David Bentley Hart on the question, Is God a person?

Also from that wiki entry I liked (especially the part I bolded):

In my heart of hearts, I want to vote for someone whose entire political philosophy is derived from John Ruskin by way of Kenneth Grahame, with lashings of William Cobbett, Gilbert White, and William Morris; failing that, I want to enjoy the luxury of writing in Wendell Berry on every ballot. But the imminent collapse of the civil order of the entire world doth make pragmatists of us all. I long for the day, however, when I can return to my posture of airily insouciant disdain for the whole system and can again cast votes only for hopeless third party candidates with a clear conscience. But I suspect I will die before that day comes.

Still more biography he is now 59 years old. A year younger than my ten years younger youngest brother.

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Another taped conversation between Hart and Kuhn that I found interesting is called Does Consciousness Defeat Materialism which required them to get into the nature of consciousness and to consider various positions various scientists, philosophers and theists have taken (mostly past the two minute portion I recorded from the auto generated transcript below which I’ve begun at the 2:08 mark. The entire video is about 12 minutes long.

Hart

Consciousness is obvious in the sense it’s something we all do but precisely because it’s so uh obvious precisely because it is everything we do in a sense uh the problems aren’t always immediately obvious to us.

Kuhn

Well … the specific uh aspects of the brain you take out a certain part of the brain you lose that function and so this is something that nobody denies absolutely certain that you have this very high correlation uh between being able to see in a certain part of the brain or being able to feel in certain part of the brain so uh on its surface there looks like there’s a direct correlation

Hart

There may be a direct correlation but correlation and causation are are aren’t exactly the same thing and the the the phenomenon of Consciousness is different from the capacity for it, logically speaking. I don’t think that any pure Cartisian out there but there may be but those who really think that there’s a sole substance that’s so ontologically distinct from the material that it really is just sort of like an alien inhabiting a house when it enters the body. But that said, the question is is not whether as material beings we require this apparatus to function properly in the use of Consciousness it’s whether Consciousness can emerge from from that physical state either phylogenically or neurologically with the consciousnesses and there you encounter all sorts of problems and problems that more and more tend to be acknowledged now both by philosophers of mind but also some very canny scientists who are interested not just in the question of cognitive correlation but what Consciousness might be.

  • LOL! Here’s where I disagree with Hart.
  • A Cartesian would say: “I think, therefore I am.”
  • But it does not necessarily follow that some subset of “being” or “being things” would be capable of ‘saying’: “I am, therefore I think.”
  • I have a small group of nephews and nieces who are atheists, who have confirmed for me that they are confident believers in abiogenesis and disdainfully say: “There’s no James Tour among us.” I’m certain that that they are certain that I am a Christian, and therefore must be a ‘Jame Tour’ kind of believer in biogenesis. I don’t think I am, but don’t know enough about what he believes and teaches to confirm or deny that I am.
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Never heard of James Tour, no clue what they’re talking about.

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Oh yeah, Google -or in this case- YouTube:

Nobody wants to be that guy. Ugh. It must be an embarrassment for the faithful but of course none of us are directly contaminated by that sort of association. And there are nincompoops on the other side I would not like to be lumped in with like Dennett, Krauss and Dawkins though none of them seem as reprehensible as this Tour guy.

Oh lord, it gets worse.

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I haven’t “figured out how that would work”, and anyone who thinks he or she has is self-deluding. I could say that a burst of energy from the divine realm permeate the human body of the Word and elevated it to a new level of life, but that’s not much more of an explanation than the techno-babble on science fiction shows.

But I would dispute the “no sarx in the tomb” because the eternal Logos was made flesh and was and is united to it, and as all the Fathers of Chalcedon (on both sides!) agreed, the human and the divine of the Incarnate Logos cannot be separated. So as far as I can figure, Christ suffered a death worse than any other human has or will or can because the Word remained one with dead sarx as it lay shrouded on cold stone in the dark – yet since His flesh could not be touched by corruption, I suspect that He therefore continued to experience the moment of death continuously that whole time.

Some say that since He returned to life His death couldn’t count for anything. I say they have never considered that in those Earth-measured days in the tomb, the Christ suffered more death than all of us mortal types combined, and anyone who thinks that doesn’t count for anything needs to think again.

