And if that is your definition of violation of the principle “always and everywhere”, then even Nicaea would fall.
Justin Martyre, dialogue with Tripho, 56 CHURCH FATHERS: Dialogue with Trypho, Chapters 55-68 (Justin Martyr) : “Justin: I shall attempt to persuade you, since you have understood the Scriptures , [of the truth] of what I say, that there is, and that there is said to be, another God and Lord subject to the Maker of all things; who is also called an Angel, because He announces to men whatsoever the Maker of all things— above whom there is no other God — wishes to announce to them.
Theophilus of Antioch, in Ad Autolycum II, 22 NEW ADVENT: Home “But when God wished to make all that He determined on, He begot this Word, uttered, the first-born of all creation, not Himself being emptied of the Word [Reason], but having begotten Reason, and always conversing with His Reason. And hence the holy writings teach us, and all the spirit-bearing [inspired] men, one of whom, John, says, In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, John 1:1 showing that at first God was alone, and the Word in Him. “
Obviously Nicaea didn’t condemn Theophilus and Justin as persons, since they are pre-Nicene authors; rather, some of their formulations, when read in light of the dogmatic standard established by Nicaea, turn out to be incompatible with Nicene faith.
The Nicene standard is this: the Son is “begotten from the Father… true God from true God… begotten, not made… of one substance with the Father.” And the council anathematizes those who say: “There was when He was not,” “Before being begotten He was not,” or that the Son is created.
As I’ve shown, in Ad Autolycum II, 22, Theophilus says that the Logos exists within God and then adds that, when God decided to create, He begot and uttered this Word, the first-born of all creation. Therefore, the problem in relation to Nicaea is not that Theophilus denies every kind of pre-existence of the Logos; as a matter of fact, he doesn’t deny it, the problem is that, if the Son as a distinct reality is “begotten” or “uttered” when God decides to create, then the distinct sonship of the Son is linked to the act of creation. In other words, this means that God eternally has the Word and Wisdom within Himself, but generates them for the purpose of creation. In light of Nicaea, this becomes erroneous if it means that the Son, as a distinct subject, is not eternally Son, because Nicaea explicitly rejects the claim: “Before being begotten He was not.”
Put sharply: Theophilus’ Nicene error wouldn’t consist in saying that the Logos was totally absent before creation, for he doesn’t say that, but in conceiving the Son as brought forth for creation, rather than as eternally begotten from the Father.
As for Justin Martyre in Dialogue with Trypho 56, as noted, Justin speaks of Christ as “another God and Lord subject to the Maker of all things,” and says that He is distinct from the Father “numerically… not in will.” Even in this case we have the problem that in Justin the “generation” of the Logos doesn’t indicate His ultimate origin within the being of God, but rather His putting-forth or emission for the purposes of creation and revelation, conditioned by the Father’s will. Not to mention that he speaks of the Logos as “another God”. Here, in relation to Nicaea, the problem is not the distinction between Father and Son as such (Nicaea presupposes that distinction) but the fact that this distinction is expressed in terms that suggest an ontological secondariness: a God who is “other,” subordinate, and secondary in relation to the Father. That clashes with the Nicene confession of the Son as “true God from true God” and “of one substance with the Father.”
The point toward which my argument tends is, in fact, quite straightforward: if weight is to be placed on the fact that a very small minority of the Fathers espoused erroneous views concerning the punishment of the damned (together with demons, since apokatastasis implied the eventual restoration of the fallen angels as well), then the existence of Fathers such as Justin Martyr and Theophilus of Antioch would, by the same logic invoked against my appeal to the Second Council of Constantinople against both annihiliationism and universalism, appear sufficient to show that the dogmas of Nicaea were not believed “always and everywhere”, and that the authority of that council could, on those grounds, likewise be contested.
Your objection doesn’t really work, for two reasons.
Most importantly, the earliest Church plainly did deliberate corporately on doctrinal disputes. Acts 15: there the apostles and elders gather to consider the controversy over the Gentiles, there is substantial debate, Peter speaks, James gives judgment, and the final decision is issued in the name of the Church with the words: “It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us.” That is unmistakably a conciliar and authoritative apostolic determination of a disputed doctrinal matter.
Secondly, Vincent of Lérins (which you quoted with “always and everywhere” in an attempt to undermine the catholicity of Constantinople II) doesn’t mean a mathematically exceptionless unanimity when he speaks of what has been believed “always and everywhere”.
In fact, in the Commonitorium, he immediately glosses this rule as universality, antiquity, and consent, and he defines consent as the agreement of “all, or at least almost all, priests and doctors.” That distinction is very important and was absent in your reply. If what you wrote in your reply were correct, then the mere existence of some Fathers who rejected Constantinople II would indeed suffice to show that the anathemas of that council could be disregarded, and that the doctrines defined there were not promulgated with the a binding authority. That is precisely the conclusion I refuted by showing that some Fathers likewise held erroneous doctrines concerning the nature of God, which obviously didn’t render Nicaea any less binding or any less doctrinally true. In other words, the existence of a small number of erroneous Fathers doesn’t by itself invalidate the catholicity of a doctrine.
So, the mere fact that a small minority among the early Fathers employed formulations, and held doctrines, later judged heretical by Nicaea, Constantinople II, and, subsequently, the Fourth Lateran Council, doesn’t prove that either Nicaea or Constantinople II violated catholicity.
Let me cite his (of Vincent of Lerins, which you tried to cite against the Church) verbatim words
Commonitorium, chapter 2 paragraph 6: “Moreover, in the Catholich Church itself, all possible care must be taken, that we hold that faith which has been believed everywhere, always, by all. For that is truly and in the strictest sense Catholic*,* which, as the name itself and the reason of the thing declare, comprehends all universally. This rule we shall observe if we follow universality, antiquity, consent. We shall follow universality if we confess that one faith true to be, which the whole Church throughout the world confesses; antiquity, if we in no wise depart from those interpretations which it is manifest were notoriously held by our holy ancestors and fathers; consent, in like manner, if in antiquity itself we adhere to the consentient definitions and determinations of all, or at the least of almost all priests and doctors.”
Again from the Commonitorium, chapter 3, paragraphs 7/8: “What then will a Catholic Christian do, if a small portion of the Church have cut itself off from the communion of the universal faith? What, surely, but prefer the soundness of the whole body to the unsoundness of a pestilent and corrupt member? What, if some novel contagion seek to infect not merely an insignificant portion of the Church, but the whole? Then it will be his care to cleave to antiquity, which at this day cannot possibly be seduced by any fraud of novelty.
But what, if in antiquity itself there be found error on the part of two or three men, or at any rate of a city or even of a province? Then it will be his care by all means, to prefer the decrees, if such there be, of an ancient General Council to the rashness and ignorance of a few.”