True, and my comment about the anti-supernaturalists was aimed more at the “vocal minority” of the scientific community, the aforementioned Coyne and his ilk. They are the atheist equivalent of Ken Ham on the Christian side. We do have to be careful about the “broad brush”
Returning to the discussion of methodological naturalism and the limits of science –
I was reading Wittgenstein last night and ran across these quotes that I thought you would find of interest:
“The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanation of natural phenomena. … Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past ages. And indeed both are right and both wrong. The view of the ancients is, however, decidedly clearer in that they acknowledge a clear terminus, while the modern system would make it look as if it explained everything.” (Tractatus 6.371 & 6.372)
His view, as discussed elsewhere, is that natural law is only a description of a regularity in nature. A “law” does not compel events to happen, nor can anything show that a natural law has to exist. I’m curious to hear your thoughts on the matter.
Jay
I love that quote (I have never read Wittgenstein but one of my good philosopher friends at Cambridge was a fan).
I was thinking only today (walking the dog, as usual the best source of inspiration) that though science is sometimes described as the study of the physical world, that is actually too grand a description. It studies only a restricted class of events in the physical world, and is really even getting beyond itself when it deals with contingency rather than (as you cite Wittgenstein) the regularity in nature.
And so when people say that science cannot study things like “meaning”, they sometimes restrict that to stuff like poetry or faith, forgetting that even the physical world has all kinds of layers of meaning with which science has no dealings. Final causation is excluded for convenience - but all too easily excluded in principle (“no design to be seen there - just random mutations” - as if efficient causes are an alternative to formal and final causes).
In short, as Joshua Swamidass and some others have conceded here, there is a need to recognise (which means, of course, spelling out) the limitations of science as an enterprise in the ascertaining of truth…
The problem lies in the start of Wittgenstein’s quote:"The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion…" If science has become the basis (as I think it has) of “the whole modern conception”, it’s not going to take lying down the idea that it’s just a small aspect of human knowledge, no higher than other forms. That, I think from experience, is as true of Christians with that “modern conception of the world” as the secularists for whom there is no God to relativise the scientific method.
I feel a Hump of the Camel post on the matter coming on!
The specific issue of the laws of nature is one I’ve already thought and written about. It really is, to the secularist, quite a problematic concept, for it began as a specifically Christian idea derived from Mosaic law (and intended, rightly or more probably wrongly, to make God the only teleological cause in nature, contra Aristotle), and therefore requires the laws to be “written” in the mind of God. Remove him from the picture, and its pretty unclear what they are, and why they should apply anywhere, let alone everywhere. I wrote somewhat on that here, if you’re interested.
Check out this article on Wittgenstein’s Forgotten Lesson by Ray Monk before you write that post. Personally, I think Wittgenstein’s thought is key to confronting the scientism of the modern world. Bertrand Russell thought Wittgenstein was the one to make philosophy a science, but Wittgenstein confounded his former mentor by doing the opposite. Fascinating story. If you want a short book to explain his ideas, How to Read Wittgenstein, also by Monk, is a good place to start.
From the description: At the root of Wittgenstein’s thought, Monk argues, is a determination to resist the scientism characteristic of our age, a determination to insist on the integrity and the autonomy of non-scientific forms of understanding. The kind of understanding we seek in philosophy, Wittgenstein tried to make clear, is similar to the kind we might seek of a person, a piece of music, or, indeed, of a poem.
Last quote: “My type of thinking is not wanted in this present age. I have to swim so strongly against the tide.”
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Well, there would be very strong criticism if the presenter offered no new data to support the hypothesis.
I have to second Dennis’s question: have you ever been to a scientific meeting?
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Which definition includes the NON-Darwinian mechanism of drift?
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I would think a far more effective (not to mention gracious) reply would be to simply highlight the part that you believe represents a hypothesis.
For example:
ID of translation. Empirical predictions:
- the translation of RNA requires tRNAs, of twenty different flavours, each matching one coding triplet to an amino acid (yours; false on multiple levels)
- the stopping of translation is essential (Biosemiosis’s; also false).
It’s not that complex and it works in both directions. Science is also a fine learning tool for learning about science itself.
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So are you saying that you see an actual hypothesis in what Jon wrote?
That’s the reason for my question! Your definition of “evolution” does not include drift. On what basis are you excluding it?
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I don’t see why you claim that it is Dennis’s job to show that your evidence-free attributions of behaviors to large groups of people are wrong. You’re supposed to look for, and present, evidence to support them before making the attribution.
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Yep. Reading actual papers (or even books), we find scientists are indeed open to identifying design in nature, and proposing ways that intelligent design in nature could be detected, including intelligent design by a supernatural being. It is recognized that a testable hypothesis for this could be made.
“As noted earlier, specific gods with particular attributes do imply specific predictions about what we should observe in the world- and these predictions can be empirically tested (e.g., Stenger2007a).”
Yonatan I. Fishman and Maarten Boudry, “Does Science Presuppose Naturalism (or Anything at All)?,” Science & Education 22, no. 5 (2013): 940.
Scientists would welcome such a hypothesis, and have in fact openly invited IDers to propose one.
“In principle, however, nothing prevents design proponents from trying to infer the attributes and intentions of the designer on the basis of his creations.
If God really designed the bacterial flagellum, wouldn’t we expect some telltale signs of his activity (some divine signature or moral message)?”
Yonatan I. Fishman and Maarten Boudry, “Does Science Presuppose Naturalism (or Anything at All)?,” Science & Education 22, no. 5 (2013): 942.
Yet IDers keep saying scientists have never made such statements, and that scientists would reject any such hypothesis regardless of its testability. This is the opposite of the truth.
“The reluctance of ID advocates to move beyond the ‘bare design’ hypothesis doesn’t alter the fact that it is possible to flesh out supernatural hypotheses to the point where they entail specific predictions about the world.”
Yonatan I. Fishman and Maarten Boudry, “Does Science Presuppose Naturalism (or Anything at All)?,” Science & Education 22, no. 5 (2013): 942.
So what is the real reason for “The reluctance of ID advocates to move beyond the ‘bare design’ hypothesis"?
Only they can tell us for certain.
I did reread it and my question remains unaddressed. You wrote,
Whether you gave a full list or not doesn’t seem relevant. Putting everything you wrote in context, according to your definitions ID as such is formally neutral when it comes to drift (aka neutral theory), since it is not included in your Darwinian or neo-Darwinian categories.
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