Randomness in Theological Perspective

@ThomasJayOord:

I find it odd that you call Polkinghorne’s theology “classical.” He denies the classical view of God’s relation to time, denies the classical view of omniscience, denies the classical view of simplicity, denies Calvinist/Augustinian views of predestination and election, denies Thomistic views of primary and secondarily causality, denies classical views of eschatology, affirms kenotic Christology, etc

Well, partly this depends on which aspects of his thought we are prioritizing, doesn’t it? For example, while predestination and election are not trivial matters, they are irrelevant sideshows if the “Big Three” aren’t upheld—creation, Resurrection, and eschatology. (I don’t agree with you on eschatology, so perhaps you mean something different by “classical views of eschatology.”) I always focus on the Big Three first, before looking elsewhere, when assessing a Christian theologian’s thought. In John’s case, he’s absolutely orthodox on all three: creatio ex nihilo, the bodily resurrection, and the re-embodiment of the saints in God’s presence in the new heaven and earth. (In other words, he doesn’t spiritualize the Resurrection of Jesus or the resurrection of the dead. Like Tom Wright, he’s wonderfully orthodox.) And, zillions of orthodox theologians have not been Calvinists. As for divine simplicity, many theologians vary considerably on that; even William Lane Craig has reservations about certain ways of stating it. He’s not a Thomist, but lots of orthodox theologians aren’t either.

Can you cite a reference to support your claim that Polkinghorne believes God voluntarily chooses not to know the future? I don’t believe you are correct. To be capable of determining the outcome of an event is not the same as voluntarily choosing not to know the future exhaustively.

Ted: Certainly, I’ll cite two—as found in your edition (below) on pp. 124 and 136.

“If the physical universe is one of true becoming, with the future not yet formed and existing, and if God knows that world in its temporality, then that seems to me to imply that God cannot yet know the future. This is no imperfection in the divine nature, for the future is not yet there to be known. Involved in the act of creation, in the letting-be of the truly other, is not only a kenosis of divine power but also a kenosis of divine knowledge. Omniscience is self-limited by God in the creation of an open world of becoming.”

[Speaking of God’s acceptance of temporality in God’s creation and God’s relationship to it, this] “does not subvert the orthodox Christian distinction between the Creator and creation, since divine temporal polarity can be understood as a form of relationship to creatures freely accepted by God as part of the process of creation, and not simply imposed upon the divine nature. … This restriction would be understood theologically as being kenotic, a chosen self-limitation on the part of the Creator in bringing into being an intrinsically temporal creation.”

Note the final sentence in each passage! Perhaps I’m misinterpreting him, Tom—though he’s usually quite lucid, John can sometimes be a bit obscure. I think he’s saying in both places that God chooses not to have absolute omniscience relative to this creation, and in light of the undeniable fact that John affirms creatio ex nihilo, I think we can confidently say that God chose to create a specific creation, of which God would not have absolute omniscience. God was not bound to do that, since the whole creative act was free—not merely the existence of creation, but the specific nature of it and God’s relationship to it as well. Do you agree with my analysis here?

May I recommend The Polkinghorne Reader, which I edited?

Ted: You certainly may. And you did a fine job of it, Tom. I’ve used it a few times in a course, though not presently since I’m not teaching that one any more. In fact it’s the source of the quotes I’ve just given. I know that you know John pretty well, probably better than I do though I’ve had occasions to talk to him privately at length, especially when he spent four days on my campus a number of years ago. I’ve also taught students from three of his books and have read maybe half of the others. So I know many of his ideas very well and like most of them a great deal.

Best,

Ted

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If this statement is taken within the context of this post (randomness in Theological Perspective), I am inclined to say that the argument starts with a highly debatable premise (or assumption) and ends up with a clear theological statement. I suggest that if the premise is incorrect, then the theological conclusion is invalid.

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Eddie

Part of the problem, it seems to me, is that in some of these openness specualtions, even “creation” is seen as an act of compulsion, so in dialogue with its proponents that’s the word you have to use, maybe. That’s going to be true in spades if Oord wants to ditch creation ex nihilo , because the only option is one type of matter turning, or being turned, into another kind of matter. God either has to force it, or ask it politely (apparently).

But as Herbert McCabe points out (referenced in my recent Hump post), creation cannot be seen as a change at all, for until it happens, nothing is created - so nothing is there to change. You cannot ask something to exist from nothing, and ergo you can’t compel it either. Likewise nothing is there to be compelled, so (like persuasion) coercion entirely inappropriate language.

At that point the quesion is whether ones Evolutionary Creation takes the “creation” part of your chosen label seriously: that is, when one adopts the simplistic motto, “God creates through evolution”, does one see him as just another artisan, moulding matter through evolution? In that case, maybe you’ll start the accusations of “coercion” flying.