I once read a book called something like “The God in Your Closet” that addressed how humans love to take God and tidy Him up and stick Him on the shelf with a label and description. One thing it talked about – which is probably why I remember it, since one of my favorite philosophy professors did as well – is that we have a penchant for thinking that because we can label something then we understand it. One result of that is that since God doesn’t fit well into a single (human) category we effectively chop our concept(s) of Him into bits that can fit on a file card we stick in a pigeon-hole – in the back of a closet where we feel content that He is there when we want Him.

Kind of a pessimistic book, but something all Christians ought to think about!

I firmly agree! [political comment not included]

Seems to fit what I once heard called a “covenantal libertarian”, the idea being that individuals can indeed surrender rights to a community, just not to a community so large it gets impersonal – and thus humanity would best live in groups generally no larger than five hundred.

  • When you and I get there, you’re going to be more surprised than me. I’d bet you, but neither of us will have money or pockets to put it in. :rofl:
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English suffers from a additional malady: except for professional technical terms, its vocabulary – and its grammar – is very imprecise compared to even Koine Greek.

My French has withered too far to even think about this well, but it sounds about right.

Consciousness is like gravity: we all recognize it, we are all certain we have it, we know its behavior – but we haven’t got the first clue what it actually is.

As Descartes himself subtly conceded, that is as far as pure reason can go! That statement is both a triumph of clear thinking and a cry of despair.

At least Ken Ham can be somewhat excused due to ignorance!

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Probably got this somewhere on this site … but worth re-posting here…

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  • Which became clear yesterday, when I explored NASB20’s, Hart’s, and Wright’s different translations of John 18:36, to wit:
    • ἀπεκρίθη Ἰησοῦς· ἡ βασιλεία ἡ ἐμὴ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου· εἰ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου ἦν ἡ βασιλεία ἡ ἐμή, οἱ ὑπηρέται οἱ ἐμοὶ ἠγωνίζοντο [ἂν] ἵνα μὴ παραδοθῶ τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις· νῦν δὲ ἡ βασιλεία ἡ ἐμὴ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐντεῦθεν.

    • Jesus answered, “My kingdom is not of this world. If My kingdom were of this world, then My servants would be fighting so that I would not be handed over to the Jews; but as it is, My kingdom is not of this realm.” (NASB20)

    • “My kingdom isn’t the sort that grows in this world,” replied Jesus. “If my kingdom were from this world, my supporters would have fought, to stop me being handed over to the Judaeans. So then, my kingdom is not the sort that comes from here.” (Wright)

    • Jesus answered, “My Kingdom is not of this cosmos; if my Kingdom were of this cosmos my subjects would have struggled so that I should not be handed over to the Judaeans; but as it happens my Kingdom is not from here.” (Hart)

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  • For fans of Greek:

