Chris
I don’t think your appeal to the history of determinism really holds water (though it admittedly holds more than Gershwin’s appeal to the discredited myth of the mediaeval flat earth in his first line). Since we’re treating Gershwin as an authority, though, It might be intereing, too, in the interest of accuracy in such an importamnt matter as the nature of reality, to check out the historical truth of his claims about Edison, the Wrights Marconi, et al… it could be that by overegging the historical skepticism, he’s over-optimistic about the soundness of modern ideas and the ignorance of the old.
And that’s before unpicking how there could be any possible relevance of “free will” to the discussion of alleged ontologically random events in nature. Free will has to do with the freedom for rational beings to determine matters - chance events restrict freedom, rather than being a manifestation of it. And determining things is freedom.
Regarding the history of determinism, there was indeed an almost universal consensus amongst Christians (as amongst many of the Jews) from the earliest days that God’s providence in some way governs all events, yet in keeping with human freedom. As far as creation went, the world was the world God made, in which we are privileged to exist. If Acts 17.24 reflects an outdated belief in determinism, there are good reasons to question the validity of its replacement.
But God’s government was always seen as the personal supervision of a king or householder, not as the implacable outworking of a mechanistic nature. Determinism as a scientific concept is a relative latecomer, and of course is exemplified in the Enlightenment mechanical philosophy which, because it couldn’t make room for God, either elevated him to a Deistic clockmaker or dispensed with him as an unnecessary hypothesis.
It is only that philosophy that is threatened by chaos theory and quantum theory. The former, to the majority of scientists, holds that chaos is actually lawlike, but unknowable to us because of the limits of measurement. On that basis God, lacking such human limitations, would know just as much as in a Laplacian universe - but even if he did not, having freedom and power to determine events he would be quite able to determine outcomes.
Chaotic “chance” events were well-known in ancient times, despite the lack of chaos theory: a cast lot could go either way, except that its every decision was from the Lord. Aquinas discussed the interaction of chance and providence at length… including Eddie’s point that providence must cover both individual events and generalities or have no meaning.
If God cannot design anteaters, he cannot answer my prayers. If he is not concerned with molecular outcomes, then large scale change will be undirected as well.
Therefore chaos theory, as science, has nothing to say against divine providence. In fact it has no bearing on it whatsoever.
Quantum theory, assuming the majority are right about the absence of hidden variables, merely says that there are no physical efficient causes in nature that determine the outcomes of quantum events. But divine action was never constrained to physical efficient causes, until the Enlightenment thinkers implied God was bound by what they decided were his “laws”. Quantum events are not uncaused (if they were, no statistical maths could handle them and half-lives would be indeterminate). If there are, indeed, no secondary causes for them, then they are, by deduction, directly the result of the First Cause of all things.
To postulate some other determining cause of events, apart from God, in the form of ontological randomness (or “the autonomy of nature”, if one prefers incoherent and misleading terms) is not a scientific necessity, but a theological preference in the face of Scriptural revelation - and one that raises far, far more questions than it solves.
I can’t cite the authority of a Gershwin song, I’m afraid, but Asa Gray had somewhat to say on the matter in response to Darwin:
So the issue between the skeptic and the theist is only the old one, long ago argued out — namely, whether organic Nature is a result of design or of chance. Variation and natural selection open no third alternative; they concern only the question how the results, whether fortuitous or designed, may have been brought about. Organic Nature abounds with unmistakable and irresistible indications of design, and, being a connected and consistent system, this evidence carries the implication of design throughout the whole [my italics]. On the other hand, chance carries no probabilities with it, can never be developed into a consistent system, but, when applied to the explanation of orderly or beneficial results, heaps up improbabilities at every step beyond all computation. To us, a fortuitous Cosmos is simply inconceivable. The alternative is a designed Cosmos.