Why don’t you take that up with atheists?
Hi Daniel,
Evidence doesn’t magically gather and organize itself into a logically tractable shape.
The gathering of evidence requires a hypothesis to guide the collection of the evidence.
The organization of newly gathered evidence alongside existing evidence requires a catalog of existing evidence and a model, or theory, of how that evidence coheres.
To perform this process (gathering and organization of evidence) reliably requires a community of subject matter experts to peer review the work.
Finally, since an infinite number of models (invisible Martians, tin foil hats, leprechauns, etc.) can be used to explain anything, the community must apply the standard of parsimony to restrict the domain of possible models under consideration.
Would you agree with what I have outlined here, @Daniel_Fisher?
Best,
Chris
EDIT: An important note: what I have outlined here has a limit. It cannot speak to important questions of purpose, providence, or miracles. In other words, what I have outlined is an epistemological approach to data inside the boundary of what can be physically sensed, but it cannot address other questions outside of that boundary.
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when the very question i’m asking has to do with whether life as we have it is essentially miraculous, then yes, I’m afraid what you’ve outlined above sounds like it would be insufficient to address my very question.
Put another way, it is the certainly the case that some people have been convinced of Christianity because after examining the historical “evidence” about the resurrection, they ruled out any and every possible “natural” explanation, and concluded that this was in fact evidence of divine intervention. Was this legitimate, or ought we have recommended to these people that they ought not to have given up pursuing a natural explanation?
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Historical evidence had nothing whatsoever to do with my reasons for being Christian nor with the reasons of the vast majority of other Christians I have talked to.
Oops… you did say “some people.” I missed that.
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I think this is a problematic way of characterizing certain arguments for the resurrection.
It’s not about eliminating “natural” explanations (although it’s important to evaluate competing hypotheses) it’s about evaluating the evidence in a way consistent with historical inquiry.
The reason the resurrection hypothesis makes sense is because we are evaluating human testimony to events. The testimony of the first Christians is that Jesus was resurrected after having been crucified and buried. It is the Christians themselves who explained their experiences and interactions with Jesus as resurrection. There isn’t a gap argument, we are evaluating whether the first Christians convey reliable testimony. This is why it’s not different from other historical inquiries because ultimately we are discussing human testimony.
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True, I did only specify this was the case for some people… yet my general question could apply to the larger audience as well: Should any and all Christians refrain from attributing the resurrection to miraculous causes, instead preferring to pursue “natural explanations for how God governs natural phenomena”?
Yes, probably a poor way of saying it… I was trying to summarize the arguments that have been made, as i understood them, but i can appreciate the concern. Point still remains though that at some point, when someone accepts a miraculous resurrection, they lay aside the entirety of natural explanations as less satisfactory than the miraculous explanation.
I will say on the other side, it certainly is the habit of some I know to prefer any natural explanation to the “supernatural hypothesis.” which i find essentially indistinguishable from “methodological naturalism.”
So my bottom line remains… unless i am missing something, it seems those who accept the disciples’ account and are persuaded by the other reasons you mention have at some point laid aside methodological naturalism.
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If someone sees Methodological Naturalism as meaning we can’t accept the testimony of the early Christians because they involve claims of resurrection, then you are right. One of the primary aspects of historical inquiry into the resurrection is evaluating the reliability of the testimony provided by the first Christians. This is why a methodological naturalism that prevents one from accepting the testimony of the early Christians a priori is problematic.
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Most atheists, including myself, are just fine with “I don’t know” as an answer for the origin of the universe. Anyone who makes a positive claim about the origin of the universe is under the same burden of proof to support their claim, and that applies equally to theistic and non-theistic explanations. I have yet to see anything approaching compelling evidence for how the universe came about, so I am still firmly in the “I don’t know” camp.
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I appreciate your forthright statement here Daniel. You have touched on the fundamental issue.
It is not the habit of Christian scientists to regard methodological naturalism as The One True Epistemological MethodTM. Christian scientists, like Christians who perform nuclear engineering on submarines and Christians who repair automobiles, believe that the epistemological scope of MN does not–indeed cannot–address meaning, miracles, and purpose.
Meaning, miracles, and purpose are addressed by other epistemological methods such as historical inquiry. (I would also argue that faith and artistic expression are valid epistemological methods, but that is a topic that can be addressed in another thread.)
So …
When an atheist turns MN into an idol and makes false claims about it, is there a law that says I am required to accept those false claims? An atheist may claim that MN applies to miracles; does that imply that I am required to simply accept the atheist claims and therefore abandon MN as a way to perform scientific inquiries?
Or is it possible for me as a Christian to reply, “Methodological naturalism is a valid epistemology for understanding natural history and scientific matters. However, for MN to be valid, we have to respect its limits. This means that we should use other epistemologies such as historical inquiry to examine the Bible’s claim of miracles.”
What do you think, @Daniel_Fisher?
Best,
Chris
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i think this is getting at the crux of my complaint, precisely well. While i’m not sure i would state it that way, I think this far we could potentially agree:
for strictly natural phenomena, methodological naturalism is a valid epistemology for understanding these matters.
thus far, i think i could be in essential agreement, though i might quibble on the details.
