Oh I think there can be much meaning that slips by me and by extension any one individual as well. But I don’t take my own experience as the authoritative measure of what is meaningful. There can be a poem or painting or a play that just doesn’t ignite anything in me and yet they may have meaning for others. Furthermore there can be meaning which I sense in something but can’t put my finger on. Meaning can be directly apprehended before you understand the basis or are in any position to defend, explain or elaborate on.
People have two natures. Only one of them is primarily rational. In fact the other is more essential for human flourishing even though you can never reduce it to something simple enough to argue for successfully to anyone no matter their interest or receptivity. Religious meaning is in that boat. It isn’t simple enough to model with an equation or test in a lab or make a rational argument for. Now I’m not a one tradition sort of guy and I find attempts to ‘prove’ the unique adequacy of any one tradition tedious. But I don’t conclude from that they have no intrinsic meaning or value to those who say they find meaning there. But I know what it’s like to find oneself buoyed by non rational truths which resist simple explanation. Many philosophic and literary truths are in the same boat. You can only recognize such truths with sufficient familiarity with the necessary traditions and practices. Does that mean one must cultivate familiarity with all such things in order to determine which truths are most important? Of course not. Why assume there is any single gradient by which all human truths can be measured? The thing is we ourselves are the measure of what has meaning for us but it would be silly to insist that only what can be measured and verified by objective standards can even be considered. I know you have aesthetic tastes and interests so must already know this. Just because YEC presents itself as bad science doesn’t mean that anything concerned with theology or the sacred must be equally tainted. That would be a category error.
I was reading something related in Iain McGilchrist’s newest book, The Matter With Things, which I share here not because I think his name should carry special authority. Rather I just find his explanations more eloquent and I find this part at least rings true in my experience.
No-one expects me to say how I know that my understanding of Hamlet is more or less true, either. As a critic of Hamlet I state what I see: people either ‘click’ with what I say – get an insight from it – or don’t. They either feel that I (and now they) know more about Hamlet, or they don’t. This is not to give a single crumb of comfort to the ‘my view is as good as yours’ types. There are, very clearly, better and worse interpretations.
I believe philosophy is like that. With the best will in the world, on both sides, I can’t make you see what I experience as the truth. I can never convince you of a point of view unless you already, at some level, get it. As Friedrich Waismann put it,
We cannot constrain anyone who is unwilling to follow the new direction of a question; we can only extend the field of vision of the asker, loosen his prejudices, guide his gaze in a new direction: but all this can be achieved only with his consent.
The truth is not arrived at ultimately by argument alone, though discussion plays a valuable role along the way in dispelling misconceptions … : in the end every individual must choose what carries conviction, commands allegiance. The experience of understanding involves a shift from what seems initially chaotic or formless, to a coherent stable form or picture, a Gestalt – or from an existing Gestalt to a new and better one, that seems richer than the one it replaces.
Edited to draw @Kendel over to see I have begun to learn to share highlights from my Kindle and might be able to pass that on if you’re interested.