The first problem is that your hypothesis needs a null hypothesis, the conditions under which a prophecy is false. You also need a statistical model to determine if random chance would fulfill prophecy as well as the observations (e.g. Student t test). From what I have seen, prophecies are retroactively interpreted to fit an event that has already happened.[quote=“jstump, post:5, topic:37369”]
And there is no governing body that can determine definitively who is right and wrong in their attributions of “science” to any particular activity.
That is true. Scientists tend to dislike authority. At the end of the day, scientists accept a theory if it works. That is, if a theory continues to make new, independent, and accurate predictions they continue to use it. It is much more about pragmatism than a need for authoritative statements.
As a whole, I tend to agree with Weinberg on this subject.
"The value today of philosophy to physics seems to me to be something like the value of early nation-states to their peoples. It is only a small exaggeration to say that, until the introduction of the post office, the chief service of nationstates was to protect their peoples from other nation-states. The insights of philosophers have occasionally benefited physicists, but generally in a negative fashion—by protecting them from the preconceptions of other philosophers. I do not want to draw the lesson here that physics is best done without preconceptions. At any one moment there are so many things that might be done, so many accepted principles that might be challenged, that without some guidance from our preconceptions one could do nothing at all. It is just that philosophical principles have not generally provided us with the right preconceptions. In our hunt for the final theory, physicists are more like hounds than hawks; we have become good at sniffing around on the ground for traces of the beauty we expect in the laws of nature, but we do not seem to be able to see the path to the truth from the heights of philosophy. Physicists do of course carry around with them a working philosophy. For most of us, it is a rough-and-ready realism, a belief in the objective reality of the ingredients of our scientific theories. But this has been learned through the experience of scientific research and rarely from the teachings of philosophers. This is not to deny all value to philosophy, much of which has nothing to do with science. I do not even mean to deny all value to the philosophy of science, which at its best seems to me a pleasing gloss on the history and discoveries of science. But we should not expect it to provide today’s scientists with any useful guidance about how to go about their work or about what they are likely to find…"–Steven Weinberg, “Dreams of a Final Theory”