@ThomasJayOord:
I find it odd that you call Polkinghorne’s theology “classical.” He denies the classical view of God’s relation to time, denies the classical view of omniscience, denies the classical view of simplicity, denies Calvinist/Augustinian views of predestination and election, denies Thomistic views of primary and secondarily causality, denies classical views of eschatology, affirms kenotic Christology, etc
Well, partly this depends on which aspects of his thought we are prioritizing, doesn’t it? For example, while predestination and election are not trivial matters, they are irrelevant sideshows if the “Big Three” aren’t upheld—creation, Resurrection, and eschatology. (I don’t agree with you on eschatology, so perhaps you mean something different by “classical views of eschatology.”) I always focus on the Big Three first, before looking elsewhere, when assessing a Christian theologian’s thought. In John’s case, he’s absolutely orthodox on all three: creatio ex nihilo, the bodily resurrection, and the re-embodiment of the saints in God’s presence in the new heaven and earth. (In other words, he doesn’t spiritualize the Resurrection of Jesus or the resurrection of the dead. Like Tom Wright, he’s wonderfully orthodox.) And, zillions of orthodox theologians have not been Calvinists. As for divine simplicity, many theologians vary considerably on that; even William Lane Craig has reservations about certain ways of stating it. He’s not a Thomist, but lots of orthodox theologians aren’t either.
Can you cite a reference to support your claim that Polkinghorne believes God voluntarily chooses not to know the future? I don’t believe you are correct. To be capable of determining the outcome of an event is not the same as voluntarily choosing not to know the future exhaustively.
Ted: Certainly, I’ll cite two—as found in your edition (below) on pp. 124 and 136.
“If the physical universe is one of true becoming, with the future not yet formed and existing, and if God knows that world in its temporality, then that seems to me to imply that God cannot yet know the future. This is no imperfection in the divine nature, for the future is not yet there to be known. Involved in the act of creation, in the letting-be of the truly other, is not only a kenosis of divine power but also a kenosis of divine knowledge. Omniscience is self-limited by God in the creation of an open world of becoming.”
[Speaking of God’s acceptance of temporality in God’s creation and God’s relationship to it, this] “does not subvert the orthodox Christian distinction between the Creator and creation, since divine temporal polarity can be understood as a form of relationship to creatures freely accepted by God as part of the process of creation, and not simply imposed upon the divine nature. … This restriction would be understood theologically as being kenotic, a chosen self-limitation on the part of the Creator in bringing into being an intrinsically temporal creation.”
Note the final sentence in each passage! Perhaps I’m misinterpreting him, Tom—though he’s usually quite lucid, John can sometimes be a bit obscure. I think he’s saying in both places that God chooses not to have absolute omniscience relative to this creation, and in light of the undeniable fact that John affirms creatio ex nihilo, I think we can confidently say that God chose to create a specific creation, of which God would not have absolute omniscience. God was not bound to do that, since the whole creative act was free—not merely the existence of creation, but the specific nature of it and God’s relationship to it as well. Do you agree with my analysis here?
May I recommend The Polkinghorne Reader, which I edited?
Ted: You certainly may. And you did a fine job of it, Tom. I’ve used it a few times in a course, though not presently since I’m not teaching that one any more. In fact it’s the source of the quotes I’ve just given. I know that you know John pretty well, probably better than I do though I’ve had occasions to talk to him privately at length, especially when he spent four days on my campus a number of years ago. I’ve also taught students from three of his books and have read maybe half of the others. So I know many of his ideas very well and like most of them a great deal.
Best,
Ted