never occurs in a so-called public square free from political power. The prophetic witness understands St. Paul’s concept of “the powers” that actively shape and influence us as individuals. The witness, then, brings private commitments into the imagined “public” space and places into question the institutional and political powers that form our identities and relationships. Second, prophetic Christian witness is political in that it requires a church -a community of people who embody the truths professed by Christians through their practices. This is what makes it possible for people to understand and believe the Christian gospel.
(pp. 17 & 18) [All bolding from me]
I want specifically to point out how he refers to propositions in this smaller section quoted above from the abstract of Chapter 4:
I begin by noting that the goal of traditional apologetics is to justify the objective truth of the propositions of Christian doctrine. Christianity, the “essentially Christian,” is therefore assumed, implicitly or explicitly, to be captured in these propositions. The Christian truths defended by such modern apologetics are taken to be ahistorical, unsituated, abstract, and universal. I then use Kierkegaard’s concept of truth as subjectivity to launch a critique on apologetic propositionalism and to provide an alternative way to think about Christian truth.
Penner is very careful to differentiate between propositions used in apologetics from the essence of Christianity, which is the Gospel. Understanding his criticism related to “truth statements” and “assent” to them is essential for understanding the whole book and Penner’s.
This is all characterized in his contrast between the what and how of Christian belief.
I all-too-quickly skimmed over this point from Mark yesterday, that I think bears highlighting in light of Penner’s concept of “the Fragility of Faith.” If our witness to the truth is ultimately grounded in any kind of “debatable” rational persuasion, one can just as easily be argued into it as out. This is an uncomfortable confession to make, but reflects the reality we see.
So, what is compelling? When we hear that young people are not interested in Christianity, not so much because they don’t find belief in the Gospel unconvincing but the way Christians live unconvincing, we may need to take that seriously.
This.
What you just summarized there can’t be over-stated. It shows how I can win an argument (and be 100% propositionally correct as I do so) and lose their hearts. I can reveal truth - and then make them hate it, leaving them much worse off than if I had not opened my mouth at all. Because they can see that I am not a person of truth; I am not anybody they would want to be like. Penner also (throughout the book I think) emphasizes how a person can be truth (or not be truth) which is something that transcends propositional content without losing it. Current apologetics [at least in the cases of too many] keeps the muddied bathwater while abandoning the Baby. Quite literally.
Oh, my. That hits home, doesn’t it. It’s not like people are lining up to ask me anything.
Yeah, me neither.
I was going to say then again I’m under no directive to promote my truth. Doesn’t mean I don’t enjoy doing so but then I’m not even tempted to do so if someone is already snug in their own truth. The propositional difference between truths doesn’t worry me but then my truth doesn’t have to be the one and only or highest.
I wonder what Penner I would say about that. Is propositional alignment more important or is edification in a context accessible to each individual what matters?
“Let your conversation be always full of grace, seasoned with salt, so that you may know how to answer everyone.” -Colossians 4:6
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