But when I ask the question, “is such and such certain biological phenomenon in fact natural, or is it the result of intelligently guided process…
At that point, for someone to invoke methodological naturalism is to beg the question; to assume the conclusion; to make an a priori judgment. “Of course that phenomenon is natural,” i am told, “because science can only study what is natural….”
or put another way… you would reject using MN regarding biblical miracles, it sounds. your atheist scientist would object and say he “is” doing “science,” and so MN does apply to historic investigations of miraculous claims. but you would (rightly) observe that the very question at hand is whether or not the resurrection (for instance) is or isn’t natural… you would recognize it as begging the question for your atheist to apply methodological naturalism to a phenomena that you believe to have not been “natural.
the crux of my core question, is essentially… are certain features of biological life (essentially) miraculous, resulting from direct divine intervention, or are they explicable as the result of natural forces.
In the same way you would object MN applying to biblical miracles, i would reject MN as applying to (potential) miracles that God (may) have done at the beginning of, or during the history of, biological life.
The points I’m after are these: first, we are all required now to recognize that it had a cause which by definition was infinite, eternal and immaterial (even if we don’t want to attempt further characterization). And secondly for those who want to engage with it, in the category of Big Bang causes, the multiverse is a God alternative. Physicist Bernard Carr stated, “If you don’t want God, you better have a
multiverse.”
I don’t see why the cause had to be infinite, eternal, or immaterial. Clouds have a beginning, but no one thinks they are caused by an infinite, eternal, and immaterial process.
I would need to see evidence either way.
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I agree. But I need to add a very important point here:
I (like you) believe the Scriptures to be God’s divine revelation to humanity. That direct revelation gives me a basis for believing in the healing of Bartimaeus, the resurrection of Lazarus, and the resurrection of Jesus. Add to that the the availability of historical inquiry. We now have two epistemological methods (faith and historical inquiry) to reach the conclusion that those miracles happened.
Let’s take an example of a common ID assertion, namely, that the appearance of new phyla in the Cambrian involved the direct, miraculous intervention of an intelligent designer rather than the processes of evolution.
Contrast the new Cambrian phyla with the raising of Lazarus:
| Epistemological Method | Mentioned in Bible? | Available in oral or written history? |
|---|---|---|
| Raising of Lazarus | YES | YES |
| New Cambrian phyla | NO | NO |
So we have no epistemological basis to contend for an ID explanation of the appearance of new phyla in the Cambrian.
Consequently, we have no reason to investigate or expect a miracle-based explanation of Cambrian phyla, just as we have no reason to investigate or expect a miracle-based explanation of earthquakes along the San Andreas Fault or a miracle-based explanation of the earth’s elliptical orbit around the Sun.
Best,
Chris
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One common argument from ID is that some people claim that the solution to bringing evolution and Christianity together is a rather deistic one. But the fact that some hold that view is no proof that it is integral to EC, just as it would be unfair to claim that belief in Rev. Moon as the messiah or throwing parades with inadequately clothed women are integral to ID merely because some ID advocates do so (Jonathan Wells and the Raelians, respectively). In reality, the Biblical picture is that we should expect God to use ordinary means most of the time. In claiming that EC is deistic, it is the ID advocate who is saying that God is not involved in events that happen according to natural laws. But the Bible has several warnings against expecting miracles. “Jump off the Temple-God will protect you” was not good advice. Those who are seeking signs are criticized at various points. Of course, miracles do occur on occasion, but it is their rarity that makes them notable. Even when they occur, they seem to be minimized. Water turned to wine had to be carried and served in the ordinary manner; the retrieved axe head had to be fastened on better; after feeding the crowds, the leftovers were carefully saved; etc. The label of “sign” highlights the fact that biblical miracles are specifically for the purpose of pointing to God, not for mere convenience. As ID sometimes admits, the type of signs they are seeking would not point specifically to God as opposed to Zeus or Baal or advanced aliens from another planet or whatever. We are being less faithful to claim that “I’m trusting God to miraculously transport me to church if He really wants me there” than if we get out of bed, get ready, and go to church using the assumption that natural laws are in effect. “Methodological naturalism” is a bad name for the assumption that God’s ordinary ways of directing creation are in effect. Of course, if a natural-law based explanation runs into difficulty, then it is quite reasonable to suggest that some other factor may be at work in a particular situation. However, science generally can’t handle other factors, and some other way of investigation would be necessary.
What we call our finite universe (vast but not infinite) had a beginning which is beyond it. That context is “not finite.” The word typically used is infinite. Time had a beginning, and what is outside of it we call eternal. Matter first coalesced in the universe from energy put there from something that was “not matter” or immaterial.
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Why can’t the region beyond the beginning of our universe also be finite?
Then I call the region before the beginning of our universe not eternal. Problem fixed.
So you are defining energy as immaterial?
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C’mon, man! You’re just playing games with the words. To give birth to a finite, temporal (time-bounded), material universe requires something that is “larger” in each of those dimensions. Come up with better words if you like, but don’t just deny it.
But whatever words you use, if intentionality and intelligence are part of it, it’s a god, but if not it’s some kind of multiverse that gives birth to universes, and that multiverse is effectively infinite and eternal. I think the assumption among multiverse theorists is that it would also not be of the type of matter with which we are familiar (which only works here because of the laws within our universe). I like the word “immaterial” (partly because it irritates atheists, I confess) and I’ll entertain alternatives, but please don’t just deny it all.
Does it? Isn’t what @T_aquaticus is doing point out that we don’t really know? That we might as well come up with multiverses, gods, or more stuff whatever it may be. They all have the same justification which isn’t much.