κόσμος , ὁ,

A.order, κατὰ κόσμον in order, duly, “εὖ κατὰ κ.” Il.10.472, al.; οὐ κατὰ κ. shamefully, Od.8.179; “μὰψ ἀτὰρ οὐ κατὰ κ.” Il. 2.214: freq. in dat., κόσμῳ καθίζειν to sit in order, Od.13.77, cf. Hdt.8.67; “οὐ κ. . . ἐλευσόμεθα” Il.12.225; “κ. θεῖναι τὰ πάντα” Hdt.2.52, cf. 7.36, etc.; “διάθες τάδε κ.” Ar.Av.1331; κ. φέρειν bear becomingly, Pi.P.3.82; “δέξασθαί τινα κ.” A.Ag.521; “σὺν κόσμῳ” Hdt.8.86, Arist.Mu. 398b23; “ἐν κόσμῳ” Hp.Mul.1.3, Pl.Smp.223b; κόσμῳ οὐδενὶ κοσμηθέντες in no sort of order, Hdt.9.59; φεύγειν, ἀπιέναι οὐδενὶ κ., Id.3.13, 8.60.γ́, etc.; “ἀτάκτως καὶ οὐδενὶ κ.” Th.3.108, cf. A.Pers.400; οὐκέτι τὸν αὐτὸν κ. no longer in the same order, Hdt.9.66; οὐδένα κ. ib.65, 69; “ἦν δ᾽ οὐδεὶς κ. τῶν ποιουμένων” Th.3.77: generally, of things, natural order, “γίνεται τῶν τεταρταίων ἡ κατάστασις ἐκ τούτου τοῦ κ.” Hp. Prog.20.
2. good order, good behaviour, = κοσμιότης Phld.Mus. p.43 K.; discipline, D.18.216; “οὐ κ., ἀλλ᾽ ἀκοσμία” S.Fr.846.
3. form, fashion, “῞ιππου κόσμον ἄεισον δουρατέου” Od.8.492; “κ. ἐπέων ἀπατηλός” Parm.8.52; ἐξηγεομένων . . τὸν κ. αὐτοῦ the fashion of it, Hdt.3.22; κ. τόνδε . . ὁ καταστησάμενος who established this order or from, Id.1.99.
4. of states, order, government, “μεταστῆσαι τὸν κ.” Th. 4.76, cf. 8.48, 67; “μένειν ἐν τῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ κ.” 8.72, etc.; esp. of the Spartan constitution, Hdt.1.65, Clearch.3: pl., “πόλεων κόσμοι” Pl.Prt. 322c.
II. ornament, decoration, esp. of women, Il.14.187, Hes.Op. 76, Hdt.5.92.“ή; γυναικεῖος κ.” Pl.R.373c, etc.; of a horse, Il.4.145; of men, Hdt.3.123, A.Th.397, etc.; γλαυκόχροα κόσμον ἐλαίας, of an olive-wreath, Pi.O.3.13, cf. 8.83, P.2.10, etc.; “κ. κυνῶν” X.Cyn.6.1; “κ. καὶ ἔπιπλα” Lys.12.19; κ. ἀργυροῦς a service of plate, Ath.6.231b; “ἱερὸς κ.” OGI90.40 (Rosetta, ii B. C.): pl., ornaments, A.Ag.1271; “οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κ.” Isoc.2.32: metaph., of ornaments of speech, such as epithets, Id.9.9 (pl.), Arist.Rh.1408a14, Po.1457b2, 1458a33; ἁδυμελῆ κ. κελαδεῖν to sing sweet songs of praise, Pi.O.11 (10).13 (s.v.l.).
2. metaph., honour, credit, Id.N.2.8, I.6(5).69; κόσμον φέρει τινί it does one credit, Hdt.8.60, 142; “γύναι, γυναιξὶ κόσμον ἡ σιγὴ φέρει” S.Aj.293; “κ. τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐμοί” Ar.Nu.914; “οἷς κόσμος [ἐστὶ] καλῶς τοῦτο δρᾶν” Th.1.5; “ἐν κόσμῳ καὶ τιμῇ εἶναί τινι” D.60.36; of persons, “σὺ ἔμοιγε μέγιστος κ. ἔσει” X.Cyr.6.4.3; “ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κ. τις τῶν ἀρετῶν” Arist.EN 1124a1.
III. ruler, regulator, title of chief magistrate in Crete, SIG712.57, etc.; collectively, body of κόσμοι, ib.524.1; τοῦ κ. τοῖς πλίασι ib.527.74: also freq. in pl., ib.528.1, al., Arist.Pol.1272a6, Str.10.4.18, 22; cf. κόρμος.
IV. Philos., world-order, universe, first in Pythag., acc.to Placit.2.1.1, D.L.8.48 (cf. [Philol.]21), or Parm., acc. to Thphr. ap. D.L.l.c.; “κόσμον τόνδε οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ” Heraclit.30; “ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κ.” X.Mem.1.1.11: freq. in Pl., Grg.508a, Ti.27a, al.; “ἡ τοῦ ὅλου σύστασίς ἐστι κ. καὶ οὐρανός” Arist.Cael.280a21, cf. Epicur.Ep. 2p.37U., Chrysipp.Stoic.2.168, etc.; “ὁ κ. ζῷον ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικόν” Posidon. ap. D.L.7.139, cf. Pl.Ti.30b: sts. of the firmament, “γῆς ἁπάσης τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ κόσμῳ κειμένης” Isoc.4.179; “ὁ περὶ τὴν γῆν ὅλος κ.” Arist. Mete.339a20; μετελθεῖν εἰς τὸν ἀέναον κ., of death, OGI56.48 (Canopus, iii B. C.); but also, of earth, as opp. heaven, “ὁ ἐπιχθόνιος κ.” Herm. ap. Stob.1.49.44; or as opp. the underworld, “ὁ ἄνω κ.” Iamb.VP27.123; of any region of the universe, “ὁ μετάρσιος κ.” Herm. ap. Stob.1.49.44; of the sphere whose centre is the earth’s centre and radius the straight line joining earth and sun, Archim.Aren.4; of the sphere containing the fixed stars, Pl.Epin.987b: in pl., worlds, coexistent or successive, Anaximand. et alii ap.Placit.2.1.3, cf. Epicur.l.c.; also, of stars, “Νὺξ μεγάλων κ. κτεάτειρα” A.Ag.356 (anap.), cf. Heraclid.et Pythagorei ap.Placit.2.13.15 (= Orph.Fr.22); οἱ ἑπτὰ κ. the Seven planets, Corp.Herm.11.7.
2. metaph., microcosm, “ἄνθρωπος μικρὸς κ.” Democr. 34; “ἄνθρωπος βραχὺς κ.” Ph.2.155; of living beings in general, “τὸ ζῷον οἷον μικρόν τινα κ. εἶναί φασιν ἄνδρες παλαιοί” Gal.UP3.10.
3. in later Gr., = οἰκουμένη, the known or inhabited world, OGI458.40 (9 B.C.), Ep.Rom.1.8, etc.; ὁ τοῦ παντὸς κ. κύριος, of Nero, SIG814.31, cf. IGRom.4.982 (Samos); “ἐὰν τὸν κ. ὅλον κερδήσῃ” Ev.Matt.16.26.
4. men in general, “φανέρωσον σεαυτὸν τῷ κ.” Ev.Jo.7.4, cf. 12.19; esp. of the world as estranged from God by sin, ib.16.20, 17.9, al., 1 Ep.Cor. 1.21, etc.
5. οὗτος ὁ κ. this present world, i.e. earth, opp. heaven, Ev.Jo.13.1; regarded as the kingdom of evil, ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ κ. τούτου ib.12.31.
V. Pythag.name for six, Theol.Ar.37; for ten, ib.59.

