Here you go, @Klax. Here is an extended quote in defense of metaphor and mythos. I pray that it will reach you. 
So I was finally plodding through the 8th chapter of Iain McGilchrist’s book The Master and His Emissary when it finally became interesting beginning with this passage from Plato’s republic:
The stars that decorate the sky, though we rightly regard them as the finest and most perfect of visible things, are far inferior, just because they are visible, to the true realities; that is, to the true velocities, in pure numbers and perfect figures, of the orbits and what they carry in them, which are perceptible to reason and thought but not visible to the eye … We shall therefore treat astronomy, like geometry, as setting us problems for solution, and ignore the visible heavens, if we want to make a genuine study of the subject …
About this McGilchrist says,
This separation of the absolute and eternal, which can be known by logos (reason), from the purely phenomenological, which is now seen as inferior, leaves an indelible stamp on the history on Western philosophy for the subsequent two thousand years.
The reliance on reason downgrades not just the testimony of the senses, but all our implicit knowledge. This was the grounds of Nietzsche’s view that Socrates, far from being the hero of our culture, was its first degenerate, because Socrates had lost the ability of the nobles to trust intuition: 'Honest men, he wrote, ‘do not carry their reasons exposed in this fashion’. Degeneration, by this account, begins relatively late in Greece, with Plato, and involves the inability to trust what is implicit or intuitive. ‘What must first be proved is worth little’, Nietzsche continues in The Twilight of the Idols:
one chooses dialectic only when one has no other means. One knows that one arouses mistrust with it, that it is not very persuasive. Nothing is easier to erase than a dialectical effect: the experience of every meeting at which there are speeches made.
With the loss of the power of intuition,
rationality was then hit upon as the savior; neither Socrates nor his ‘patients’ had any choice about being rational; it was de rigueur, it was their last resort. The fanaticism with which the Greek reflection throws itself upon rationality betrays a desperate situation; there was danger, there was but one choice: either to perish or - become absurdly rational.
It is my impression that most new atheist advocates and Christian apologists are guilty of absurd rationality. In defense of Nietzsche’s case, McGilchrist goes on cite the neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp,
Although language is the only way we can scientifically bridge the chasm between mind and brain, we should always remember that we humans are creatures that can be deceived as easily by logical rigour as by blind faith … It is possible that some of the fuzzier concepts of folk-psychology may lead us to a more fruitful understanding of the integrative functions of the brain than the rigorous, but constrained, language of visually observable behavioral acts
Finally, @Klax, after perhaps too much prelude, this I think is what made me think of you. But note that in what follows, I’ve inserted * a phrase in this last quote from McGilchrist from earlier in this passage, to avoid his hemispheric terminology which turns so many people off.
> In this later Greek world, truth becomes something proved by argument. The importance of another, ultimately more powerful, revealer of truth, metaphor, is forgotten; and metaphor, in another clever inversion, comes to be a lie, though perhaps a pretty one. So the statement of truth contained in myth become discounted as ‘fictions’, that is to say untruths or lies - since, [to the “absurdly rational”]*, metaphor is no more than this.