I thought you were indulging in some sort of joke.
These matters are discussed widely, but to be helpful, I have provided a quote from Wikipedia, and quotes from a paper titled “Eliminativism without tears” by Rosenberg, as indicators of this area. A humorous comment would be, “Natural selection has created an illusion of intentionality and purpose because it confers some survival aspects to us (humans)”. Stuff that is way out and not scientifically based, but more an article of faith (or such)!!!
“Eliminativism about a class of entities is the view that that class of entities does not exist. For example, materialism tends to be eliminativist about the soul; modern chemists are eliminativist about phlogiston; and modern physicists are eliminativist about the existence of luminiferous aether. Eliminative materialism is the relatively new (1960s–1970s) idea that certain classes of mental entities that common sense takes for granted, such as beliefs, desires, and the subjective sensation of pain, do not exist. The most common versions are eliminativism about propositional attitudes, as expressed by Paul and Patricia Churchland, and eliminativism about qualia (subjective interpretations about particular instances of subjective experience), as expressed by Daniel Dennett and Georges Rey. These philosophers often appeal to an introspection illusion.”
and
The most powerful philosophical argument for eliminativism that has emerged
over the last few decades is due to Darwin, and has been most visibly developed by Jerry
Fodor [1990, 2009], though not with an eliminativist agenda. Physicalist antireductionism needs an account of how a clump of matter, the brain
as a whole or more probably a “population” of thousands of neurons wired together into a
circuit, has unique propositional content. To do this it needs to show how a clump of
matter—a token neural circuit–can be about some other thing in the universe.
The best resource, perhaps physicalism’s only resource, for explaining how
intentionality emerges and what it consists in has to be Darwin’s theory of natural
selection. There is one huge reason for supposing so. Behavior, including verbal
behavior, that is putatively guided by intentional states is purposive, goal directed, it is
quintessentially a matter of means aimed at ends. Such purposive behavior inherits its
purposiveness from the brain states that drive it. It is why the intentionality of the noises
and the marks we make is derived from the original intentionality of neural circuits. But
there is only one physically possible process that builds and operates purposive systems
in nature: natural selection. That is why natural selection must have built and must
continually shape the intentional causes of purposive behavior. Accordingly, we should
look to Darwinian processes to provide a causal account of intentional content. That
makes teleosemantics an inevitable research program.
Any naturalistic, purely causal, non-semantic account of content will have to rely
on Darwinian natural selection to build neural states cable of having content. This is what
teleosemantics seeks to do. But that is exactly what a Darwinian process cannot do.
The whole point of Darwin’s theory is that in the creation of adaptations, nature is
not active, it’s passive.
And of course natural selection has
disposed organisms, in this case humans, to behave in ways very finely adapted to
exploiting the particular structural identity between components of the neural circuitry
and what it bears an informational relation to.