Or instead, do you take the “creation” part as being that ex nihilo act of divine power which lies behind the efficient causes of evolution? If so, the whole idea of “divine puppetmasters”, “calling all the shots” and so on becomes entirely vacuous, and therefore the need for ever more baroque theodicies to give nature back its “autonomy” so much froth. There is no “coercion” problem to solve - it was only brought into existence by ones limited conception of God and creation (rather as the “mind body” problem was created ex nihilo by Cartesian dualism).

Since Gray has been mentioned a bit, I can cite him as an example of the latter - God’s activity in the world (ie from its viewpoint), in classical Christianity, is a continuing process of enactment of God’s love, wisdom and power ex nihilo , within and behind material efficient causes (and this we call design). Being intended and created by God is not an imposition - it’s a wonderful gift. That seems a lot more of a biblical way to enjoy God’s Lordship than squeezing it into some democratic straitjacket.

Ted, I guess you’ll be aware that “Darwinia” is available online (horrible as books without paper are!). The review of “Origin” is in that, and I assume it would be what Darwin got reprinted?

TED: Yes, one can define it in various ways, but I’m going off something John has told me himself—namely, that he thinks panentheism might properly describe God’s relationship to the new creation, but not to the present one. As he understands the term, at least, John is not a panentheist. In the long section you have in your reader about this, taken from his Science and the Trinity (a fairly recent work from 2004), he says (p. 192), after nodding toward the need to stress divine immanence alongside transcendence, “I do not believe that this requires us to embrace the tool-inclusive language of panentheism.”

TOM: Yes, Polkinghorne is not a panentheist, if we take the meaning of panentheism to be what he says it is. But he is a panentheist as defined by other people. That was my point.

Thanks, Ted. I know both of those passages, but I had interpreted them differently than you did. Reading them in light of your claim, however, I can see that your interpretation has merit.

In your initial note, I thought you were saying JP thought of omniscience similar to how Clark Pinnock thought of omniscience early in his open theism days. That is, Clark would say there are things God could know about the future because those things are knowable, but God has voluntarily chosen not to know them so we can be free.

I think JP would say God is essentially timefull and creation is essentially timefull too. God is essentially timefull in Triniity, and, should God decide to create, creation is essentially timefull. If this is so, the ONLY way God could know the future exhaustively would be to determine all of it. It’s not a view I find attractive. Perhaps I’ll ask JP next time we chat.

Sorry for assuming you hadn’t seen the book. Some of your comments in your initial post made me wonder if you thought I’d not read Polkinghorne carefully enough to know how I was similar or different from him. I must have been reading you poorly. I’m sorry.

Thanks for engaging on these issues, Ted!

Tom

Eddie,

Thanks for your good post!

My argument on this in my book, The Nature of Love, relies fundamentally on two ideas.

  1. Jesus has a soul/mind/spirit (I’m fine with any of these terms) that continues beyond his death. That soul/mind/spirit would want to cooperate with God’s call to resurrection. And it would be efficacious to the extent possible upon bodily members influenced by it.

  2. All entities are not vacuous substances. They have a measure of responsiveness. ON this point, I’ve been influenced by Whitehead and what some call panexperientialism. Consequently, a body and its elements would have some capacity to respond to God and to Jesus’ mind.

I’m sure this response doesn’t answer all your questions. I still have questions myself. But I hope you can see the basic ingredients are present for a theory of divine persuasion that resurrects Jesus.

Blessings,

Tom

Insightful response, Eddie. I agree with much of what you’ve said.

As I see it, EC is a broad label embracing theories that say God creates through evolution. One need not be Evangelical or affiliated with Biologos to affirm Evolutionary Creation.

I also don’t see anything inherent in Whitehead that conflicts with EC. In fact, I find them quite compatible. Whiteheadians were EC before EC was cool, although they usually use the term “theistic evolution.”

I also don’t see anything inherent in Evangelicalism that conflicts with Whitehead. Granted, “liberal” Christians have appropriated Whitehead far more than Evangelicals, and many Evangelicals have stood in opposition to process thought. But I don’t think anything inherent in Evangelicalism or Whiteheadean thought requires this opposition. Besides, the vast majority of objections to Whitehead I hear from Evangelical are objections based upon misunderstandings or uncharitable interpretations. (By the way, this was my PhD dissertation thesis.)

I agree that much of contemporary science and many scientists with links to Biologos assume a mechanistic view of the world. at least among less complex organisms and entities. (Many are mind/body dualists when it comes to humans, however.) But I don’t think this MUST be the case. And I think for scientific and theological reasons they would be wise to rethink their fundamental ontologies and metaphysics.

As I see it, many of the people you cite are attracted to methodological naturalism, because it safeguards them from the liabilities of Intelligent Design and allows them to do their scientific work in the public sphere without making any appeals to divine action. This practice is fine, so long as they are quick to say their conclusions are provisional and incomplete. I think many would do this and actually do this, in the name of humility if for no other reason.

