Behe on why do some scientists still not accept intelligent design?

[mattconnally (Badger Ward)]

Okay, I’ll reply in the other stream…

[glipsnort (Steve Schaffner)]

@mattconnally

Schaffner and Venema, I’m so glad to hear that and I don’t doubt what you’re saying. I believe the majority are focused on their science and trying to avoid the fray. However, I can give you many more current-day quotes that may not be as brazen as Lewontin’s, but are definitely toeing the line with him. I’m a bit self-conscious that I’ve redirected this thread, but I think it’s safe to say that it started off talking about how Behe was biased in his science. And so I’m saying that, most definitely, the establishment (and most universities) are zealously biased in favor of metaphysical naturalism,

And I’m telling you, based on direct experience with hundreds of scientists and six or eight major research institutions, that I have never experienced any such bias, much less a zealous one.

@mattconnally

“Consciousness is a process generated by the hugely complex interactions of highly active cells within the brain and associated nervous tissue.” (p. 168)

I think I see the problem. What you’ve quoted isn’t a prior commitment to metaphysical naturalism – it’s an assumption (backed up with quite a lot of evidence) that a particular observable phenomenon is the product of material causes. As I said earlier, that’s what scientists do. Now, I quite agree with you that a purely materialistic, reductionist description of human thought is inadequate as a full description, but that doesn’t mean that there can’t be a materialistic description of thought or consciousness.

[mattconnally (Badger Ward)]

@glipsnort

but that doesn’t mean that there can’t be a materialistic description of thought or consciousness.

Actually, that’s exactly what it means. I assure you that you cannot find a theory as to how the physical brain can perceive nonphysical phenomena (like mathematics). The most common way to resolve the dilemma (which I think is the same thing as what they call “the hard problem of consciousness”) is just to say that our ability to do math and language is instinctive:

• The Language Instinct by Pinker.
• The Number Sense by Dehaene
• The Math Instinct by Devlin
• The Human Instinct by Miller
• The Consciousness Instinct, by Gazzaniga. (At the end of his book, he admits that his solution is “not very scientific”.)

But to call our ability to perceive numbers and words instinctive is an incredibly ironic answer. After all, instincts are things we do without thinking, so to say we can do math or language instinctively is like saying we can thinking without thinking!!! A laptop can instantly solve massively complex math equations and then give you the answer in one of a dozen languages because that’s what it’s programmed to do. My liver can do all kinds of complex chemistry because that’s what it’s programmed to do. But it would be incoherent to declare that either the laptop or the liver is actually thinking. By contrast, we ourselves cannot do such things without thinking very slowly and carefully. You cannot comprehend this sentence if you’re on autopilot. (And if you are on autopilot it’s because you’re thinking about something else!)

With apologies again for invading this stream, I’ve been encouraged to redirect it over to What Words Are Not. In the most recent post I summarized the answer of one leading neuroscientist, Stanislas Dehaene, in his book The Number Sense: How the Mind Creates Mathematics.

You know a couple of you questioned my motives in–in a gracious and appropriate manner–for making this argument. But I really don’t think this threatens evolutionary theory. (Although we couldn’t speculate on how an immaterial mind evolved, we can still accept all the theories about how the brain evolved.)

[glipsnort (Steve Schaffner)]

@mattconnally

Actually, that’s exactly what it means.

I believe you’re missing my point. I don’t believe a materialistic description is an adequate one, but I think it’s pretty clear that, however else may want to characterize it, thought occurs via physical processes in the brain. As far as we know, those physical processes involve ordinary chemistry and physics and can be described as such.

[rsewell (RON SEWELL)]

@mattconnally

I assure you that you cannot find a theory as to how the physical brain can perceive nonphysical phenomena (like mathematics).

You seem to have extrapolated your “words are non-physical” discussion to “We do not know what brains are for. We do know, however, what brains are not for. They are not for thinking.”

Brains can think. What more theory is required?

[mattconnally (Badger Ward)]

Oh okay, thanks for clarifying, Schaffner. Yes, we can certainly agree on that. And I might add that all of those books I listed were excellent reads–especially Pinker’s and Gazzainga’s–even though their conclusions got skewed by materialistic presuppositions.

[JeffSchloss]

WOW!!!
When I read Matthew’s introductory summary, saying that Behe claimed: “When Darwin first proposed his idea, many scientists were skeptical that his mechanism of random mutation and natural selection would work” – I thought Matthew had to be wrong. No way could Behe make such an absolutely unarguable and fundamental error: Darwin did not propose the mutation / section mechanism! Nobody had any idea of mutations or even (given the languishing of Mendel’s work) of genes! The m/s proposal of the synthetic theory didn’t arise for another century. Really an astounding error from anyone claiming to comment - critically or supportively - on evolutionary theory.