IMO what Wright and Hart did there belongs in the notes in a study Bible or commentary, not in the text. I can see what they’re each doing, but think it’s commentary rather than translation.

Yowza. I haven’t delved into references as far back as that includes in a very long time!

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…Which all highlights the growing relative importance (for me) of what sort of over-arching narrative is a person deriving from scripture and creation - and how then does any particular verse or passage fit (or not!) into that narrative? Is a particular narrative obliged to ignore (or explain away) large swaths of what seemed to be Jesus’ and the apostles’ driving narratives? Or is it basically pretty faithful to the overall apostolic narrative with the exception of maybe some verses that then need explaining or don’t seem to fit well? Wright’s take on the scriptural narrative seems pretty compelling to me - Hart’s blanket dismissal notwithstanding. Yet Hart may have some good valid points and critiques about various things, lest anybody think that Wright has absolutely everything sewn up.

This isn’t to dismiss the importance of good and solid translation work that we’re all beneficiaries of. But commentary on all that work - and drawing out over-arching narratives from it are the “so what then…” for me that is a necessary next step - without which all such prior work would have only been done in vain.

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These words of Hart are quite traditional for the ancient, medieval, and early modern Christian theology; so it’s even difficult to understand why somebody would see anything controversial in these statements.
However, there is a tricky cultural context, which Hart seems to ignore: when our contemporaries discuss the personhood of God they often mean, “is God someone distinct from impersonal forces of nature, or not?”
In this context, the answer should be, IMHO, as plain and unambiguos as possible: God is not a person because God is the three persons. The Logos of God is personal enough for a human person, Jesus Christ, to be the embodiment of the said Logos; therefore, the internal, trinitarian relations of God are also fittingly described as interpersonal relations.