But I believe a fuller and more robust explanation for any occurrence in the world requires appeals to divine action. So while the methodological naturalist temporarily brackets questions of divine action, the devoted EC person must eventually make some kind of appeal to divine action for that person to truly be EC. The “Creation” aspect of EC implies divine action of some sort.

As to your last point, only a very small minority of Whiteheadians would say God is constantly in process and always changing, if by this you mean ALL aspects of God change or are in process. The more common view among Whiteheadians (and other open and relational theologians) is that God’s nature is unchanging, while God’s experience changes. Whitehead called this dipolar theism, but that label is rarely used today. This general view fits well with the broad biblical witness to the God who sometimes repents (has a change of mind) but who is always faithful to love.

For what it’s worth,

Tom

Jon,

Thanks for chiming in. I think a much stronger doctrine of creation can be offered than creatio ex nihilo. It’s likely that my next book will address this.

Tom

Thanks, Eddie.

I would say it’s impossible to harmonize Whitehead and classical Christian notions, if by “classical” you mean the view that God is in all respects timeless. In my view, divine timelessness is the key notion to most classical theologians. But I also think Whitehead’s thought harmonizes better with the broad biblical witness than the classic view of God’s time harmonizes with that witness. I care more about harmonizing with scripture than the tradition, although I know the two cannot be neatly separated as if the tradition wasn’t influenced by the Bible.

You make a good point about Whitehead’s “nature of God” language. Few open and relational theologians follow Whitehead’s language here, because, as your rightly point out, it sounds like God has two natures.

I’m not aware of Whitehead saying he was unattracted to St. Paul. I’d like to see that reference, to see the context. Do you know where Whitehead says this? Whitehead has very positive things to say about Jesus. And he thinks Christianity would have been better off following the relational metaphysics of the Eastern Church than the Western. But I wouldn’t recommend Whitehead as the quintessential Christian theologian! : )

I understand your call for some “splaining.” Whitehead surely doesn’t gibe well with much of Calvinist or Thomistic thought. But Evangelicalism, at least as I see it, is far bigger than the Calvinist/Reformed tradition. Wesleyans, Pentecostals, Anabaptists, and others are often far more willing to rethink classic views of God, in light of scripture, reason, and experience. In fact, my experience is that most open and relational theologians – whether Evangelical or not – have theological roots in something other than the Calvinist or Thomist traditions.

Finally, I really like your last paragraph. Whiteheadians have been at the front of offering plausible metaphysical schemes to account for both the theological and scientific enterprises. The book I’d recommend on this issue is David Griffin’s, Religion and Scientific Naturalism. (By the way, “naturalism” for Griffin does not mean “atheism.”) A more accessible version of that book is Two Great Truths: A New Synthesis of Scientific Naturalism and Christian Faith, Westminster John Knox Press. As far as my own work, you might try the final chapter in my book, Defining Love. I’ve not published a book-length manuscript on method yet.

Thanks for the dialogue,

Tom

@Eddie
@ThomasJayOord

I have a problem with Process Theology and Traditional Theology in that they are NOT rooted in the Trinity as we know it from the Word, Jesus Christ.

Our philosophy must be rooted in the Trinity (I AM WHO I AM), not our theology rooted in Plato (philosophy.)

For a different perspective, Roger, you might read the essays in the book, Trinity in Process, edited by Philip Clayton and Marjorie Suchocki.

From Religion in the Making, the text of which appears to be available online at http://www.anthonyflood.com/whiteheadreligion.htm:

The modern world has lost God and is seeking him. The reason for the loss stretches far back in the history of Christianity. In respect to its doctrine of God the Church gradually returned to the Semitic concept, with the addition of the threefold personality. It is a concept which is clear, terrifying, and unprovable. It was supported by an unquestioned religious tradition. It was also supported by the conservative instinct of society, and by a history and a metaphysic both constructed expressly for that purpose. Moreover, to dissent was death. On the whole, the Gospel of love was turned into a Gospel of fear. The Christian world was composed of terrified populations.

“The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge,” said the Proverb (i. 7).

Yet this is an odd saying, if it be true that “God is love.” In flaming fire taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; says Paul.

Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power. (II Thessalonians i. 8, 9.)

The populations did well to be terrified at such ambiguous good tidings, which lost no emphasis in their promulgation.

If the modern world is to find God, it must find him through love and not through fear, with the help of John and not of Paul. Such a conclusion is true and represents a commonplace of modern thought. But it is only a very superficial rendering of the facts.

He goes on. The word Paul does not appear again after this, though.

Maybe it’s time to re-state the obvious about randomness ^^^^^ <<<<

Please excuse the handful of words that are in all caps … just quoting something from quite a while ago!

The conclusion requires continual renewal: whether randomness is genuine or just an appearance, an all-knowing God is going to know what happens even with genuinely random processes!

George