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  • Are you serious? What Christian denomination/sect, if any, are you affiliated with?
  • And which Greek Text do you, or your denomination/sect take as your standard?
  • Lot of luck with that.
  • IMO, there’s a huge difference between Hart’s “of this Cosmos” and Wright’s “from this world”.
    • For me, the “Cosmos” is a really big category, which includes all that is physical, seen and unseen. Wright’s “this world” is considerably more tentative/speculative or open to a reader’s personal choice, and ambiguous, and his choice of “from” allows him to take liberty–or exercise free will–in what I call “his paraphrase” of the New Testament, not to mention his “trinitarian” approach.
  • Notes:
    • Textual variants in the New Testament
    • Relevant (IMO) quote from Hart’s 11-page “Preface to the 2nd edition” of his translation.
      • "I had hoped to be able to read the texts without unwarranted presuppositions and free from the burden of feeling I must serve the interests of this or that orthodoxy. While I believe I succeeded in large part, I have since then come to realize I could have succeeded far better. We are all products of our pasts, and it is often much harder than we realize to shed the habits of thought and speech that are bred in the bone. In the first edition of this translation, there are still a number of verses that echo older English translations better than they disclose the contents of the original Greek. In many instances, the difference is quite consequential. In many others, it is less so, but is worth getting right even so.
    • Relevant quote from Hart’s 24-page “Introduction” to his translation:
      • For this translation I have worked from the so-called Critical Text, which is based on earlier and different manuscript sources (such as those of the Alexandrian Text-type), but I have also included a great many verses and phrases found only in the Majority Text (placing them in brackets to set them off from the Critical Text). I do this not because I accord the Majority Text equal authority—in many places it clearly represents later and usually dubious attempts to “improve” and harmonize the texts, by repairing lapses of sense, filling in lacunae, or discreetly effacing errors—but in order to give some idea of how fluid the textual transmission of Christian scripture was, and how impossible to reduce to a single version. Even here, I should also note, each of these text-types exists in differing forms, and I have accorded none of them absolute authority. When, therefore, the Majority Text is indicated, either by brackets or in a footnote, this does not mean that every version of the Byzantine Text concurs on the wording. There is no convenient way, simply said, to represent in any translation the sheer diversity of the textual evidence, or the absence of any single authoritative version upon which to rely. In the course of my work, though taking the most recent scholarship on the Critical Text as my guide, I consulted editions going as far back as the edition of Hort and Westcott from 1881 and as far forward as the current editions of the Nestle-Aland Novum Testamentum Graece (currently in its twenty-eighth edition) and The Greek New Testament of the United Bible Societies (currently in its fifth edition), as well as various reproductions of ancient manuscripts (to the degree that my meager palaeographic skills allowed). Where I found evidence of interesting textual variants, I recorded the fact in my footnotes. For this second edition of my translation, moreover, I have reinstated certain phrases that my earlier version did not include based on considerations I now regard as misguided, or at any rate insufficiently strong; most of these additions accord with the best modern scholarship Introduction regarding the best form of the Critical Text. So, for now at least, with the exception of a few places where I still demur from the current consensus on the Critical Text, my translation is more or less fully up to date. For the bracketed materials from the Majority Text, I consulted both The New Testament in the Original Greek According to the Byzantine/ Majority Textform of Maurice A. Robinson and William G. Pierpont, and The Greek New Testament According to the Majority Text edited by Zane C. Hodges and Arthur L. Farstad; but ultimately I relied on the official Patriarchal Text of the Greek Orthodox Church from 1904, as it seems to me the most representative of the Majority tradition. I have also enclosed a few other dubious words or passages within brackets in my translation, even if they appear in both the Critical and Majority Texts, to indicate where to my mind the most credible critical consensus identifies an interpolation; in each significant case, I explain my decision in a footnote. The result is that my version agrees with no other scholarly or devotional version perfectly, and that it—like every other, alas—is an attempt at an approximation to an ideal version of the text that in actuality we shall never be able to identify entirely.
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Gravity is something we’d notice more if it were taken away. Otherwise it is about as noticeable as water is to fish. But if consciousness were taken away we’d notice nothing at all. Experience would just cease. Experience of everything physical is filtered through perception and cognition, not all of which is conscious.

  • No doubt, we would notice some differences in our present circumstances, but change the circumstances and we might not notice any. For example, awake and alert, we notice the difference between falling down and falling up, i.e. ascension. But in a Near-Death Experience, when a person’s flesh-and-blood body is laying on an operating table, heavily anesthetized, and the person is acutely aware of floating above the body or passing through walls and into another realm, how noticeable is the gravity while they’re “moving”?
  • Think so?
  • A paramecium is, I’ve read, one of the smallest living animals. It’s unicellular,capable of moving with the aid of its cilia and has intake and outlet vacuoles which enable it to gobble up whatever it’s going to consume or expel whatever isn’t consumed. It surely has some degree of consciousness which enables it to distinguish between consumables and non-consumables, and to avoid amoebas that consume paramecium. Surely, a paramecium has a minimal amount of conscioussness, no?
  • What, if anything, would a body-less individual consciousness process by metabolism?
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I’ve always been - and I am - a Lutheran. Now, what does Hart say? He denies that “God is a
large psychological subjectivity … who goes through changes of temperament or makes choices or experiences pathos” - and this has been perfectly common for all Christian denominations with solid grounding in the patristic thought and medieval scholastics, including Lutheranism.

What I say is not a reappraisal produced by the liberal Lutheran theologians of the previous two centuries - this view is also shared by our fundamentalists.

Let me quote, for instance, the thoroughly fundamentalist book, which upholds even the doctrines of verbal inspiration and six 24-hour days of creation; it stems from the Missouri Synod and is still in use: Mueller, John Theodore. Christian Dogmatics: A Handbook of Doctrinal Theology St-Louis, Mo. 1934.

Like Franz Pieper, whose Christliche Dogmatik he was rendering, Mueller has closely followed the tradition of Lutheran scholastics.

So, he was very clear that, in the first place, divine properties are categorically different from anything we may call a property (e.g., a physical quality or a psychological trait) of a human person because in God there is no real distinction between essence and attributes.

When we describe human beings, we ascribe to them both a nature and attributes. Just so Holy Scripture, accommodating itself to the laws of human thought and speech, ordinarily speaks
of God as possessing both a divine essence and divine attributes. In other words, it speaks of God’s attributes, such as omnipotence, grace, love, etc., as inhering in the divine essence. Nevertheless
the attributes of God are not accidents ( accidentia), but His very divine essence, since God is absolutely simple in His divine Being … Of the divine attributes Gerhard writes (III, 84) : “The attributes exist inseparably in God; for as it is impossible that the essence of an object may be separated from the object itself, so also the attributes cannot be separated from God, since they are the very essence of God.” (Doctr. Theol., p. 122.) And Calov (II, 222): “1f the attributes really differed from the essence after the manner of accidents, a composition in God would be predicated.” (Ibid.) Our dogmaticians are therefore right in saying that "the divine attributes are distinguished from the divine essence, not really, but only according to our mode of conceiving” (Mueller 1934, 161).

That divine attributes are not really different from divine essence means that God is immutable; divine will is categorically different from human dispositions that will often change and succeed one another.

c. Divine immutability ( immutabilitas) is the attribute of God according to which He is liable to no change whatever, neither as to existence (Rom. 1, 23; 1 Tim. 1, 17; 6, 16) nor as to accidents
(Jas.l, 17) nor as to will or purpose (Num. 23, 19; Prov.19,21; Mal. 3, 6). If Holy Scripture ascribes to God change of mind (Gen. 6, 6; 1 Sam. 15, 11) or change of place (Gen. 11, 5), it does this in accommodation to our mode of perceiving” (Mueller 1934, 164).

This doesn’t mean, however, that scriptural references to divine feelings and the like are just the human words without anything real behind them. The standard interpretation of these fragments is that the writers of the Scripture speak analogically - divine will is not the same as human feelings and volitions but has something common with them; therefore, the human-related terms are analogically used to speak about God.

When treating the doctrine of the divine essence and attributes, the question has been debated: “In what sense are essence and attributes ascribed to God and to creatures?” The answer is: Not a) univocally (univoce), so that they belong to God and the creatures in precisely the same meaning, nor b) equivocally ( aequivoce), so that the attributes when used of God have an entirely different meaning than when they are used of creatures, but c) analogically ( analogice), so that the attributes ascribed to creatures bear an analogy, or resemblance, to the attributes of God; that is to say, the attributes belong rightly both to God and men, but not in the same manner nor in the same degree. When we say, “God lives, and man lives,” or, “God loves, and man loves,” we ascribe to God perfect, absolute, and independent life and love, but to man imperfect, relative, and dependent life and love. The same attributes which God has in Himself as His most perfect, divine essence man has from God as His free gifts, and not indeed as his essence, but as accidents, which may be lost.” (Mueller 1934: 161-162).

And now please compare the last quote with the words of Hart: “God is in fact infinitely personal. More personal than we are”. Here Hart makes the same distinction in the same manner - what God has infinitely, perfectly, and on his own, humans have only to some extent, imperfectly.

As for the standard Greek Text, it goes without saying that Luther, Melanchton, and the Formula of Concord authors had only the Textus Receptus. But they have not dogmatized the use of only this version. As far as I know, different Lutherans hold different opinions with regard to Nestle - Aland; but these attitudes are not a part of confessional standards.

As for translations of John 18:36 - surely, I’m not an expert in this. But, as far as I understand, the Greek word
κόσμος may be legitimately translated in more than one way.

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I find the NDE more interesting now than I used to but I think efforts to explain them mechanistically as hopeless as those which try to do the same for God or dreams or love. I don’t know what they are, how they work or what they mean though I’d find the meaning question more interesting than the first two.

Happy to concede that all life right on down to your paramecium friend and trees are conscious to some degree and in some manner, I might even wonder if inanimate objects might be an expression of divine consciousness.